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PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS AND THE BENEFITS OF SPECIALISATION - NORDIC 
EVIDENCE PRE AND DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The private equity market has had two distinct waves, first in the 1980s and second in 
the late 2000s. The first wave and the beginning of the second have been extensively 
studied, however, due to data availability issues the complete second wave has not yet 
been studied. Also, while the determinants of private equity performance as well as 
specialisation have received attention in the literature, the Nordic markets have been 
left untouched. This paper will be able to contribute to the literature in four distinct 
areas: first by covering whole time period of the latest wave of buyouts, second by 
shedding light on private equity performance over the financial crisis, third probing 
further in the specialisation advantages of private equity firms and fourth providing 
more evidence on the Nordic markets which are one of the most active buyout markets 
in Europe and still not yet have enjoyed much attention in the literature.  
DATA 
This paper studies 127 private equity backed buyouts and their corresponding peers 
with complete operational data available in Nordic (Finland, Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark) countries. The data contains all buyouts completed within the time frame of 
2003-2007 as well as operational data for three years post-buyout, or until the exit. The 
effect of sample selection bias is estimated with an additional of 66 buyouts and the 
peers without complete operational data. The hand-collected peer group is matched by 
industry, size and geography.  
RESULTS 
This study has four key findings in Nordic private equity buyouts during the latest wave 
of buyouts and over the recession. First, private equity firms are able to outperform their 
peer companies in sales growth and profitability. Second, PE firm specialisation on 
industries or stages both drive higher performance for sales growth and profitability, 
where stage specialisation may have an advantage in the latter. Third, under pre-crisis 
economic conditions private equity backed buyout operating performance is comparable 
to peers on average. However, under crisis conditions private equity firms are able to 
maintain the performance of the portfolio companies thus creating clear difference to 
that of the peers. Specialisation seems to have an advantage during more difficult 
economic conditions compared to peer companies. And lastly, private equity firm 
performance across all stages and industries does not seem to largely differ across time 
periods. 
KEYWORDS 
Private equity, leveraged buyouts, specialisation   
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PÄÄOMASIJOITTAMINEN JA ERIKOISTUMISHYÖDYT POHJOISMAISSA ENNEN 
RAIHOITUSKRIISIÄ JA KRIISIN AIKANA 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Pääomasijoitusmarkkinoilla on ollut kaksi selkeää sykliä, 1980-luvulla sekä 2000-
luvun puolivälissä. Kirjallisuus on tutkinut kattavasti ensimmäisen syklin, mutta 
viimeisintä ei ole pystytty tutkimaan aineiston saatavuuden vuoksi. Aiempi kirjallisuus 
on keskittynyt myös pääomasijoittajien menestyksen tekijöihin ja 
erikoistumishyötyjen tutkimiseen, mutta pohjoismaisia pääomasijoitusmarkkinoita ei 
ole kattavasti tutkittu. Tämä tutkielma laajentaa aikaisempaa kirjallisuutta neljällä osa-
alueella: kattaa koko viimeisimmän pääomasijoitussyklin, tutkii 
pääomasijoittajavetoisten yritysten ja niiden verrokkien operationaalisen tehokkuuden 
eroja ennen kriisiä ja kriisin aikana, tutkii pääomasijoittajien erikoistumishyötyjä 
niiden portfolioyrityksissä sekä kattaa pohjoismaiset pääomasijoitusmarkkinat. 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Tutkimusaineisto käsittää 127 pääomasijoitusvetoista yritysostoa ja niiden 
verrokkiyritykset Pohjoismaissa (Suomi, Ruotsi, Norja ja Tanska) vuosina 2003-2007. 
Aineistoon on sisällytetty myös 66 vastaavaa yritysostoa ja verrokkiyritykset, joille 
täydellistä operationaalista aineistoa ei ollut saatavilla estimoimaan lähdeaineiston 
valinnan puoluellisuutta. Tutkimusaineiston yrityksille on kerätty kolmen vuoden 
operationaalinen aineisto yritysostojen jälkeen, tai siihen asti, kun yritys on myyty. 
Verrokkiyritykset ovat koottu toimialan, koon ja geografian mukaisesti.  
TULOKSET 
 Tutkimuksella on neljä keskeistä löydöstä viimeisimmän pääomasijoitusmarkkinasyklin 
yritysostoille Pohjoismaissa: 1) Pääomasijoittajavetoisten yritysten operationaalinen 
tehokkuus on huomattavasti parempi kuin verrokkien myynnin kasvussa sekä 
kannattavuudessa. 2) Toimialoihin tai investointivaiheisiin erioistuneet 
pääomasijoittajat ovat pystyneet vaikuttamaan merkittävästi portfolioyrityksiensä 
myynnin kasvuun sekä kannattavuuteen. Investointivaihe-erikoistuminen voi johtaa 
suurempiin parannuksiin kannattavuudessa. 3) Pääomasijoittajavetoisten yritysten 
operatiivinen tehokkuus on keskimäärin vastaavaa verrokkiyrityksien kanssa. 
Taantumassa pääomasijoittajat pystyvät kuitenkin ylläpitämään portfolioyritystensä 
tehokkuuden, tehden merkittävän pesäeron verrokkiyritysten tehokkuuteen 
vaikeammassa talouden tilanteessa. Pääomasijoittajan erikoistumisella näyttää olevan 
etu operationaalisessa tehokkuudessa taantumassa verrokkeihin verrattuna. 4) 
Pääomasijoittajien välinen tehokkuus ei muutu eri talousoloissa. 
AVAINSANAT 
Pääomasijoittaminen, yritysostot, erikoistuminen  
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Glossary 
Table 1 - Explanation of key terms in the paper 
Term Explanation 
Bn Billion 
CCC Cash Conversion Cycle 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciations and amortisations 
EVCA European Venture Capital Association 
HHI The Herfindahl- Hirschman- Index, used to measure the degree of industry and 
stage specialisation 
ICA The Index of Competitive Advantage, used to measure industry and stage 
specialisation 
LBO Leveraged buyout 
LP Limited partner, institutions or high net worth individuals who invest in private 
equity funds 
MBO Management buyout where the current management acquires the company, with 
private equity firm backing 
Nordic region Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Also used in the form of the Nordics or 
the Nordic countries  
PE Private equity. Refers to private equity firms, might also be used along with the 
word fund (PE fund)  meaning a private equity fund or company i.e. a private 
equity backed company 
PE vs. VC Private equity firms tend to invest in more mature companies whereas venture 
capital firms’ focus tend to be start-ups and early stage investments 
Peer company Comparable company for a buyout company in terms of industry, size and 
geography 
Private equity company Company acquired by a private equity fund, managed by a private equity firm. 
Also referred to as private equity backed company, target or buyout company 
Private equity firm Entity which manages private equity funds, which in turn invest in companies. 
Also referred to as a general partner (GP) 
Private equity fund Managed by a private equity firm, capital pool which invests in companies 
PTP Public-to- Private transaction. Where a public company is acquired, delisted and 
taken back to private 
ROIC Return on Invested Capital 
RLBO Reverse leveraged buyout. A company which has previously been delisted when 
taken over by a private equity firm over is listed upon exiting the investment 
WC Working capital 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and motivation 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and private equity (PE) industry have been widely studied since 
the first LBO wave in the 1980s. Jensen (1989) predicted that leveraged buyout organisations, 
which later became private equity firms, would emerge as the dominant corporate 
organisational form. Since then the private equity industry value has grown in three-digit 
multiples, alone in the U.S. commitments of the buyout funds were over 100 times greater in 
2006 than they were in 1985 measured in inflation-adjusted dollars (Cao and Lerner, 2009). 
Such growth in private equity investments has spurred a wide range of research on the 
abnormal performance of PE-lead buyout companies, each providing either a new piece of 
explaining their operations or offering mixed evidence contradicting the previous research. 
The research recognises two distinct waves of LBOs; first being from 1982 or 1983 to 1989, 
second beginning in 2003 or 2004 and ending in 2007 or 2008 (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009). 
Burrows and Wright (2009) cover a slightly longer time period and report a drop in the PE 
activity in 2008 to the levels of 2002 and a further accelerating trend in the first two quarters 
of 2009 indicating the end of the second LBO boom. The same pattern can be seen in Figure 1 
which summarises the median valuation levels of U.S. public-to-private (PTP) transactions 
from 1982 to 2006. 
Figure 1 - Enterprise value to EBITDA in U.S. public-to-private buyouts from 1982 to 
2006 (excluding 1990-1996) 
EBITDA is a commonly used cash flow measure and stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciations and 
amortisations 
Source: Kaplan & Stein (1993) for 1982 to 1989 and Guo et al. (2011) for 1997 to 2006. Adapted from Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2009) 
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Evidence suggests that availability of debt financing is a major factor in determining private 
equity activity. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) report accelerating investment pace of private equity 
funds as interest rates decline whereas Axelson et al. (2009b) find current (at the time of the 
buyout) market conditions the most significant factor in explaining leveraged buyouts’ capital 
structures. Further proof is provided by Shivdasani and Wang (2011) who conclude that the 
credit market conditions before the recent financial crisis fuelled the LBO boom through 
banks’ looser lending policies and private equity firms’ better access to capital. Thus, the 
favourable market conditions resulted in a record amount of invested capital in private equity 
totalling USD 375bn through 654 companies alone in the U.S. in 2006. Furthermore, nine of 
the ten largest buyouts occurred in 2006. (Washington Post, March 15, 2007).  
After the first wave of buyouts, researchers have comprehensively studied LBOs with a 
steady number of new research being published each year. However, the new research has 
always trailed with a few year lag due to data availability issues. The newly available post-
buyout operational data of three years after the most recent cycle busted now provides a 
unique opportunity to research the most recent deals and the PE-backed buyout companies’ 
performance pre and during the financial crisis as well as the bust of the private equity 
market. Little evidence has yet been provided on the characteristics and performance of PE-
backed buyouts during and after the recent boom from 2003 through 2007. This thesis aims at 
filling the gap in the research as well as to dig deeper into the determinants of the 
performance. 
1.2. The research problem  
This paper studies the operating performance of private equity backed buyout companies in 
the Nordic region including Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway and the buyouts’ relative 
performance on that of the comparable companies. The focus is in the specialisation effects of 
private equity firms i.e. can industry or stage specialised firms create higher or abnormal 
operating performance.  
The paper also tests whether the specialisation effects and operating efficiency of buyouts will 
change under different economic conditions i.e. pre and during the financial crisis. This study 
includes factors that have previously found to affect the abnormal performance of PE-backed 
companies to control for other operational efficiency drivers.  
The literature suggests that private equity firm specialisation or the degree of non-
diversification is providing competitive advantage of the buyout companies over their peers. 
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Although there are mixed evidence, both stage and industry specialisation are found to be 
positively related on the abnormal returns of PE firms as well as on abnormal operating 
performance. Specialisation is approached with two methods, the Index of Competitive 
Advantage (ICA) as presented by Cressy et al. (2007) on the basis of the study by Archibugi 
and Pianta (1994) and with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Hirschman, 1945; 
Herfindahl, 1950) measuring the degree of diversification. Both methods allow the study of 
industry and stage specialisation of private equity firms, more detailed description of the 
methods is provided in Section 6. 
Research has also presented a wide variety of variables explaining either the returns on PE 
investments or the operational performance. Focusing on the latter, this study attempts to find 
evidence if these variables continue to be significant in the financial crisis explaining the 
buyout company performance or whether the factors have changed under different market 
conditions. Further insight is provided through expanding the current literature to cover the 
Nordic countries in greater detail as previous research suggest that there might be a difference 
in the nature and determinants of private equity performance across countries and market 
areas. 
1.3. Contribution to the existing literature 
This study will be able to contribute to the literature in four distinct areas, first by covering 
whole time period of the latest wave of buyouts, second by shedding light on PE performance 
over the financial crisis, third probing further in the specialisation advantages of PEs and 
fourth providing more evidence on the Nordic markets which are one of the most active 
buyout markets in Europe and still not yet have enjoyed much attention in the literature.  
Research on private equity and buyouts has largely concentrated in the U.S. and in the UK 
which are the most active buyout markets in the world. These studies have covered a wide 
array of fields such as returns on PE investments e.g. Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Groh and 
Gottschalg (2006), Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) and Guo et al. (2011), the role of 
corporate governance and ownership e.g. Weir and Wright (2006) and Acharya and Kehoe 
(2008) and the operational effects of PE investments of the buyout companies e.g. 
Lichtemberg and Siegel (1990), Harris et al. (2005), Bergström et al. (2007), Cressy et al. 
(2007), Boucly et al. (2008) and Davis et al. (2008). However, the majority of the research 
has covered only the first wave and the buyouts occurred before the last few years of the latest 
boom.  
12 
 
Due to the recent nature of the recession of which effects the world is still enduring, it has not 
been previously possible to study the buyout companies under the influence of the crisis as 
sufficient amount of data and a number of years has not yet been available. However, in 
2011/2012, a three year window after the PE boom busted in 2007-2008, and the crisis began, 
provides enough data points for a viable research. Furthermore, only a little evidence thus far 
has been published on these effects. To the best of my knowledge Jääskeläinen (2011) 
currently represents the only study in this area with a data set covering the years after 2007, 
where Jääskeläinen studied which areas of operational efficiency PE firms are able to improve 
on compared to peer companies. This study expands on the topic by concentrating on the 
factors of PE firms that drive the operational efficiency improvements and whether these 
factors change during different economic conditions.  
Cressy et al. (2007) argue that private equity companies which are specialised relative to their 
competitors either through industry or stage expertise have acquired and possess deeper 
knowhow on the different aspects of the company and its operating environment. Therefore 
the specialised PE companies can provide more effective monitoring and advice resulting in 
superior performance over their peers. Also, the authors suggest that using their knowledge, 
PEs may be able to pick winners, companies that initially have better grounds to succeed. 
There are also a number of other studies covering private equity and venture capital 
specialisation. Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) suggested that early stage venture specialists 
were less diversified and Maningart et al. (2002) found highly stage diversified venture 
capitalists to require higher return for their investments. Cressy et al. (2007) and Gottschalg 
and Wright (2008) provided evidence that industry specialised private equity firms are able to 
create real and lasting value, having a positive impact on profitability. Cressy et al. (2007) 
also reported that stage specialisation may boost growth, however, not having an impact on 
profitability. Gompers et al. (2005) provided more evidence on industry specialisation by 
finding evidence that industry specialised VCs tended to be more successful. Contrary 
evidence has been provided by Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) and Brigl et al. (2008) who 
concluded that industry diversification does not have significant effect on returns or the firm 
performance. Futhermore, more mixed evidence was found by Lossen (2006) who suggested 
that rate of return of PE funds declines with diversification across stages but increases with 
diversification across industries. The author’s findings propose that stage specialisation could 
result in better returns whereas same improvements could not be gained with industry 
specialisation. This mixed evidence is far from conclusive and needs further probing in to the 
13 
 
issue in order to make more definite answers. Furthermore, it is topical to study whether the 
suggested specialisation gains persist over the crisis or is the PE firms’ superiority diminished 
in the case of a major shock. 
Nordic buyout markets have not enjoyed much attention in literature. To the best of my 
knowledge only Bergström et al. (2007) have published a research covering the Nordics, 
concentrating on operational performance of the Swedish private equity backed companies 
from 1998 to 2006. There are a number of master’s theses covering a part of the Nordic 
market, however, many of them including only Finnish data such as Wistbacka (2002), 
Kekkonen (2004), Havu (2007) and Männistö (2009). Jääskeläinen (2011) is the only who 
covers all of the Nordic countries in his study. As Figure 2 suggests, Nordic countries 
(Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) are among the biggest private equity markets in the 
Europe measured by private equity investments as percentage of GDP. UK and Sweden have 
both significantly larger PE markets than other European countries or than the European total.  
Figure 2 - Private equity investments as % of GDP in 2010 in Europe 
 
*Other CEE consist of Slovakia and Ex-Jugoslavia 
Source: EVCA (2011), retrieved 27 September 2011 
Regardless of Norway, Finland and Denmark being below the European total, as a whole, the 
Nordic countries could be considered one of the most important PE market in Europe if 
measured as % of GPD. Thus, it is necessary to cover Nordics in greater detail in order to 
understand fully the whole private equity scene. Cumming et al. (2007) find that there is a 
consensus in literature on different methodologies, measures and time periods suggesting that 
LBOs and particularly MBOs improve the target companies’ performance and have a 
significant effect on work practices. However, the authors continue by introducing the need 
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for international research on buyouts as the nature and determinants of the performance of 
private equity backed buyouts and different types of LBOs differ by country.  
1.4. Limitations of the study 
This study has three main limitations. First, it is limited to Nordic (Finland, Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark) first-round private equity backed buyouts from 2003 to 2007 in the Thomson 
VentureXpert database. Second, the study concentrates only on private equity firms and thus 
excludes venture capital firms and the companies that have had venture capital backing 
according to Thomson VentureXpert database. The differences of private equity and venture 
capital are explained further in Section 2. And third, the focus is on operational efficiency and 
especially on the drivers behind the operational efficiency changes that previous literature has 
found significant. The possible biases in data selection are discussed in Section 5. 
1.5. Main findings 
This study has four key findings in Nordic private equity buyouts during the latest wave of 
buyouts and over the recession. First, private equity firms are able to outperform their peer 
companies in sales growth and profitability. Second, PE firm specialisation on industries or 
stages both drive higher performance for sales growth and profitability, where stage 
specialisation may have an advantage in the latter. Third, under pre-crisis economic 
conditions private equity backed buyout performance is comparable to peers on average. 
However, under crisis conditions PE firms are able to maintain the performance of the 
portfolio companies thus creating clear difference to that of the peers. Specialisation seems to 
have an advantage during more difficult economic conditions compared to peer companies. 
And lastly, private equity firm performance across all stages and industries does not seem to 
largely differ across time periods and economic conditions 
1.6. Structure of the study 
Section 2 introduces private equity firms’ operations and transactions in detail. Section 3 
discusses the literature and the theoretical framework of the thesis. Section 4 describes the 
hypotheses. Section 5 gives a description of the data gathered and Section 6 continues with 
the methods and variables. Section 7 discusses the results and analysis and finally, Section 8 
concludes.  
2. Private equity in essence 
This section discusses and defines private equity; the model through which PE firms operate 
as well as the compensation system of the model. This section, however, is limited to 
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components that are deemed sufficient for the reader to understand the context of this thesis 
and for a more comprehensive description of private equity model and its components, please 
refer to Gilligan and Wright (2008). 
2.1 What is private equity? 
Private equity (PE) can be characterised as risk capital being invested in companies 
experiencing different stages of their life cycle. These stages include companies in their start-
up phase, mature companies, distressed companies and every other stage in between. Private 
equity acts as a financial intermediary who raises capital from institutional investors and high 
net-worth individuals to invest these funds to private and illiquid companies. The aim of PE is 
thus to maximise the returns of their investors by increasing the value of target companies 
through financial, governance and operational engineering.
1
 Private equity drives the change 
in the target companies as active investors by taking on significant control rights and board 
seats as well as by imposing contractual restrictions on management and by utilising full and 
timely information on the current state of their target. Private equity thus differs from other 
asset classes that have similar investment strategies with PE such as hedge funds, value funds 
or active funds through their ability to influence the companies’ decision making.  
The term private equity is a broad definition of an investor that is not quoted in the public 
market. However, academic literature and private equity firms recognise four distinct sub-
classes of PE: venture capital (VC), mezzanine/growth capital, distressed and buyouts. 
Venture capital commonly refers to investments in start-ups or other companies with strong 
business ideas and high growth potential and investment needs but low current cash flows. 
Mezzanine capital acts as transitional funds between VC and buyout investments. 
Overlapping both investment types, mezzanine can be described as growth capital when 
invested in later-stage venture capital companies and as subordinate debt layers with an equity 
component when invested as a part of a buyout. Distressed company investments are part of 
buyouts, however, a specialised segment investing only in mature and distressed companies. 
Academic literature commonly separates private equity into venture capital and buyouts, 
where distressed investing is assigned to buyouts and mezzanine can be assigned to either 
depending on the type of the company; venture stage or buyout stage. This paper focuses on 
the latter, buyouts.  
                                                 
1
 Please refer to Section 3 for more detailed description of the three types of value generation of private equity as 
defined by academic literature. 
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Buyouts refer to one-time investments where controlling stake of a company is acquired using 
typically a significant amount of debt and a smaller portion of equity. Hence, a typical buyout 
can also be referred to as a leveraged buyout (LBO). LBO structure is used for acquisitions of 
mature companies with value creation potential and stable cash flows in order to repay the 
debt. Buyouts can also be conducted without private equity firms, however, literature has 
suggested that majority of buyouts are associated with private equity backing. Also, some 
confusion in the literature might arise from the 1980s leveraged buyout associations. 
However, these organisations are the predecessors of the current private equity firms and thus 
could be referred to as PE firms as well. 
Within the buyout segment, there are several different classifications of buyouts. These sub-
classes can be characterised as either through the driving forces behind the buyout or their 
vendor sources. The driving force is associated with the role of the management in the 
buyouts and can arise either from the inside or the outside. The insider buyouts, also known as 
management buyouts (MBOs), occur when the incumbent management acquires their 
company along with a private equity firm. The outsider buyouts, also known as management 
buyins (MBIs), on the other hand have private equity firms which impose a new management 
for their recently acquired company. Buyouts can also be classified through their vendor 
source; public-to-private (PTP) where a publicly listed company is taken private, divisional 
buyouts where a division of a larger company is acquired by a PE firm, private-to-private 
buyouts, family business buyouts, public sector buyouts as well as secondary buyouts where a 
private equity firm acquires a buyout company from another PE firm i.e. a second round 
buyout. Figure 3 shows the distribution of LBOs made from 1980 to 2008 in the sample of 
Axelson et al. (2010). Although the sample size is limited, the figure shows an approximation 
of deal type distribution, where public-to-private deals lead both in quantity in the number of 
deals made as well as the median enterprise value. However, the result might be biased as 
public-to-private deals have higher availability of data than private companies. 
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Figure 3 - The distribution of LBOs by vendor source from 1980 to 2008 in the World 
The figure represents the distribution of LBOs by vendor source by number of acquisitions made and their 
median enterprise value in USD millions from 1980 to 2008 in the World. The sample contains only acquisitions 
which have disclosed their enterprise value within the sample of Axelson et al. (2010). 
Source: Adapted from Axelson et al. (2010) 
 
In this thesis I will use buyout, leveraged buyout and private equity backed buyout 
interchangeably as these terms are commonly used as substitutes in the literature and by 
industry practitioners.  
2.2 Structure of the private equity model 
The typical private equity model is organised as closed-end fund limited partnerships where 
general partners (GPs) i.e. private equity firms, provide a minority share of equity and 
manage the funds and the funds’ portfolio companies. Limited partners (LPs) on the other 
hand provide the majority of equity capital for these funds and are entitled also for the 
majority of the returns. Figure 4 provides an illustration of the PE structure. 
In this thesis I refer to general partner as private equity firm and use them interchangeably as 
it is the case with portfolio company, private equity company and a buyout company. These 
terms are agreed among industry practitioners and in academic literature.  Next, I will define 
main components of the model and discuss each in greater detail.   
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Figure 4 - The private equity model structure 
A typical private equity model is structured as illustrated below. General partner (GP) i.e. a private equity firm 
manages n number of funds where in each fund a number of limited partners (LPs) provide majority of equity 
capital. This equity capital is pooled in a fund which in turn acquires with leverage i number of companies i.e. 
portfolio companies.  
 
Source: Adapted from Gilligan and Wright (2008) 
2.2.1 Private equity firm 
Private equity firms provide investment management services where they set up a fund and 
gather investments from a variety of sources, however, mainly from large investors. This 
equity capital is then leveraged to boost the fund’s investment potential. PE firms actively 
identify targets, invest in companies typically called portfolio companies and manage these 
companies to drive value generation until the exit. PE firms thus aim at maximising the 
investors’ returns through active management. In return of these services PE firms receive a 
number of fees which are discussed in more detail in a later section. 
2.2.2 Private equity fund 
Private equity funds are closed-end funds with finite lives. This means that the investors who 
commits to a fund cannot draw their funds out until the fund has reached its end. Funds have 
clear targets as in investment strategy and focus as well as the size of the fund itself. Along 
with raising a sufficient amount of equity capital from LPs and before the first portfolio 
company investment, the parties agree on the contract’s covenants. These covenants define 
clear boundaries for the GPs in terms of investment target characteristics, GP compensation, 
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the amount of capital per investment, the degree of leverage, types of securities used in the 
acquisitions, collaboration with other PE firms as well as re-investments if the first portfolio 
companies are exited early. This process of gathering the required amount of capital may take 
up to a year. 
Metric and Yasuda (2010) suggest that a typical PE fund’s life time is 10 years, in other 
words that the LPs must commit to illiquidity of their capital for up to 10 years. The lifetime 
of a fund can be divided roughly into two stages: investment stage and harvesting and growth 
stage. During the investment stage the PE firms actively identify a large quantity of 
prospective targets before committing to roughly 15 to 25 portfolio companies. PE firms do 
not require the LPs to transfer their committed capital when the fund is raised but rather the 
GPs draw down capital as investments are made. This characteristic separates PE funds from 
similar asset classes such as hedge or mutual funds. Drawdowns mitigate the long-term 
illiquidity of the investments and provide the LPs to seek for return from alternative sources 
in the mean time.  
The remaining five years is known as harvesting and growth stage where a PE firm actively 
monitors and manages the portfolio companies, provides follow-on investments and prepares 
the companies for a successful exit. GP and LP contracts may also have a clause which allows 
the extension of harvesting stage in cases which may provide a more lucrative return if exited 
in a later time. Metric and Yasuda (2011) screen a number of previous studies and find 
median holding periods from four to nine years, depending on the study. 
Academic literature has found persistence in the positive performance of PE firms’ funds. 
Successful PE firms thus raise new funds within three to five years after the inception of the 
previous fund. (Metric and Yasuda, 2010). The year of the fund’s inception is called the 
vintage year and the number of PE firms’ funds is referred to as the fund’s sequence number. 
These numbers can be used to determine the maturity of the fund as well as PE experience, as 
the number of funds raised by a PE implies successful investment history and thus is a 
commonly used proxy for the experience.  
2.2.3 Limited partner 
Roughly all private equity funds are organised as limited partnerships in which the LPs 
commit substantial amounts of equity capital to these funds, to be drawn down upon 
investing. Unlike the majority of other investment fund types where even households can 
20 
 
invest e.g. a typical open-end mutual fund, PE funds accept only certain types of investors. 
Figure 5 provides an illustration of private equity investors from 2002 to 2006. 
Figure 5 - Private equity investments by investor type in 2002 to 2006 
 
Source: Gilligan and Wright (2008) 
 
The far largest investor type is pension funds, followed by banks and fund-of-funds. Gilligan 
and Wright (2008), however, point out that the investors of fund-of-funds are usually pension 
funds, insurance companies and high net-worth individuals thus inflating the importance of 
pension funds as an investor type even greater. Also, inadvertently households are PE 
investors although they can not invest in the funds directly.  
2.3 Transaction structure and its components 
Private equity transactions differ from other acquisitions by their structure, also private equity 
companies have capital structures that are unique only to these companies. This Section first 
presents the typical transaction structure and later moves on to the discussion of capital 
structures in PE deals. 
2.3.1 Private equity transaction structure 
Private equity transactions involve a creation of an acquisition vehicle called “Newco”. This 
vehicle is a shell company with nominal capital and assigned temporary directors, designed 
only to facilitate the transaction. Both senior debt and sub-ordinate debt are raised directly to 
the Newco from variety of investors, backed by the assets of the target company. Banks and 
institutions are usually senior debtors whereas sub-ordinate classes are held by higher-yield 
investors such as hedge funds and mezzanine investors. The debt is contingent on a successful 
completion of the deal and not issued in the case of a failed transaction. Private equity deals 
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are typically highly levered and thus the success of the deal depends highly on the amount and 
conditions of debt raised. The remainder, minority portion, of capital is provided by the 
acquiring private equity fund in the form of equity. In the case of an unsuccessful deal, as 
said, the debt is never issued and as a result the Newco is disbanded. On the other hand, after 
a successful transaction the Newco is merged with the target company to form a new portfolio 
company with a new capital structure. Figure 6 illustrates this structure in a graphical form. 
Figure 6 - Private equity transaction structure 
Private equity transactions are conducted by forming a shell company called “Newco”. This company holds 
temporary directors and raises the debt capital from variety of sources. The debt is contingent on a successful 
transaction thus not issued in case of a failed deal. Equity capital is provided by the private equity fund. To form 
the portfolio company after a successful acquisition, “Newco” is merged with the target company along with 
their new capital structure.  
 
 
2.3.2 Capital structure in private equity transactions 
The previous sections have discussed in great detail about the equity investors and fund 
managers, limited partners and general partners, respectively. However, equally as important 
investor group are the creditors who provide secured senior debt as well as unsecured higher-
yield financing. 
The senior debt is typically provided by a group of creditors such as banks and institutional 
investors, divided to number of different tranches to cater for individual investor preferences 
and private equity needs. Such loan structure with a group of lenders is usually referred to as a 
syndicated loan. The tranches in a typical PE transaction are divided into Term loan A which 
is amortising debt held by a bank where as Term loan B, C and so forth are bullet loans that 
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are either securitised or sold to institutional investors. Further debt classes include several 
layers of sub-ordinated debt including 2
nd
 lien debt, mezzanine and corporate bonds. Each 
layer has different credit terms reflecting their security and seniority. In addition to above, PE 
firms have a wide variety of contingent debt which may include e.g. revolving credit, capital 
expenditure facilities as well as acquisition lines of credit. The contingent debt is not 
necessarily drawn with other classes of debt, but instead drawn as needed depending on the 
type of the contingent debt. Figure 7 shows an illustration of a typical capital structure of 
private equity backed buyout in mid 2000s. 
Figure 7 - A typical capital structure in a private equity buyout in mid 2000s 
The figure represents the capital structure of a buyout of Kwik-Fit in 2005 which had a typical capital structure 
for buyouts during mid the 2000s. The deal had a total enterprise value (EV) of £774 million which was financed 
by roughly 75 percent of debt and 25 percent of equity. The debt component can be divided into several tranches, 
in this case three layers of senior debt (Term loans A through C) and two layers of junior debt in the form of 2
nd
 
lien and mezzanine. Pricing of the debt is shown relative to the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and 
mezzanine debt’s return is divided into two components: cash interest and payments-in-kind (PIK). 
 
Source: Adapted from Axelson et al. (2010) and Jääskeläinen (2011) 
 
Axelson et al. (2010) suggest that the capital structures of private equity transactions are more 
complicated than academic literature imply. Also, the authors report that debt structure is 
typically standardised and as an example for a typical debt structure in mid 2000s they 
provide statistics of a buyout of a U.K. tire and exhaust-fitting company Kwik-Fit in 2005. 
The deal, carried by a PE house PAI, was financed with roughly 75 percent of debt and 25 
percent equity totalling to an enterprise value of £ 773.5 million. The senior debt comprised 
of three layers, where Term loan A was a seven year amortising loan with 2.25 percent spread 
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over LIBOR whereas layers B and C were bullet loans
2
 maturing in eight and nine years with 
2.5 percent and 3.0 percent LIBOR spread, respectively. In the junior debt category the 
company had a 9.5 year 2
nd
 lien debt with 5.0 percent spread which was senior to a 10 year 
mezzanine loan. Return of the mezzanine loan was split in two components, 4.5 percent cash 
interest and a 5.0 percent payments-in-kind (PIK), where the holders are issued additional 
notes of 5.0 percent on the value of the outstanding debt. In addition to these, Kwik-Fit had a 
senior £40m revolving credit line and a £50m capital expenditure facility, both maturing in 
seven years with a 2.25 percent spread. 
The level of leverage in PE deals has varied over time. Axelson et al. (2010) find significant 
cyclicality in the use of leverage depending on the prevailing market conditions in their 
sample containing private equity buyouts from 1980 to 2008. The authors report three peaks 
of high leverage use, in late 1980s, late 1990s and in 2006-2007 with corresponding drops in 
the leverage levels a few years post peaks. The authors also find similar cyclicality in the debt 
structure where the periods of high leverage are associated with longer maturities and smaller 
Term loan A layer i.e. the most senior and thus the most secure. Therefore, the high leverage 
levels are possible to obtain by increasing the amount of higher risk-higher yield debt. The 
authors conclude that based on their findings the determinants that drive public firms’ debt 
usage are different to those of PE backed companies. PE backed companies’ use of leverage is 
found to correlate the most with macro-economic conditions that allow PE firms to benefit 
from mispricing of debt and equity. Similar findings are provided by Kaplan and Stein (1993), 
Guo et al. (2007), Ljunqvist et al. (2007), Axelson et al. (2009b) and Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009). Cyclicality and mispricing are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.3. 
2.4 General partner compensation 
The compensation structure of general partners is based on management and performance of a 
pool of funds rather than a single deal. According to Axelson et al. (2009a) compensation is 
balanced to mitigate the risks of excessive risk taking as well as the obligation to pay the 
private equity firms for their performance. Therefore, GP compensation is divided into fixed 
and variable components which terms are agreed on the limited partnership contracts. In 
addition to these, GPs can receive other fees that may be significant in the total returns and 
are not allocated to either of these components.  
                                                 
2
 Bullet loan’s principal is paid full at maturity and has no repayments in the course of its life time unlike an 
amortising loan. 
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Before introducing these components in detail, I must define a few terms that are needed to 
explain the structure. Committed capital is the amount that a LP has promised to invest in a 
PE fund. As discussed previously, drawdowns occur when a PE firm makes an investment in 
a portfolio company and thus requires the LPs to invest a part of their committed capital. A 
part of the committed capital is used to pay for the fees of general partners and therefore 
Metric and Yasuda (2010) make a distinction between investment capital and lifetime fees 
where investment capital refers to the portion of committed capital that may be invested in 
portfolio companies whereas lifetime fees refer to the portion that are used to pay the GP fees. 
Also, invested capital is the share of investment capital that has been invested whereas net 
invested capital is the difference between invested capital and value of exited investments and 
the associated costs. 
2.4.1 Fixed component (management fee) 
The fixed component consists of management fees which account around 1-1.5 percent of 
committed capital for larger funds and 2 percent for smaller funds (Gilligan and Wright, 
2008). Management fees were originally created to pay for general partner’s operating costs 
associated with salaries of the fund managers and other employees as well as other costs that 
were needed to manage the fund. Excess fees are allocated in new recruitments and other 
improvements in the business to enable PE firm’s growth. To balance the incentive structure 
of general partners and limit excess management fees, four different approaches for setting up 
the management fee structure have been introduced in the private equity industry. 
First, historically the most popular method has been to calculate the fee as constant 
percentage of committed capital. This method, however, creates incentives for the GP to 
inflate the size of the fund as it would result in greater amount of fees in absolute terms. 
Second, a recently popular method has been a decreasing fee schedule where the percentage 
of committed capital decreases after the investment phase. Third, a two phase rate that is 
constant and based on committed capital the first five years and constant and based on net 
invested capital for the last five years. The final method utilises both the second and the third 
method, where the rate is both decreasing and changes from committed capital to net invested 
capital during the fund’s lifetime. Metric and Yasuda (2010) provide statistics on the issue 
and conclude based on their sample that a median level of lifetime fees is roughly 12 percent 
of committed capital. 
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2.4.2 Variable components (carried interest) 
Management fees are fixed and thus LPs are obligated to pay the fees even for non-
performing GPs. The variable component on the other hand is totally dependent on the 
success and performance of the fund. This component is known as carried interest. Gilligan 
and Wright (2008) estimate that on average carried interest generates roughly 30 percent of 
the GPs’ total compensation although there is great variance around the average. The typical 
carried interest compensation is structured in a way that after the private equity fund has 
reached a certain return level for their limited partners, called the hurdle rate, the general 
partners will receive a 20 percent share of the excess returns. 
Calculation of carried interest requires four components: carry level, carry basis, carry hurdle 
(hurdle rate) and carry timing. Carry level is the share of excess profits that are attributable to 
the GP, typically 20 percent as discussed above. Carry basis defines the basis on which the 
profits are calculated. The basis can be either equal to committed capital or to investment 
capital. Metric and Yasuda (2010) find that 93.6 percent of buyout fund use committed capital 
as their carry basis. Carry hurdle (hurdle rate) refers to the size of return that a LP must 
receive before a GP may receive their share of the excess returns over that particular return. 
The hurdle rate is typically based on committed capital as it mitigates the risk of PE firms to 
inflate the size of the fund beyond their manageable limits as the hurdle rate on funds that not 
have been invested reduces GP’s carried interest. Metric and Yasuda (2010) report that the 
virtually all funds have a hurdle rate in the range of 6-10 percent. Carry timing defines the 
timing of the carried interest payments. Carry timing can allow GPs to collect some variable 
fee earlier than suggested with carry hurdle. This allows GPs to receive compensation for 
successful and early exits of their portfolio companies. 
2.4.3 Other fees 
Other fees beside management fees and carried interest, include transaction and monitoring 
fees. Transaction fee is similar to the fee that investment banks charge for their services in 
transactions. PE firms thus include a fee in the purchase price whenever they buy or sell a 
company. A majority of limited partners require GPs to share these fees where according to 
Metric and Yasuda (2010) 33 percent of LPs demand all transaction fees, 41 percent demand 
only 50 percent and the remaining LPs have arrangements somewhere between 50 and 100 
percent.  
Monitoring fee is charged by GPs from their portfolio companies in return for their services in 
improving the companies. Similarly, monitoring fee is also typically shared with limited 
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partners, limited partners having 80 percent of the fees and private equity firms having the 
remaining 20 percent. Metric and Yasuda (2010) report that yearly monitoring fees are in the 
range of 1-5 percent of EBITDA and smaller companies are charged higher percentages. The 
authors continue in their study in 2011 that these other fees are not widely studied but 
conclude that during the latest wave they accounted for a significant part in general partner 
compensation and especially for larger funds. 
2.4.4 Limited partner return 
The evidence at best is mixed whether limited partners investing in private equity funds 
receive abnormal returns compared to investing in other asset classes or whether the LPs 
receive returns at all net-of-fees. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Ljungqvist and Richardson 
(2003) suggest that net-of-fees PE funds return roughly equal return than S&P 500 during the 
same time frame and net-of-fee IRR is 5.7 percent higher for PE funds than a simulated 
investment in S&P 500, respectively. An example that contradicts the findings of the authors 
above is the acquisition of RJR Nabisco by KKR in 1988, where KKR paid a premium of 
roughly USD 10 billion to the former shareholders and managed to receive only a low return 
for the deal, thus resulting in even lower returns for their limited partners after the fees.  
Metric and Yasuda (2010, 2011) find that the fees amount to USD 19 in present value for 
USD 100 of capital invested in a median PE fund. The authors conclude that net-of-fees, 
return for LPs will be lower than the return on the PE fund’s investments. Also, the authors 
study GP compensation through sensitivity analysis and find that the fee structure is less 
sensitive to performance and is disproportionately large when the use of leverage reaches high 
levels.  Although the current compensation structures are designed to mitigate the incentive 
problems of GPs and align the compensation with performance, it remains inconclusive that 
are the PE firms creating value for limited partners or do they capture most of the benefits to 
themselves. 
2.5 Exit of the investments 
Private equity returns depend heavily on the value of companies at the time of exit. Returns 
are generated also through capital gains during the holding period, however, these cash flows 
represent the minority in returns. This distinction separates private equity from large 
corporations’ strategic acquisitions which aim at synergy benefits and not exiting. 
Historically, PEs had three main exit channels: (1) sale of the company to a corporation i.e. a 
trade sale, (2) initial public offering (IPO) or (3) receivership and liquidation in case of a 
bankruptcy. Gilligan and Wright (2008) identify three alternative exit methods that have 
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emerged during the past decade: (4) a sale of the company to another PE fund i.e. a secondary 
buyout, (5) leveraged recapitalisation and (6) sale of investment portfolios to other financial 
institutions. Among these six methods of exit trade sale is identified to be the most typical.  
The industry practitioners typically aim at a range from three to five years for an exit. In the 
academic literature there is evidence of wide variation in the holding periods which also vary 
through time. The evidence, however, does not support the claim that private equity firms 
would engage in “flip transactions” where the PE firms buy and sell companies in a short 
period of time for quick gains. On average, the evidence shows that larger deals tend to be 
exited within a shorter period than smaller deals. Wright et al. (2009) find that the most 
common range for time to exit was between four to five years for the deals exited before mid 
2007. Figure 8 shows the average time to exit in private equity deals for buyouts of over £10 
million. Gilligan and Wright (2008) find based on the data that time to exit has encountered 
an increasing trend over the years, the most current observation being around four years.  
Figure 8 - Average time to exit in PE buyouts of over £10 million by year of exit 
 
Source: Adapted from Gilligan and Wright (2008) 
 
There has also been criticism towards private equity that the value is captured in the short 
term by the firms thus the portfolio companies’ performance will deteriorate in the long term 
after the exit. The academic literature has reported changes in the companies to be present 
after the exit and the evidence somewhat support the criticism. Burton et al. (2002) find that 
agency problems do re-emerge after the exit, however, the change took several years become 
significant. Discussion on accounting performance is provided by Wright et al. (2009) who 
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suggest that pre-IPO portfolio companies’ performance is significantly higher than that of 
their same sector buyout companies. The authors continue that the abnormal performance 
remains to be high after the exit but declines after four years. Cao and Lerner (2009) share 
similar findings as the authors provide evidence of higher or equal performance of buyouts 
that have gone through an IPO than other IPOs during the same period. However, the authors 
also report deterioration in returns over time.  
3. Literature review (theoretical background) 
In the wake of the first buyout wave Jensen (1989) suggested that leveraged buyout 
organisations, or later known as private equity backed buyouts, would displace the typical 
public corporations as the dominant organisational form of companies. The reasoning behind 
his suggestion leaned on nature of the typical public corporations with dispersed ownership, 
weak corporate governance and low leverage. These could be improved through PE firms’ 
concentrated ownership, performance-based management incentives and higher leverage 
which would then show up as active corporate governance and more efficient organisations 
with reduced cost burden.  
The growth of PE backed buyouts, especially during the second wave, has been accompanied 
by increased criticism. The arguments against PE buyouts have been made about negative 
effects on employment and remuneration, asset stripping, asset flipping
3
 as well as tax 
aversion by using leverage and offshore holding accounts. Cumming et al. (2007), however, 
conclude that the literature suggest PE buyouts to “enhance performance and have a salient 
effect on work practices” across different time periods, measures and methodologies.  
The following sections study in greater detail the theories and empirical evidence of the 
determinants of private equity performance as identified by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) as 
well as alternative theories behind the abnormal performance of PE buyouts. 
3.1 Three determinants of private equity performance 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) identify three determinants of private equity performance 
through which the PE firms influence their buyout companies and create value: governance, 
financial and operational engineering.  
The first wave of buyouts in the 1980s was associated mainly with governance and financial 
engineering. Value creation was sought through active ownership and increased tax benefits 
created by higher levels of leverage. Since the 1980s the buyout environment has changed 
                                                 
3
 Making profit through reselling of the target company’s assets shortly after the buyout 
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significantly. Increased competition for deals across PE firms and the development of deal 
auctions have limited opportunities in mispricing, corporate governance has become more 
active in general and the leverage levels of buyouts more conservative. These changes have 
driven the PE firms to seek out alternative sources of value creation which has given way to 
the growth of operational engineering, referring to PE firms’ operating and industry expertise 
through which they improve create value for their buyout companies.  
3.1.1 Governance engineering 
In Jensen’s (1986, 1989) free cash flow theory, leveraged buyouts (private equity firms) 
create value of their target companies by enhancing governance, thus mitigating agency 
problems of the management and resulting in more efficient operations. Cumming et al. 
(2007) review much of this literature and conclude private equity transactions to use 
governance mechanisms that improve the target companies’ performance. Leslie and Oyer 
(2009) emphasised three governance mechanisms that PE firms actively use in their value 
creation process: higher leverage ratios that drive discipline in managers, restructuring the 
board and management and managerial incentives. Table 2 introduces a summary of findings 
of recent studies relating to governance aspects of private equity transactions.  
Table 2 – Recent empirical evidence of governance in private equity deals 
Authors Study sample Findings 
Cotter and Peck  
2001 
64 LBOs in U.S. 
from1984 to 1989 
PE’s majority stake in equity associated with less 
leverage. PEs are better represented in smaller boards 
suggesting active ownership and monitoring. Authors 
suggest that active monitoring by a PE substitutes tighter 
debt terms in monitoring and motivating management. 
Heel and Kehoe  
2005 
60 exited deals from 11 
leading private equity 
firms 
In the top third best performing deals management team 
changed or strengthened in 83 percent of deals whereas 
the corresponding figure for worst performing third is 33 
percent. Successful PE firms have management incentive 
plans in the range of 15-20 percent of total equity as well 
as require CEO to invest personally in the company. In the 
top third of deals PE firms spent more than half of their 
time on the company during the first 100 days, meeting 
the management almost daily whereas in the worst 
performing deals the corresponding figure was 20 percent. 
Nikoskelainen and 
Wright 2007 
321 exited buyouts in 
U.K. from 1995 to 2004 
Management equity is a significant factor, among other 
corporate governance mechanisms, in determining returns 
for LBOs and context-dependent especially in relation to 
the size of the buyout 
Acharya and Kehoe 
2008 
59 large buyouts in U.K. 
from 1991 to 2004 
Median CEO ownership is 3 percent while the 
management team as a whole has 15 percent of the equity. 
PE buyout companies have 12 formal meetings per year in 
addition to several informal contacts. One-third of CEOs 
of PE buyout companies are replaced within the first 100 
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days and the two-thirds are replaced during a four year 
period. 
Kaplan and Strömberg 
2009 
43 LBOs in U.S. from 
1996 to 2004 
Median CEO equity ownership is 5.4 percent (stock and 
options) and the management team as a whole has 16 
percent of the equity. 
Leslie and Oyer  
2009 
144 reverse LBOs in 
U.S. from 1996 to 2006 
Private equity backed companies have much higher equity 
incentives for top executives but lower salaries than 
similar public companies 
Cornelli and Karakas 
2011 
142 PTP deals in U.K. 
from 1998 to 2003 
After taking a company private the board size decreases 
and its composition undergoes significant changes. Private 
equity firms are involved in boards only if their expertise 
is most needed e.g. not in cases where the value gains are 
primarily driven by financial engineering. Higher PE 
involvement decreases CEO turnover. 
Gong and Wu  
2011 
126 LBOs in U.S. from 
1990 to 2006 
CEO turnover of 51 percent within two years after the 
buyout. CEOs replaced in companies with high agency 
costs characterised as low leverage and high level of 
undistributed free cash flow. Entrenched CEOs and 
underperforming CEOs measured as low return on assets 
are also more likely to be replaced. 
 
Debt discipline 
One of the central elements of reducing the agency costs Jensen (1986, 1989) argued to be 
increased level of leverage. He suggested that debt could reduce the costs by substituting 
dividends and creating an obligation to periodically serve the interest and repayments as 
failure to do so would cause the company to be bankrupt. With high levels of leverage, 
considerable proportion of the free cash flow would have to be allocated to service the debt, 
which in turn would reduce the misallocation of free cash flow to unproductive investments or 
non-payments to shareholders. The threat of insolvency through higher debt levels would act 
as an incentive for the company to operate more efficiently.  
Jensen (1986, 1989) also suggested that equity and active ownership are also key elements in 
reducing the agency costs. Higher debt levels enable the investors to acquire a controlling 
stake of the equity which otherwise would not be possible. The majority stake allows the 
investors to actively monitor and control the target company through a board presence further 
reducing the agency costs. 
Building on this, Cotter and Peck (2001) continued with their study of the relationship 
between incentives created by debt levels and active ownership. The authors find LBO deals 
to be less levered with short-term and/or senior debt when the private equity firms have 
majority control of the target company’s equity. The majority stake enables the PE firms to 
have greater representation on smaller boards which is also associated with active monitoring 
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of managers. For such transactions, higher levels of leverage do not seem to significantly 
increase the target company’s performance. However, in all other cases e.g. where PE firms 
are not actively monitoring the using high leverage does significantly increase the target 
company’s performance. The findings and the authors thus suggest that active involvement 
and ownership of PE firms work as a substitute for the monitoring and motivating gains 
achieved through high debt levels. Therefore, PE transactions are able to create value through 
improved governance and not only mainly through benefits of leverage as it was the case in 
the first wave of buyouts in 1980s. 
Governance engineering 
In addition to creating incentives for management through leverage and active ownership, the 
agency costs may be reduced through governance engineering by restructuring the board of 
directors and the management. The literature suggest that private equity firms frequently 
change the composition and size of the management and the board as well as engage in active 
monitoring through board seats. 
Cornelli and Karakas (2011) concentrate on the role and changes of boards when a public 
company is taken private. The authors’ findings suggest significant changes in the 
composition and structure of the board. They also probe further into the effects of these 
changes. First, the board size decreases and the representation of outside directors are limited 
as PE firm’s representatives take over the board seats. The number of representatives and PE 
firm involvement is more pronounced in difficult deals.
4
 Second, the authors find evidence of 
PEs being able to give a longer horizon to management. The target companies experience 
higher CEO turnover in difficult deals, however, a higher number of PE board seats does not 
seem to increase the turnover. Third, consistent with Cotter and Peck (2001), the authors find 
a negative correlation between leverage and PE firm presence in a board. Therefore, deals 
motivated by financial engineering and not by company restructuring require less attention 
from PE firms.  
Gong and Wu (2011) provide evidence of PE firms using effective governance mechanisms to 
improve the target company. The authors concentrate on studying the turnover of entrenched 
CEOs or CEOs causing agency problems. They find a CEO turnover rate of 51 percent within 
two years of a transaction. CEOs are replaced in companies experiencing high agency costs 
characterised as low leverage and high levels of undistributed free cash flow. PE firms 
                                                 
4
 Difficult deals are defined by authors as transactions where private equity firms’ involvement and expertise are 
especially needed. 
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controlled boards tend to replace non-performing CEOs, measured by pre-deal return on 
assets. In contrast to public companies, PE backed companies are more likely to replace 
entrenched CEOs. Acharya and Kehoe (2008) continue on these lines to conclude that PEs are 
not hesitant to replace non-performing management and actually one-third of CEOs are 
replaced within the first 100 days whereas the remaining two-thirds are replaced within four 
years of the buyout date. 
More evidence on the relationship between management changes and performance is provided 
by Berg and Gottschalg (2005) who argue for the benefits to be gained in operational 
efficiency by replacing non-performing management. Heel and Kehoe (2005) build on their 
argument with statistics on 60 transactions by 11 leading private equity firms. They find that 
in the best performing third of the deals management is changed or strengthened in 83 percent 
of transactions whereas only in 33 percent of transactions experience management changes in 
the worst performing third. The authors find two other major factors influencing the 
company’s performance: active management and management incentives. They approach 
active management by studying the number of days that PE firms’ representatives spend with 
the target company’s management during the crucial first 100 days after the transaction. In the 
top third the representatives spend more than half of their time with the company’s 
management and meet almost daily whereas the corresponding figure for the worst third was 
20 percent. Management incentives also play a key role in company performance. Successful 
deals have usually incentive systems totalling roughly 15 to 20 percent of the total equity 
where the leading PE firms usually require the CEO to invest personally in the company. 
Management incentives 
Management incentives are provided not only through salaries but more effectively through 
equity stakes given by a PE firm to the target company’s management. Evidence on the topic 
suggests that incentives in general and especially the size have a considerable impact on 
company performance. Some PE firms have also found management’s investments in the 
company to drive greater performance thus requiring management to acquire a stake of the 
equity. This investment allows the management to have a position to capture the benefits of 
success but on contrary to also have a significant downside in case of non-performance. The 
nature of management equity in private companies is illiquid, therefore the possible benefits 
through an equity stake are not realised before a successful exit. The nature itself thus reduces 
agency problems especially in the case of manipulating short-term performance.  
33 
 
Wright et al. (2008) suggest in their comprehensive literature review that management’s 
equity incentives may have a substantial influence on company performance, however, the 
transaction price of the buyout could have a significant impact on the size of their stake. PE 
firms’ target return is highly sensitive to the price paid, the amount of debt raised and thus the 
share of equity they can obtain. Therefore, a higher transaction price or less external funding 
may both leave less room for management to receive an equity stake as PE firms would 
require a larger equity stake to obtain their target return.  
The actual size of management incentives in buyouts are studied by Acharya and Kehoe 
(2008) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) with similar data samples for U.K. from 1997 to 
2004 and for U.S. from 1996 to 2004, respectively. Acharya and Kehoe (2008) find a median 
CEO equity stake of three percent whereas the median management team as a whole receives 
15 percent of the company equity. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) report similar findings with 
a median CEO stake of 5.4 percent and a median management team stake of 16 percent. The 
findings are consistent with the first wave of buyouts in the 1980s studied by Kaplan (1989b), 
he found an increase in management equity stake by a factor of four when taking a company 
private. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) continue that even though a wider variety of 
management incentives are used today than in the 1980s, managers in leveraged buyouts still 
enjoy greater upside trough equity stakes than managers in public companies.  
The impact of corporate governance on PE returns is studied by Nikoskelainen and Wright 
(2007). The specific factors which create value in buyouts differ with the characteristics of 
target companies i.e. MBI, MBO, size, ownership, leverage etc. Therefore, the authors report 
that corporate governance engineering does not drive performance in all deals. However, 
management’s equity ownership is significant in determining returns in larger buyouts. The 
authors thus conclude that the value creation and returns are generated with interrelated 
governance mechanisms which all are context dependent in relation to characteristics of the 
company and the buyout. 
Conflicting evidence on the relationship of management incentives and performance is 
provided by Leslie and Oyer (2009) who report that PE backed buyouts do not have any 
considerable advantage over non-PE backed companies in terms of operational efficiency e.g. 
ROA, operating income or headcount. However, the authors find that PE buyout companies 
have much higher management incentives comparable public companies. They provide 
further insights in this area through three main observations. First, buyout company 
management enjoys on average an equity stake of almost twice as large as comparable 
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companies’ management which amounts to 2.3 percent equity ownership. Second, buyout 
company management has on average 11.7 percent lower salary than comparable 
management, which a considerable part can be explained with smaller size of buyout 
companies. Third, buyout company management has on average 12.5 percent higher variable 
pay share. The result thus suggest that management compensation does not drive abnormal 
operational performance in buyouts over peer companies even though the management has 
much stronger incentives. 
3.1.2 Financial engineering 
Jensen (1986, 1989) suggested that PE firms employ corporate governance mechanisms in 
their buyout companies to reduce agency costs which in turn increase the value of the 
company by operating more efficiently. The mechanisms are two-fold e.g. a carrot and a stick. 
First, PE firms improve incentives for management to work harder by involving them as 
equity owners of the buyout company, as discussed in greater detail in section 3.1.1. 
Governance engineering. These incentives act as a carrot to boost the potential upside at the 
time of time of an exit. Second, PE firms will lever the buyout companies creating a heavy 
debt burden. High leverage levels will force the management to operate the company more 
efficiently as a failure to do so would result in a bankruptcy and thus losing their jobs and 
realising the downside in their equity stakes, hence the stick.  
The free cash flow problem will be alleviated or eliminated as higher leverage accompanied 
by higher interest costs and repayments will decrease the cash at disposal of managers, thus 
the management could not as easily engage in non-value maximising investments. Also, the 
risk of bankruptcy increases with the level of leverage, forcing the managers to act in the best 
interest of the company and to make optimal investments to reduce risks involved with 
leverage. Higher debt levels are beneficial as long as the costs of expected financial distress 
do not outweigh the benefits of reduced agency costs and increased interest tax shields. The 
optimal capital structure is discussed by Modigliani and Miller (1958) who argue that it is 
achieved when the marginal benefits of leverage equal the marginal costs. 
The structure of the debt affecting motivation of managers is also taken in account in Jensen’s 
(1986) argument. He suggests that not only the higher debt level is driving management 
towards more efficient operations but rather the amount of the periodical payments. More 
pressure during the critical early stages of the buyout created by shorter maturity debt creates 
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stronger incentives for the management to work. Therefore, the use debt is more likely to 
motivate managers if a buyout is financed partly with shorter term debt. 
The literature has concentrated mainly on two aspects of leverage, first, the effect of leverage 
on returns and second, on the factors influencing the use of leverage. The next two chapters 
will discuss the empirical evidence on these two topics. 
The effect of leverage on company value and returns 
One main source of value creation in buyouts has been identified to be interest tax shields i.e. 
tax deductibility of interest payments. Prior research has studied the value of these tax shields, 
however, the estimates have always been highly sensitive to the assumptions made with the 
debt structure. Evidence on the value of tax shields as well as their sensitivity to the debt 
structure is provided by Kaplan (1989a) who finds interest tax shield to account from four to 
40 percent of company’s value. Lower estimates assume a debt repayment schedule of eight 
years and the benefit of corporate tax deductions are offset by personal taxes whereas higher 
estimates assume a permanent debt without any offset of personal taxes. Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) approximate a reasonable range for tax shields in 1980s, based on the 
results of Kaplan (1989a), to be from 10 to 20 percent.  
Guo et al. (2011) study 192 public-to-private buyouts in the U.S. completed between 1990 
and 2006 finding a 33.8 percent share of returns attributable to interest tax shields, other 
sources of returns being mainly operational improvements and general development in 
industry valuation. The authors, however, point out that the estimation is made under the 
assumption that the companies are able to maintain the same leverage ratios after the exit and 
thus being overstated for e.g. distressed companies. Similar findings are presented with 
European data by Acharya et al. (2011) who study 395 Western European PE transactions 
during the years 1991 to 2007. The authors conclude that 49.7 percent of average IRR in the 
deals in question is generated by financial leverage, other main sources being general industry 
valuation development and abnormal operating performance.  
The benefits of using leverage for value gains has likely decreased recently due to more strict 
credit terms and less external financing given by lenders. The studies presented above have 
data samples ending before the most recent crisis and thus still reflect the booming economy 
and looser credit terms. However, the most recent deals studied (prior to 2008) show already 
the trend towards using less leverage. According to Guo et al. (2011) the 1980s leverage 
ratios were as high as 90 percent whereas their study revealed more conservative, but still 
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high, use of leverage of 70 percent measured by total debt to capital. Lower leverage ratios in 
recent deals might also be due to the more conservative transactions in the terms of pricing. 
The authors point out that despite the trend of less risky transactions, the deals completed in 
2005 and later show higher valuations followed by higher leverage and lower interest 
coverage ratios. It seems that although financial engineering gains may be harder to obtain 
than in the 1980s, it still remains as the one key factor in creating value for PE investments.  
Factors behind the use of leverage 
The chapter above established a relationship between value generation and leverage, but are 
there other factors behind the use of leverage and to explain the development during recent 
years. The paper of Axelson et al. (2009b) answers the question by studying 153 large 
buyouts from 1985 to 2006 covering both the U.S. and Europe with roughly equal sub-
samples. The authors find that the factors driving leverage in buyouts are cross-sectionally 
unrelated to comparable peer companies and mainly driven by the cost of borrowing. The 
authors conclude that leverage and pricing of deals are affected by the availability of 
financing which has caused the private equity waves. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) report similar 
conclusions that low interest rates result in private equity funds to accelerate their 
investments.  
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) raise a question on the difference between the factors driving 
leverage in buyouts and public companies. Guo et al. (2011) show that in their data sample 
buyouts result in a median increase in leverage of 45.7 percent, suggesting roughly 50 percent 
difference in leverage between public and buyout companies. In their comprehensive 
literature review, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) propose three explanations to this difference. 
First, public equity investors’ pressure from worry of higher debt levels and the associated 
risk of bankruptcy could prevent managers from exploiting favourable debt market conditions 
or managers themselves do not like to carry high debt loads. Second, as repeat borrowers PE 
funds have been able to build a good reputation with lenders leading to better credit terms and 
access to credit market. Third, compensation structure (discussed in more detail in Section 2) 
through management fees as a percentage of total capital managed give incentives to increase 
leverage ratios beyond optimal levels of an individual firm. Also, good recovery rates in the 
case of bankruptcies might also provide incentives to increase leverage. Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998) conclude for defaulted LBOs in the 1980s that the companies were valued roughly the 
same after a rescue or sale as going concern as they were before the buyout.  
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3.1.3 Operational engineering 
Since the 1980s, the private equity field has seen major developments. One significant 
development, discussed by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), was to use one additional source 
for value creation, operational engineering, in addition to governance improvements and gains 
from leverage. The authors define operational engineering as superior knowledge on 
industries and operations which PE firms use to create value in their portfolio companies. 
This has driven PE firms to seek out talent with various backgrounds in operations, finance, 
industries along with professionals in organic and inorganic growth strategies (Kaplan and 
Strömberg 2009, Acharya et al. 2011). The success of private equity firms has transformed 
the competitive landscape. Today, competition between a larger number of international and 
local PE firms for the best deals has led to a more diligent identification of potential targets. 
PE firms use their expertise, investment bankers as well as consultants to identify valuable 
investments and to construct beforehand comprehensive development plans to assess the 
target company’s viability as an investment.  
Literature on operational efficiency gains is largely positive; Table 3 provides a short review 
of research made in this area. The evidence is consistent across methods, time periods and 
geographical locations. However, analysing the evidence one should keep in mind the two 
main factors that may plague the results. First, literature has shown managers to manipulate 
companies’ earnings prior to transactions (Wu, 1997) and second, selection bias arising from 
non-available accounting data for private companies, especially in the U.S. where private 
company reporting is voluntary.  
Table 3 - Recent empirical evidence on operational efficiency in private equity deals 
Authors Study sample Findings 
Kaplan 
1989b 
76 large PTP MBOs in 
the U.S. from 1980 to 
1986 
Operational improvements create value in LBOs. 
Operating income, operating margin, operating income to 
assets, inventory to sales and net cash flow all have 
significant improvements during the first three years after 
the buyout. However, sales development lags behind the 
industry peers.  
Lichtenberg and Siegel 
1990 
12,000 manufacturing 
plant LBOs in the U.S. 
from 1983 to 1986 
Manufacturing plants experiencing a LBO had higher total 
factor productivity (TFP) than industry peers. The 
abnormal performance over peers continued after the LBO 
exit. 
Wright et al. 
1997 
409 buyouts in the U.K. 
from 1982 to 1985 
Buyout companies outperform their non-buyout peers in 
two to five years after the buyout in terms of productivity 
and financial ratios.  
Desbrierers and Schatt 161 MBOs in France MBO companies’ performance exceeds that of their peers 
before and after the buyout, however, performance of the 
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2002 from 1988 to 1994 buyout companies decline after the exit. 
Harris et al. 
2005 
35,752 manufacturing 
plant MBOs in the U.K. 
from 1982 to 1998 
Manufacturing plants experiencing MBOs have significant 
improvements in productivity after the buyout. These 
improvements are not limited to certain industries. 
Bergström et al. 
2007 
73 Swedish buyouts from 
1998 to 2006 
Using EBITDA margin and ROIC figures as indicators of 
operating profitability, the authors find significant 
improvements in the buyout companies relative to peer 
companies. However, the findings do not support 
abnormal growth in buyout companies over their peers. 
Weir et al. 
2008 
138 PTPs in the U.K. 
from 1998 to 2004 
The authors find for buyout companies significant 
improvements in financial health relative to the year prior 
the buyout and relative to their peer companies. Further 
evidence is provided of significant improvements in 
working capital and liquidity. However, same 
improvements cannot be found for profitability. 
Leslie and Oyer 
2009 
144 reverse LBOs in the 
U.S. from 1996 to 2006 
Buyout companies do not outperform public peer 
companies in terms of profitability or operational 
efficiency. In the data sample sales per employee is the 
only measure to show positive and significant relation to 
PE ownership and buyout performance. 
Acharya et al. 
2011 
395 Western European 
PE buyouts from 1991 to 
2007 
Abnormal performance of buyouts over their peers is 
generated through EBITDA margin and sales growth. 
Evidence is also provided on the influence of PE firms’ 
partners background on performance in organic and 
inorganic development of the buyouts. 
Guo et al. 
2011 
192 PTP buyouts in the 
U.S. from 1990 to 2006 
The modest operating gains found in the study either 
compare to or slightly exceed those of their peer 
companies depending on adjustments for the measures. 
Jääskeläinen 
2011 
144 Nordic buyouts from 
2005 to 2007 
Industry adjusted change in operating performance of 
buyout companies is significant in terms of sales growth, 
profitability, employment efficiency and working capital 
efficiency. 
Lerner et al. 
2011 
495 PE buyouts that have 
at least one patent in the 
U.S. from 1980 to 2005 
The authors study whether long term performance is 
sacrificed for short term gains and measure this by using 
patenting activity as a proxy. They find that the quantity 
of patenting does not change, buyout companies’ patents 
are more cited and their portfolios become more focused 
as a result of PE ownership. 
 
United States 
Kaplan (1989b) found major operational improvements in his sample of companies, results 
being significant both absolutely and relative to industry within a time frame of three years 
after completing the buyout. The author, however, found buyout companies to grow slower 
than comparable companies although other measures were highly positive and significant e.g. 
mean operating margin over peers ranged from 12.4 percent to 34.8 percent and inventory 
levels dropped 10 percent relative to sales. The results were unchanged even after controlling 
for divestments suggesting MBOs to create value trough operational improvements.  
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Guo et al. (2011) provide an exception to the highly positive operating improvements with a 
recent U.S. data sample. The authors find modest operating improvements which either 
compare to or slightly exceed those of their comparable companies, depending on adjustments 
made for the measures. Only after adjusting for industry, performance and market-to-book, 
there is a significant increase in EBITDA to sales and net cash flow to sales from one year 
prior to the buyout to one or two years after. The results do not match the high gains found in 
the 1980s. However, the authors do find high investor returns at the company level of which 
they can attribute 22.9 percent to operating efficiency improvements, 17.7 percent to changes 
in general industry valuation and 33.8 percent to tax shields.  
Leslie and Oyer (2009) study managerial incentives in reverse LBOs in the U.S., along with 
their findings on the main topic the authors also study operational performance in these 
companies. The authors’ operating metrics include Return on Assets, EBITDA/Total assets, 
sales per employee and employees/Total assets, however, the only measure to show 
significant and positive development under PE ownership is sales per employee. Furthermore, 
the authors find that even this measure shows no difference between the buyout companies 
and their public equivalents.  
Europe and UK 
Similar positive findings for operational performance improvements are provided by Wright 
et al. (1996), Weir et al. (2008) and Acharya et al. (2011). Wright et al. (1996) extend the 
study horizon to six years post buyout shedding evidence on longer term effects of buyouts in 
the U.K for the first time. The authors report no short term gains from PE ownership over 
comparable companies. However, over years from three to five after the transaction, buyout 
companies seem to outperform their peer companies in terms of return on assets and profit per 
employee. The authors also find evidence of deteriorating performance of buyout companies 
in the year six. Overall, during the six years under review buyouts outperform non-buyouts on 
average by 9 percent measured by the authors’ productivity measure.  
With a more recent public-to-private deal data in the U.K. Weir et al. (2008) show significant 
improvements in financial health post transaction for the buyout companies both absolutely 
and relatively to companies remaining public. The more detailed analysis reveals significant 
improvements in working capital efficiency and liquidity, however, profitability significantly 
declining after the buyout. The authors also make a distinction between PE backed and non-
PE backed buyouts and find no difference in the two types of deals in terms of financial 
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health. Their analysis concludes privatisation to reduce agency costs in all deals but PE 
companies to achieve larger gains through financial and governance engineering, though the 
gains are limited to the latest wave of buyouts. 
Acharya et al. (2011) expand their dataset to cover Western Europe. Their findings suggest 
PE buyout to outperform their peers especially in terms return which is associated with 
greater sales growth and EBITDA margin improvement relative to the comparable companies. 
The abnormal performance in operating efficiency creates on average 34 percent of the 
average IRR for the sample of companies. Other sources of return are identified as financial 
engineering (50 percent) and exposure to the industry (16 percent). The authors also show 
evidence of general partner background to influence buyout companies’ performance. They 
find significantly higher outperformance in organic deals or internal value creation programs 
if driven by general partners with operational background e.g. consulting or industry 
managers. The same logic applies in M&A driven deals where GPs with banking or 
accounting background create significantly higher outperformance.  
Mitigated bias 
Selection bias in operational performance studies has been a major problem in making 
definite conclusions on the efficiency of PE backed buyout companies. While studies made 
with a U.S. data are mainly concentrated around reverse LBOs, PTPs or deals with other 
obligations to disclose their financial statements such as public debt, some European studies 
have been able to mitigate this problem by taking advantage of the legislation requiring 
private companies to disclose their accounts. As it is with this study, Desbrierers and Schatt 
(2002), Bergström et al. (2007) and Jääskeläinen (2011) have been said or could be described 
as to have encountered only slight selection bias, mainly associated with availability of some 
public accounts although required by legislation to disclose. 
Desbrierers and Schatt (2002) study management buyouts in France in late 1980s and early 
1990s, finding evidence of buyout companies to outperform their peer companies both before 
and after the buyout. In contrast to studies made with U.S. or U.K. data, the authors report a 
declining trend in performance after an exit of the buyout. Former family businesses are 
identified to encounter a more severe decline in performance after an exit than divestitures of 
subsidiaries of Groups, former constituting a significant share of the French company 
universe. The conclude that buyout companies are able to deliver higher return on investors 
measured by EBIT to economic assets, are significantly less levered, have higher liquidity 
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indifferent of the measure used and are more profitable than their peer companies. The 
authors argue that to a major part of this outperformance can be attributable to reduced agency 
costs through transferring the management to experts in a particular business field. 
Important contribution to Nordic as well as European PE literature is provided by Bergström 
et al. (2007) who study Swedish PE buyouts in late 1990s to mid 2000s. As measured by PE 
investments as a percentage of GDP, Sweden represents the second largest private equity 
market in the Europe (EVCA, 2011). The authors’ evidence suggest PE companies to have a 
significant and positive impact on their buyout companies’ operational performance in terms 
of EBITDA margin and return on invested capital. They report a 3.07 percent change in 
EBITDA margin of buyout companies over their peers. The value created by PE firms can not 
be attributed to transfer of wealth from employees to investors or a breach of implicit 
contracts facilitated by a buyout. Furthermore, the authors find no evidence that higher 
leverage or management ownership would be drivers in the value creation process. Their 
results are consistent with the literature suggesting PE firms to drive abnormal performance of 
their buyouts over peer companies.  
Jääskeläinen (2011) extends his study to cover the Nordic countries, including Sweden, 
Finland, Norway and Denmark with a data sample covering deals made between 2005 to mid 
2007. The author studies operational performance buyouts, however, unlike Bergström et al. 
(2007) and this study, the author limits his report not to take in account the determinants of 
this performance. The findings are consistent with general literature that PE buyouts 
outperform their peers in terms of employment efficiency and working capital efficiency. 
However, opposed to a number of studies, he finds outperformance also in sales growth and 
profitability. Some evidence is also provided on the differences between Nordic countries, 
suggesting Swedish and Norwegian buyouts to drive the whole Nordic sample operational 
performance. 
Real effects 
The study of operational performance of buyout companies has been extended to cover to real 
effects i.e. productivity, R&D activity and the resulting patents. On this front, this paper 
indentifies two studies which have had a major contribution on the study of real effects, 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and Harris et al. (2005) who extend the former study with a 
larger and more detailed data sample.  
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Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) were the first to study the relationship between LBOs and 
MBOs and productivity. Their data sample covered over 19,000 manufacturing plants in the 
U.S. from 1970s to 1980s. Their findings suggest that LBO plants outperformed their industry 
equivalents both pre and post buyout in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) and that 
plants which were under a MBO showed even greater performance over their peers. The mean 
TFP for the whole sample over their peers increased from 2.0 percent to 8.3 percent in a three 
year period post buyout. The corresponding figure for MBOs increased from 4.3 percent to 
10.2 percent over the same time period. The productivity improvement could not be attributed 
to cuts in employee remuneration, investments or the number of blue-collar employees. The 
authors also shed some light on the impact of buyouts on R&D which has been especially 
difficult to study due to data availability. The authors report that LBO companies are much 
less R&D intensive than other companies due to the non-R&D intensive nature of typical 
buyout industries and overall buyout companies’ R&D expenditure is below the industry 
average. The results suggest, despite the lower R&D intensity of buyouts that R&D 
investments do not change after a buyout transaction and thus the productivity gains measured 
by TFP are not driven by cuts in R&D.  
Along on these lines, Lerner et al (2011) study whether long term performance of PE buyouts 
is sacrificed for short term gains. The authors study changes in patenting activity and find no 
change in quantity of patents being issued for the buyout companies, however, they do find 
and increase in patent citations (proxy for economic importance) and that the companies’ 
patent portfolios converge into the core areas of a particular company. Therefore, consistent 
with Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), PE firms do not engage in sacrificing long term 
performance for short term gains by tampering with the companies’ R&D activity. 
Harris et al. (2005) extended the study of Lichtenberg and Siegel (2005) with a larger data 
sample of roughly all manufacturing plant MBOs in the U.K. from 1982 to 1998, amounting 
to circa 36,000 individual plants. The authors found inconsistently with Lichtenberg and 
Siegel (1990) that the MBO plants were less productive than their industry equivalents, 1.6 
percent and 2.0 percent less efficient before the buyout in the short term and in the long term, 
respectively. However, the authors did find significant increases in TFP in the short term and 
in the long term after the buyout, 70.5 percent and 90.3 percent, respectively. Furthermore, 
these productivity improvements were not limited to particular industries. The results suggest 
that the efficiency improvement were a result of new management or owners who reduced the 
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labour intensity of production increasing outsourcing in the manufacturing process and that 
the MBOs are an effective way to achieve these gains.  
3.2 Abnormal benefits created by specialisation gains 
The current literature, public press as well as industry reports all support the fact that private 
equity firms drive towards concentrating their investing activities around certain industries or 
development and investment stages (here forth stages) to accumulate and utilise their 
expertise to achieve competitive advantage over other investors. (The Economist, 2004; 
EVCA, 2005) Table 4 provides a short summary of literature on the relationship between 
specialisation and PE performance. 
Table 4 - Recent empirical evidence on specialisation gains in private equity deals 
Authors Study sample Findings 
Norton and 
Tenenbaum 1993 
A survey of 98 venture 
capitalists being 
members of National 
Venture Capital 
Association in 1990 
The authors conclude that specialisation in a particular 
investment stage or in connected stages as well as 
specialisation in a limited number of industries or 
companies will enable the VCs to better control risk of 
their investments due to gains in information sharing. 
Maningart et al. 
2002 
A survey of 200 VC 
companies in the U.S., 
U.K., France, Belgium 
and Netherlands in late 
1990s 
Stage specialist venture capitalists demand higher returns 
in deals which require higher intensity involvement i.e. in 
the deals which are not in their core investment stage. 
Ljungqvist and 
Richardson 2003 
73 funds that a major 
U.S. institutional 
investor invested in from 
1981 to 1993 
The authors found that private equity funds tend to 
specialise in a small number of industries and the mean of 
PE investments concentrated on one industry was roughly 
40 percent of the total number of companies held. 
However, the authors did not find any significant impact 
of specialisation on returns of the funds. 
Lossen  
2006 
227 PE funds of an 
European fund-of-funds 
investor gathered from 
2004 and 2005 
The authors study the impact of diversification on the PE 
funds’ returns. They find that higher diversification across 
stages drives lower returns, but higher diversification 
across industries drives higher returns. This implies that 
specialisation benefits would drive returns in 
concentrating on a limited number of stages. The authors 
did not find any relationship between diversification 
across countries and the funds’ returns. 
Cressy et al. 
2007 
122 PE buyouts in the 
U.K. from 1995 to 2002 
Private equity companies generate higher operating 
profitability for their portfolio companies compared to 
their non-PE backed peers. Industry specialisation drives 
higher abnormal performance whereas stage specialisation 
may give advantages in growth prospects. 
Brigl et al. 
2008 
1,000 PE buyouts in 
Europe from 2000-2006  
Diversification across countries or industries does not 
predict buyout performance in terms of PE fund IRR. The 
results suggest that there are no specialisation gains to be 
achieved by concentrating on a limited number of 
countries or industries. 
Gompers et al. 1,084 VC firms and Venture capitalists with higher level of industry 
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2008 13,785 VC companies in 
the Venture Xpert 
database from 1975 to 
1998 
specialisation have a higher likelihood of success in their 
portfolio companies. 
 
Cressy et al. (2007) provide two theories which may explain the specialisation gains that drive 
the current development of private equity firms. First, by accumulating information of certain 
industries or stages PE firms reduce the information asymmetries associated with probability 
of success in a particular situation. Second, PE firms gaining more experience in these 
industries or stages allows the use of more in-depth understanding of the market environment 
and the target company’s strengths and weaknesses in a particular situation i.e. PE firms 
reduce uncertainty of their investment prospects. Therefore, not only PE firms are able to 
drive higher performance in these companies through their expertise, they also may be able to 
select the companies with best possible prospects for investment. The authors also point out 
that while interpreting the possible specialisation benefits, one should measure them against 
possible costs of lower diversification. 
Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) also studied the theories behind specialisation benefits along 
on the same lines as Cressy et al. (2007). The authors conclude that certain some venture 
capitalists are more focused as they seek to control the risk of their investments through the 
gains in information sharing. 
The underlying hypothesis in this study thus is that industry as well as stage specialisation 
will enable private equity firms to drive higher performance in their portfolio companies than 
that of the non-specialised PE firms. 
Cressy et al. (2007) find strong support for the specialisation hypothesis. The authors 
conclude PE backed buyouts to drive abnormal operating profitability over comparable 
companies by 4.5 percent and industry specialisation to add 8.5 percent on top of the normal 
PE operating profitability over peers. However, the authors do not find similar strong effects 
with stage specialisation but suggest that it may have a positive effect on growth. The authors 
also show evidence of financial engineering and skill in investment selection to drive PE 
company performance rather than managerial incentives as suggested by previous literature. 
Similar positive findings are provided by Gottschalg and Wright (2008) who suggest that 
more experienced and more focused PE firms in certain industries are able to use their 
expertise to drive better development in their portfolio companies. Their results suggest that 
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by some PE firms which focus on a limited number of industries would be able to create real 
and lasting value for their companies.
5
 
Evidence of specialisation benefits in venture capital markets is provided by Maningart et al. 
(2002) who conclude that venture capitalists who invest outside their core expertise demand 
higher returns for the deals as the deals require higher intensity involvement from the VCs. 
The results provide more support to the theory of specialisation decreasing the uncertainty 
and risks of the investments, thus resulting in lower required returns. Gompers et al. (2008) 
continue with specialisation and venture capitalists and report that more industry specialised 
VCs are associated with greater probability of success of the portfolio company. 
Lossen (2006), however, provide mixed evidence on specialisation benefits as he finds that 
PE funds’ returns increase with diversification across industries but decreases with 
diversification across stages. The results imply that specialisation gains would drive returns 
by focusing on a limited number of stages whereas industry specialisation and focus would 
have a negative effect on returns. The authors also shed light on country diversification, 
however, do not find any consistent influence on returns. The findings of Birgl et al. (2008) 
are along the lines of Lossen (2006) on geographical diversification. However, the authors do 
not find that industry diversification would be a significant driver in PE firm returns. 
The conclusions of Ljundqvist and Richardson (2003) are consistent with Birgl et al. (2008) 
and report that they do not find any significant evidence of industry diversification to 
influence returns. The authors do provide further support for PE firm trend to concentrate and 
specialise on a limited number of industries e.g. on average a PE firm has 40 percent of their 
investments in a particular industry. 
3.3 Other theories of private equity performance 
Critics of private equity have argued that the value creation in PE investments does not arise 
from operational, financial or governance engineering but rather from wealth transfer from 
employees to owners, taking advantage of private information or market timing. This section 
discusses each topic in greater detail and provides further evidence on PE value creation.  
3.3.1 Employment effects 
Leveraged buyouts and private equity firms have received criticism for transferring wealth 
from the target companies’ employees to the investors by severe cuts in the number of 
                                                 
5
 More detailed discussion of the authors’ findings could not be provided due to their paper not being available 
through Aalto University’s databases or public databases. 
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employees and their wages. It is true that PE firms restructure their target companies in seek 
for productivity and operating efficiency gains, however, there is no consistent proof in the 
literature that suggest layoffs to drive PE company performance. Table 5 provides a short 
review of evidence of employment effects in PE deals, consistent with the previous statement. 
Table 5 - Empirical evidence on employment effects in private equity deals 
Authors Study sample Findings 
Kaplan 
1989b 
76 large PTP MBOs in 
the U.S. from 1980 to 
1986 
Median change in employment 0.9 percent during a 
buyout and the corresponding figure after controlling for 
divestments is 4.9 percent. The results are not consistent 
with allegations of buyouts leading to job cuts, however, 
buyout employment increases less rapidly than their 
peers’. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel 
1990 
12,000 manufacturing 
plant LBOs in the U.S. 
from 1983 to 1986 
The compensation and number of white collar employees 
drop after a buyout and those of blue collar employees 
remain roughly the same. The ratio of white collar to blue 
collar employees decrease after a buyout by 6.5 percent 
compared to industry average. 
Amess and Wright 
2007 
533 LBOs in the U.K. 
from 1993 to 2004 
The authors conclude that LBOs’ or PE firms’ effect on 
employment is quite neutral, they do not create or destroy 
jobs. The results suggest that buyouts have similar 
employment growth than their peers but wage 
development is slower. 
Boucly et al. 
2008 
830 buyouts in France 
from 1994 to 2004 
The authors study employment effects in buyouts and find 
that buyout companies enjoy higher job and remuneration 
growth than their peer companies. The excess job growth 
over their peers is 13% within three years post buyout. 
Davis et al.  
2008 
3,200 PE firms in the 
U.S. from 1980 to 2005 
The authors conclude that buyout companies’ employment 
growth is smaller pre and post transaction than that of 
their peers. However, they find that buyouts engage in 
creative destruction in labour market where there is faster 
reallocation of jobs as well as more jobs at new 
establishments, resulting in overall only to a modest 
impact on net employment compared to their peers. 
 
Interpreting and analysing the results, one should remember that some studies might suffer 
bias arising from methodology used in the studies. Some research have not been adjusted for 
M&A activity or do not answer the question of differences and shifts between full time and 
part time employees. As Kaplan (1989b) suggest that there is a four percent difference in 
employment growth after adjusting for divestments.  
The evidence in literature, presented above, suggest that private equity firms do not engage in 
destroying jobs to transfer wealth to the investors. However, buyout companies’ employment 
and wage level growth on average does not match the growth of comparable companies. One 
exception should be noted, a study made with French data, Boucly et al. (2008) conclude that 
47 
 
both employment and wage growth for PE companies is greater than that of their peers. These 
results might be a result of the different determinants in value creation by country as 
suggested by Cumming et al. (2007) and the conclusions of Desbrierers and Schatt (2002) of 
the French market being structurally different as the French market is dominated by family 
companies. Overall, this implies that PE firms do not drive employment growth in their 
portfolio companies in general, but rather concentrate on value creation through improved 
performance. 
3.3.2 Asymmetric information 
Private equity firms have been claimed to take advantage of asymmetric information between 
private equity firms and their potential target companies and to use this private information to 
drive operational improvements and thus value creation in their investments. It is discussed in 
previous chapters that PE firms do use superior information to achieve abnormal 
performance. Also, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) have suggested that some critics argue that 
a target company’s management would favour PE ownership in seek of a good deal for 
themselves thus causing undervaluation. Therefore, this PE firms are suggested to achieve 
value for their investments by operational improvements achieved with insider and private 
information and by information asymmetries causing undervaluation. 
Operational improvements through private information as the only source of value is negated 
by evidence in literature. Kaplan (1989b) as well as Wistbacka (2002) both conclude that the 
buyout companies’ projections are too optimistic and therefore their actual performance does 
not match their forecasts. The asymmetric information criticism would suggest that the actual 
performance would be greater than the projections. 
Also, the claim of management to favour PE deals is not supported by evidence. A number of 
studies have shown that management is likely replaced after the transaction within a certain 
time period; Section 3.1.1 Governance engineering discusses these findings in greater detail. 
Therefore, the management can not be certain of PE firm’s willingness to maintain the 
managers in their current positions.  
There is, however, evidence on information asymmetries in pricing. Guo et al. (2007) as well 
as Acharya et al. (2011) suggest that PE firms can create large returns for their investments 
even with modest operational performance improvements. The results would suggest that PE 
firms can acquire companies with a considerably lower price than they receive when exiting 
the investment i.e. buyout companies are undervalued. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) provide 
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alternative explanations on the undervaluation issue. The authors suggest that the 
undervaluation could be a result of good negotiation skills of PEs against the target company 
board or mispricing caused by market fluctuations.  
3.3.3 Mispricing/cyclicality 
The waves of private equity activity, especially the two main waves in the 1980s and in mid 
2000s as identified by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), suggests that credit market conditions 
would be a significant driver in PE investments. Evidence to support the pattern is provided 
by Kaplan and Stein (1993) for the 1980s wave by suggesting buyout specialist to have 
received abnormally favourable credit terms from high yield bond investors. For the wave in 
mid 2000, Guo et al. (2007) have similar findings. The authors show that deals completed in 
2005 and later showed higher levels of leverage and lower interest coverage ratios, suggesting 
looser credit policy by lenders.  
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) thus provide a hypothesis, based on literature, that PE firms use 
mispricing of debt and equity as a source for returns i.e. arbitrage opportunities when interest 
rates are low compared to the cost of equity.  
Axelson et al. (2009b) provide evidence of the use of leverage in large LBOs in the U.S. and 
Europe with a data set covering 153 deals from 1985 to 2007. The authors find that the use of 
leverage in LBOs has the strongest relationship on the debt market conditions at the time of 
the transaction. The decrease in interest rates is associated with larger amount of debt used in 
the deals and also the availability of debt financing is found to be positively correlated with 
the acquisition price. Ljunqvist et al. (2007) use a similar time frame with 2,274 companies in 
the U.S. for 207 private equity funds initiated during 1981 to 2000. The authors’ results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that PE funds are more active in investing as interest rates 
decline.  
The results imply that the availability of debt financing is a major driver in private equity 
investment cycles. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) conclude that a necessary condition for high 
investment activity is for operating earnings yields to be higher than the interest rates of high 
yield bonds and vice versa for low investment activity.  
3.4 Nordic evidence 
Nordic countries have not received much attention in the buyout literature. To the best of my 
knowledge only Bergström et al. (2007) has conducted a detailed study of operational 
performance of buyouts, however, concentrating only on Sweden. Thus far, in Europe, only 
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British, Swedish and French buyouts have been studied in general although Nordic countries 
represent the largest PE market area in Europe if measured by private equity investments as a 
percentage of GDP (EVCA, 2011). There has been a number or Master’s theses on buyouts in 
Finland and Nordics, but the studies have largely concentrated on only Finnish markets and 
PE firms’ abnormal performance over their peers. Table 6 provides a short review of the 
private equity related studies conducted in the Nordic area. 
Table 6 - Empirical evidence on private equity deals in Nordic countries 
Authors Study sample Findings 
Wistbacka 
2002 
39 LBOs in Sampo Bank 
in Finland from 1994 to 
2000 
The author studied the characteristics of leveraged 
buyouts that Sampo Bank gave financing in the late 
1990s. He found that the deals were highly levered, no 
major changes in valuation or financial structure was 
present within the time frame and that the buyouts’ 
projections were too optimistic. Also, for distressed 
companies he found that management equity has an 
alleviating effect. 
Kekkonen 
2004 
40 MBOs in Finland 
from 1986 to 1999 
The author studies the post buyout performance of 
management buyouts in Finland. He found profitability 
and general performance improvement in the companies, 
however, no improvement in operational efficiency.  
Bergström et al. 
2007 
73 Swedish buyouts from 
1998 to 2006 
Using EBITDA margin and ROIC figures as indicators of 
operating profitability, the authors find significant 
improvements in the buyout companies relative to peer 
companies. However, the findings do not support 
abnormal growth in buyout companies over their peers. 
Havu 
2007 
54 LBOs in Finland from 
1996 to 2005 
The author studies operational efficiency in Finnish LBOs 
and reports higher operational efficiency and growth over 
their peer companies with an exception on profitability.  
Männistö 
2009 
191 PE buyouts in 
Finland from 2002 to 
2004 
The study was conducted on the private equity companies’ 
societal and economic impact on Finland. The author 
found that sales, the number of employees, total assets as 
well as intangible assets grew faster than that of their 
peers. The results were more pronounced for high 
technology companies and seed stage investments. 
Jääskeläinen 
2011 
144 Nordic buyouts from 
2005 to 2007 
Industry adjusted change in operating performance of 
buyout companies is significant in terms of sales growth, 
profitability, employment efficiency and working capital 
efficiency. In addition to above, Swedish and Norwegian 
buyouts tend to have higher performance than Finnish or 
Danish buyouts.  
 
Specialisation effects as well as the determinants of the alleged abnormal performance have 
been neglected. This study aims to study that are there any outperformance of PEs, does 
specialisation drive even higher performance and as suggested by Cumming et al. (2007) do 
the determinants of performance differ by country and market area. 
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4. Hypotheses 
The objective of this thesis is to study differences in operational efficiency between PE 
backed buyout companies and their peers as well as the determinants of the performance 
mainly PE firm specialisation advantages. In addition to this, this thesis covers the years from 
2003 to 2007 providing an unique opportunity to study the above mentioned pre and during 
the financial crisis. The hypotheses are divided into three subgroups; first, private equity 
firms’ performance on peer companies, second, the benefits of specialisation and third, 
changes of the performance and its determinants over the different economic conditions. The 
hypothesis are based on the theoretical framework provided by the previous literature which 
is discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
4.1 Operational efficiency 
First, the thesis attempts to answer to whether the Jensen (1989) hypothesis of alleged 
superior governance of private equity firms is creating superior operating performance for 
their portfolio companies over comparables. Operational efficiency is measured through sales 
growth, profitability, return as well as through working capital management which have been 
identified in previous literature as key areas of performance, among others Kaplan (1989b), 
Singh (1990), Berg and Gottschalg (2005), Bergström et al. (2007), Weir et al. (2008), 
Acharya et al. (2011), Guo et al. (2011) and Jääskeläinen (2011). Hence,  
H1: PE backed buyouts’ operational efficiency is significantly greater than that of the peer 
companies measured by Sales growth 
H2: PE backed buyouts’ operational efficiency is significantly greater than that of the peer 
companies measured by profitability as EBITDA margin and EBITDA/Total Assets 
H3: PE backed buyouts’ operational efficiency is significantly greater than that of the peer 
companies measured by return through ROIC 
H4: PE backed buyouts’ operational efficiency is significantly greater than that of the peer 
companies measured by working capital management as Cash conversion cycle and Net 
working capital/Sales 
4.2 Specialisation benefits 
The previous literature has provided evidence that private equity firms that specialise on 
either on industries or investment stages are able to drive higher operational performance and 
return in their portfolio companies. Among others, Norton and Tenenbaum (1993), Cressy et 
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al. (2007) as well as Gottschalg and Wright (2008) suggest deeper knowledge and expertise 
on certain areas to be the key driver in this abnormal performance. Hence, 
H5: Industry specialised PE firms are able to drive stronger operational efficiency through 
the measures provided above 
H6: Stage specialised PE firms are able to drive stronger operational efficiency through the 
measures provided above 
4.3 Persistence over economic conditions  
Previous literature has suggested persistence in performance for private equity firms due to 
accumulated experience and knowledge, among others Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Wright 
et al. (2009). Therefore, it can be expected that private equity firm performance should persist 
over time periods. Furthermore, private equity firms should be able to leverage on the 
superior expertise even during difficult economic conditions such as the financial crisis. This 
ability should thus be seen as greater difference in operational efficiency over peer companies 
during these difficult times as well as specialised firms should be able to outperform the non-
specialised firms due to the greater experience. Hence,  
H7: PE-backed buyouts’ abnormal operating efficiency has persisted over the financial crisis 
through the measures provided above 
H8: Industry specialisation benefits have persisted over the financial crisis, measured by the 
variables provided above 
H9: Stage specialisation benefits have persisted over the financial crisis, measured by the 
variables provided above 
5. Data 
This paper examines the Nordic (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway) private equity 
backed buyout companies and the benefits of private equity firm specialisation on the 
buyouts. The buyout companies are benchmarked to their peers to study whether the PE firms 
can create superior performance on their portfolio companies. The research window of 2003-
2007 also gives an opportunity to compare the pre and post financial crisis buyouts and their 
performance. A number of other explanatory factors are used in each stage to account for 
other determinants of performance, other than specialisation and PE backing. 
The research window from 2003-2007 was chosen due to several reasons. First, as discussed 
in the Section 1, the private equity activity has experienced two major waves; first being from 
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1982 or 1983 to 1989, second beginning in 2003 or 2004 and ending in 2007 or 2008 (Kaplan 
& Strömberg, 2009). The first wave has enjoyed much attention in the literature where as data 
availability issues have thus far limited the scope of studies to concentrate on the first wave or 
on the earlier years of the second wave. Furthermore, a longer time period with a sufficient 
number of observations allows splitting the data to pre and post financial crisis buyouts.  
Cressy et al. (2007) argue in their study that operating improvements of buyout firms should 
be visible within three years of the transaction. Further arguments are provided by Bull 
(1989), Kaplan (1989b), Malone (1989), Singh (1990), Opler (1992) and Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) who find that the buyouts made in the 1980s in the U.S. have considerable 
improvements in profitability and cash flow measures from one year prior the buyout to two 
to three years after the transaction. Wu (1997) on the other hand shows evidence of earnings 
manipulation in management buyouts prior to the transaction, thus casting doubt on the 
accuracy of the accounting measures used widely in the literature. To avoid the effects of 
manipulation on the measures, this study concentrates on the operating performance 
improvements on the year of the buyout to three years after the transaction. The accounting 
data for the base year, year of the transaction, is gathered in the spirit of Bergström et al. 
(2007). The authors suggest that to calculate only the impact of PE ownership, only the years 
which have enjoyed private equity backing for the majority of the months should be 
accounted for. Therefore the base year for the buyouts occurring on the first half of the year, 
the prior year will be used and for the buyouts occurring on the second half, the same year is 
used as the base year. The research window of this study thus must close in the end of 2007 in 
order to obtain full three years of operational data for each buyout company as at the time of 
this thesis the fiscal year 2011 figures are only partially available whereas the fiscal year 2010 
figures can be obtained. However, operational data has been gathered only to the point where 
the private equity firm in question has exited the company if the divestment has been made 
within the three years of the buyout. This necessary adjustment is made as the paper 
concentrates on the improvements of the PE firm on the company under its influence.  
The construction of the dataset was carried out in five phases; first identifying the transactions 
over the targeted time period, second, a matching peer group to the buyout companies was 
selected, third, information on private equity firms was collected for estimating the degree of 
specialisation and for control variables, fourth, operational data on both the buyout companies 
and the peer group was gathered and finally data on the other control variables were 
identified. These phases will be described in greater detail in the following chapters.  
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5.1 Bias 
There are a number of biases that are present when studying LBOs and especially private 
equity backed buyouts. These biases are mainly concerned with selection and survivor bias.  
First, it is possible that a selection bias arises due to the fact that buyouts might not occur 
randomly in the whole population of companies. Also, the study is made with data gathered 
from Thomson VentureXpert (also known as Thomson Financial Venture Economics) which 
does not represent the whole private equity scene, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Kaplan & 
Srömberg (2009) both acknowledge this caveat of VentureXpert in their papers. The database 
thus might omit the smallest funds with smallest buyouts, resulting in a slight selection bias. 
However, unlike a major part of previous studies especially made with U.S. data, this study 
does not rely on companies which are publicly listed in some form such as public-to-private 
(PTP) deals, reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) or companies with public debt. By covering 
private companies, VentureXpert and this study suffers significantly less of the selection bias 
than the previous literature. 
Further selection bias might arise from the study’s focus on companies on their first round of 
financing of buyouts/acquisitions without prior private equity involvement rather than the 
whole universe of buyouts. VentureXpert lists the types of buyouts in the following manner: 
Startup/seed, early stage, expansion, buyout/acquisition, later stage and other. However, 
Figure 9 shows that the buyouts/acquisitions represent the majority of the market and provide 
less varying sample of private equity transactions. Other stages vary significantly by year e.g. 
replacement capital and later stage venture being only largely represented in 2006 and seed 
stage investments are absent totally in 2010.  
Figure 9 - European private equity investment by stage 2006-2010 in EURbn 
Source: EVCA, 2011, retrieved 27 September 2011. 
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Second, in some cases distressed companies might delay reporting their financials, the 
companies might not be even obligated to report or the population would be limited to 
companies remaining within the sample over the observation period, leading to survivor bias. 
This study concentrates on the post-buyout performance and does not cover explicitly exited 
companies, therefore, the sample used will include all companies, whether or not they have 
experienced distress and whether or not the companies have been exited. Disclosure of 
accounting data of private companies in the U.S. relies on voluntary reporting and thus is 
seldom done to limit the amount of information on the company of which the competitors 
could benefit (Bergström et al., 2007). In the European Union a directive sets the obligatory 
minimum standard of private company disclosure of accounting information to the public, the 
company should thus report the balance sheet, income statement as well as the notes to the 
financial statements (Cumming and Waltz, 2004). However, Weir et al. (2008) state that for 
their sample of companies in the UK that the quality of the disclosed accounts might limit the 
advantage of mandatory disclosure in Europe. This might be true especially for some 
commercial databases providing certain items of the financial statement information. 
However, Orbis (a database providing accounting information), which is used in this thesis 
sources their information from local registries.  
5.2 Private equity company transactions 
The private equity backed buyout companies were identified using Thomson VentureXpert. 
The data obtained includes all completed first round private equity backed buyout deals in the 
Nordic region within the time frame from 2003 to 2007. The focus of the study is limited to 
first round of financing i.e. the first private equity involvement of the company, to better 
capture the effects of private equity on their target companies. Bergström et al. (2007) support 
the argument by suggesting that there are less room for operating efficiency improvements in 
companies that are acquired from other private equity firms than in first round of financing 
buyouts. The authors’ reasoning lies behind the expectation that a private equity firm will 
implement the possible operating efficiency improvement measures already during the first 
round, thus the subsequent measures made by a second private equity firm will have less 
effect on the company than the initial measures. 
The dataset includes 504 PE buyout companies which have had their first round of financing 
within the research window. The number of the companies covered in this study is limited to 
a more manageable size through a random selection where one third of the total number of 
buyouts made each year was included. Bankrupt companies were excluded from the random 
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selection due to issues with bias associated with comparing bankrupt buyouts with healthy 
peer companies. Roughly 10 percent of the randomly selected buyouts were bankrupt and thus 
replaced with a new random selection. PE companies have higher risk of being bankrupt as 
the companies are highly levered and PE firms have tendency to take on higher risk in the 
search for higher returns. Financial companies were also excluded in the selection process. 
The final sample of companies thus covers 160 buyouts. Due to data availability issues 127 of 
the buyouts had complete accounts available for the observation period. The effects of 
random selection as well as the estimation of the effect of missing account data on the results 
will be discussed in more detail in Section 6 and tested in Section 7. 
During this stage of data gathering Thomson VentureXpert was also used to gather additional 
data on the buyout companies and their private equity firms including the industry group, age 
of the company, fund and its size, sequence number of the fund, firm capital under 
management, PE firm affiliation as well as the number of companies invested in. These 
variables are used in the analysis as various proxies for sources for operational efficiency 
improvements. 
Figure 10 shows the distribution of the buyouts by domicile and year. The data has been split 
in to a subsample having complete account data of 127 buyouts as well as into the total 
sample of 160 buyouts. The figures show quite equally distributed sample over the years, 
although having a roughly increasing trend towards the end of the sample as it was the case 
with the whole PE market activity as shown in the Introduction Section. And as discussed in 
the same Section, Sweden is the most active PE market among the Nordic countries whereas 
Denmark has only roughly one fifth of the deals of Sweden. The buyouts were grouped by 
VentureXpert’s industry major group which shows a dominating quantity of companies in the 
Non-high-technology industry. The major group was selected as specialisation of the PE firms 
is increasingly hard to determine as more precise industry groups are used.   
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Figure 10 - Distribution of PE buyouts by domicile, year and industry group 
 
 
Source: Thomson VentureXpert 
5.3 Peer group selection  
This study measures the operating performance improvements, if any, the private equity 
involvement and specialisation advantages for the target companies. A proper way of testing 
the PE’s alleged advantages is to benchmark the buyout companies’ performance to a similar 
group of private companies which are not enjoying the knowledge and support of a private 
equity firm.  
Following the example of Alemany and Marti (2005) and Lerner (1999), a comparable sample 
of private non-PE buyout companies is matched with industry and size of the buyout 
companies. However, taking account differences in operating environment between each 
country, the peer group is further matched by geography (Cressy et al., 2007). Although the 
peer companies are matched through the factors above, a bias might still be present due to the 
fact that the companies might have completely different operations despite being in the same 
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industry. The method to compare performance with peer companies is not fool-proof, 
however, the literature suggests that it is accurate enough to make conclusions as well as a 
straightforward approach analyse the private equity benefits.  
First, the peer group is matched to the buyout companies using the NACE (an European 
industry standard classification system) classifications in Orbis. Second, the potential 
companies are further narrowed down by selecting the companies operating in the Nordics. 
And third, sales on the year of the buyout is selected to represent a proxy for size and matched 
accordingly to the peer companies. The selection is made in the spirit of the previous 
literature. Data on the peer companies were gathered in a later stage and the summary 
statistics are presented in Section 5.6. 
5.4 Private equity firm and funds 
This study probes further in the determinants of operating efficiency of PE backed buyout 
companies, especially focusing on the alleged superior governance advantages that PE firms 
may provide. The benefits of PE ownership are approached through studying both industry 
specialisation as well as stage specialisation. The degree of specialisation of a PE firm is 
measured against all other PE firms operating throughout the same time period. Thus, the 
degree of specialisation is relative to the other PE firms.  
The private equity firms operating within the research window were identified using Thomson 
VentureXpert totalling to 19,529 PE firms in the database. Each PE firm’s funds as well as 
portfolio companies were listed along with the portfolio companies’ operating industry and 
stage at the time of the buyout. The industry group of the portfolio company is classified 
according to the VentureXpert industry classifications and the stage in similar manner.  
More precise data were gathered of the private equity firms involved in the buyouts in the 
selected sample of this thesis. Summary statistics of these firms is presented in Table 7. The 
Table shows that on average the PE firms in question are quite experienced with a mean 
number of funds of 7, 184 companies invested in as well as US$ 3,940m capital under 
management. The average figures are rather high due to a few larger PE firms in the sample. 
The median figures shed some more light on a typical PE firm, however, still quite 
experienced according to the statistics. The sample is not limited to only experienced firms as 
it includes firms on their first fund under management or their first buyout. A rather large 
share of the buyouts had not yet been exited at the time the data was gathered which may be 
an effect of the financial crisis as PE firms are reluctant to sell the companies with lower 
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returns in an economic downturn as well as the absence of buyers as a result of the difficulty 
of obtaining external financing as well as risk associated with uncertain future development. 
Table 7 - Summary statistics of PE firms involved in the selected Nordic buyouts from 
2003 to 2007 
 
5.5 Operational data 
Operational data was gathered using the Orbis database from the year of the buyout to three 
years after the transaction or to the year of the exit if the company was divested within the 
three years. The data was gathered for both the buyout companies as well as for the peer 
group companies. As described in the beginning of this section, the base year for the 
transaction (year 0) was identified as the current year if the deal occurred on the second half 
of that particular year and as the previous year if the deal had occurred on the first half of that 
year.  
Operational data was gathered on sales, operating profit, depreciation, cost of goods sold, 
operating costs, total, fixed and current assets, current liabilities, inventory, receivables and 
payables, leverage, cash position and the number of employees. Roughly 21 percent of the 
selected companies did not have accurate coverage in the Orbis database, which was to be 
expected as PE firms are reluctant to publish or delay deliberately publishing the accounts 
data for their portfolio companies. 
One more step in the data gathering was added due to the structure of the private equity 
transactions. Private equity firms typically form a new holding company for which they raise 
capital and use to acquire the target company. Later the holding company is merged with the 
target to form the new portfolio company. This imposes a problem in the reported financials 
as new layers of subsidiaries are formed for the new parent. The problems arise with new 
names of the parent holding companies as well as the consolidation of the financial 
Mean Median Min Max St.dev No exit
Number of funds under management 7.13 4.00 1.00 50.00 9.57
Holding period (years) 4.15 4.00 1.00 8.00 1.92 56.69%
Number of companies invested in 183.98 50.00 1.00 1,441.00 380.17
Capital under management (US$ 
millions)
4,613.15 587.10 2.90 84,300.00 10,313.39
The table presents the summary statistics for the subsample of PE firms that were involved in the selected
Nordic buyouts during the time period of 2003-2007.
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statements. However, the Orbis database was used to identify the correct ultimate parent of 
the portfolio company. Descriptive statistics of all the variables are shown in Section 5.6. 
5.6 Other control variables 
Data for additional control variables or other determinants of operating efficiency, which 
could not be obtained using VentureXpert or Orbis were gathered from a variety of sources. 
Mergers and acquisitions activity of the portfolio company was identified using Zephyr 
database, CEO change was obtained from news sources and company websites and MSCI 
World Index and 12 month Euribor were obtained from Datastream. Also missing accounts 
for company age were gathered using company websites and news sources.  
5.7 Descriptive statistics 
Table 8 shows the summary statistics of the 127 companies and their peers with complete data 
available and includes all the variables used or gathered for this paper. Leverage could not be 
gathered for all the companies despite Orbis having all the other relevant data available. The 
t-test shows that PE firms are able influence the sales growth and maintain a higher EBITDA 
margin than the peer companies, the differences being significant at 1 and 5 percent level, 
respectively. The results are in line with the previous literature. However, EBITDA/Total 
Assets or ROIC do not show any significant difference between the two groups. Working 
capital (here forth WC)  measures show mixed evidence where cash conversion cycle (CCC) 
indicates that PE companies are using working capital more efficiently than peers although 
not significantly whereas Net Working Capital (NWC)/Sales and Inventory and Receivables 
are showing inefficient and Payables efficient use of WC compared to peers, the latter two 
significantly at 1 percent level. Overall the evidence at this stage suggests that PE firms are 
not more efficient in terms of use of working capital, not in line with the previous literature. 
The results thus seem to support the first and second hypothesis by outperforming the peer 
companies in terms of sales growth and profitability. Based on this simple comparison, 
hypothesis three and four should be rejected as there is no clear advantage for buyout 
companies in working capital management and return. 
Of the other operational efficiency measures the ratio of improvement in sales and the number 
of employees is significant at one percent level. The significance may arise also from the fact 
that sales have increased significantly more for buyout companies than peers, employment 
staying at the same level, however, indicating that efficiency in the companies has improved, 
being consistent with previous literature. 
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Table 8 - Summary statistics of PE backed buyout companies and the corresponding peer companies from 2003 to 2007 
 
 
Panel A - PE backed buyouts Panel B - Peer companies
Variable n Mean Min Max St.dev Mean Min Max St.dev T-test
Sales growth 127 31.5% -23.7% 263.7% 51.4% 8.7% -25.6% 87.4% 20.5% 4.64***
EBITDA margin 127 9.0% -50.0% 93.2% 15.8% 5.9% -53.8% 45.5% 11.9% 1.79**
EBITDA/Total Assets 127 11.3% -69.5% 44.4% 16.2% 10.9% -82.6% 56.0% 16.0% 0.17
ROIC 127 7.6% -154.2% 347.1% 37.9% 7.3% -131.2% 135.2% 25.6% 0.08
CCC 127 60.15 -216.11 385.10 100.51 68.27 -126.30 493.30 98.42 -0.65
Current ratio 127 2.14 0.26 11.07 2.47 1.96 0.41 11.97 1.64 0.71
NWC/Sales 127 0.16 -1.46 4.47 0.47 0.13 -1.98 1.47 0.33 0.42
Inventory/Sales 127 0.12 0.00 0.73 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.53 0.11 0.33
Receivables/Sales 127 0.14 0.00 0.56 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.50 0.08 2.73***
Payables/Sales 127 0.10 0.00 1.56 0.15 0.07 0.01 0.34 0.05 2.38***
ICA IND 127 0.65 0.00 1.00 0.48 - - - - -
ICA STG 127 0.89 0.00 1.00 0.31 - - - - -
HHI IND 127 0.50 0.00 0.78 0.23 - - - - -
HHI STG 127 0.47 0.00 0.77 0.25 - - - - -
PE affiliation 127 0.85 0.00 1.00 0.36 - - - - -
Leverage 114 0.18 -331.50 169.73 44.42 - - - - -
Company age 127 30.06 0.00 414.00 45.70 24.15 0.00 98.00 22.68 1.31*
PE size 127 4,613.15 2.90 84,300.00 10,313.39 - - - - -
PE experience 127 7.13 1.00 50.00 9.57 - - - - -
Initial sales 127 150,988.86 120.00 6,244,565.00 670,485.85 178,923.39 8.00 6,312,360.00 802,105.96 -0.30
Initial profitability 127 13.33% -227.71% 1032.71% 96.06% 6.66% -229.38% 75.00% 24.25% 0.76
Employment 127 39% -99% 406% 93% 6% -78% 288% 38% 3.80***
CAPEX/Sales 127 -4.80% -374.27% 106.61% 40.56% 0.11% -187.10% 206.38% 28.54% -1.11
CAPEX/Total Assets 127 -2.57% -72.69% 316.43% 34.22% -2.01% -224.93% 137.82% 27.56% -0.14
CEO 127 0.57 0.00 1.00 0.50 - - - - -
Acquisitions 127 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.46 - - - - -
Divestments 127 0.03 0.00 1.00 0.18 - - - - -
Acquisitions/Total Assets 127 4.46% 0.00% 141.46% 15.27% - - - - -
Divestments/Total Assets 127 0.38% 0.00% 39.32% 3.57% - - - - -
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Panel A - PE backed buyouts Panel B - Peer companies
Variable n Mean Min Max St.dev Mean Min Max St.dev T-test
MSCI 127 4,159,567.04 2,413,622.00 5,850,547.00 927,186.45 - - - - -
PE market 127 41.43 21.00 65.00 16.83 - - - - -
Interest rate 127 3.06% 1.99% 4.78% 0.91% - - - - -
The table presents the summary statistics of 127 Nordic PE backed buyout companies over three years from the buyout or the holding period if the company has been sold within
the three years and their corresponding 127 peer companies. The sample includes only companies with complete data available for the observation period. Comparisons of the mean
values of the variables between the buyouts and peers have been calculated using Welch's corrected t-test. Sales growth is the mean growth of sales over the holding period.
EBITDA margin and EBITDA/Total Assets are the mean values during the holding period, where EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciations and Amortisations. ROIC
is the mean value of Return on Invested Capital and CCC is the mean cash conversion cycle, a working capital measure. Current ratio shows the mean current ratio over the holding
period. Net Working Capital/Sales, Inventory/Sales, Receivables/Sales and Payables/Sales all are working capital measures and indicated as mean values over the period. ICA IND is
the industry specialisation dummy calculated using the Index of Competitive Advantage whereas ICA STG is the corresponding stage specialisation dummy, taking a value of one in 
the case of a specialised firm. HHI IND is the industy specialisation calculated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index whereas HHI STG is the corresponding stage specialisation.
PE Affiliation dummy indicates whether the PE firm is independent or affiliated with e.g. a government or a bank, taking a value of one in the case of an independent firm. Leverage is
the mean net debt/EBITDA over the period. PE Experience measures the experience of the PE firm using the fund's sequence number as a proxy. PE Size indicates the total capital
commitments made to the firm. Initial sales and Initial profitability indicate the amount of sales and the level of profitability using EBITDA margin % as a proxy on the year of the
buyout, respectively, indicators of PE firms alleged winner picking abilities. Company age measures the age of the company on the year of the buyout. CAPEX/Sales, CAPEX/Total
Assets and Employment (Sales/Number of employees) measure the changes in the ratios over the holding period proxies for CAPEX stripping and efficiency improvements,
respectively. CEO dummy indicates whether the CEO of the company has been replaced over the three years of the buyout, taking a value of 1 in the case of the event. Acquisitions
and Divestments dummies indicate whether the company has made acquisitions or divestments during the three years after the buyout taking a value of 1 in the case of the event,
respectively. Acquisitions/Total Assets and Divestments/Total Assets are the mean values for the values of the events relative to total assets of the company in question. MSCI is
the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Indexwhereas Interest rate indicates the level of the 12 month EURIBOR at the time of the buyout and thus measuring the state of
the market.  PE market is the total investments of European PE firms made on the buyout year according to EVCA in EURbn. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Capital Expenditure relative to Sales and Total Assets has decreased in the buyout companies, 
however, the difference to peers not being significant. This could be interpreted as a sign of 
diverting cash flows to PE firm returns or other functions, not being the case with this sample 
as the peer companies have had the same tendency during the observation period. The M&A 
activity of the buyout companies has been quite low over the period, amounting to 4.5 percent 
of Total Assets in acquisitions and 0.4 percent of Total Assets in divestments. Leverage of the 
buyouts measured by Net Debt/EBITDA is rather low compared to previous levels reported 
by the literature and private equity convention with a mean ratio of 0.18. In other terms of 
liquidity, Current Ratio is not significantly different between the groups although PE firms do 
have slightly higher mean value. CEO of the company has been changed within the three 
years of the buyout in roughly half of the companies. Cornelli and Karakas (2011) suggest in 
their paper that CEO change is more likely in “difficult” companies which in my sample 
might be present due to the difficult conditions provided by the economic downturn.  
The two different specialisation variables paint a different picture of the PE firms. The Index 
of Comparative Advantage (ICA) suggest that more than half of the PE firms are either or 
both industry or stage specialised whereas the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index (HHI) suggests 
that on average the PE firms are neither diversified nor specialised in industries or investment 
stages. Other PE firm variables show that the firms are on average quite experienced as shown 
by the number of funds and the amount of capital under management as well as that the firms 
are mostly independent i.e. not affiliated with a bank or other institution. The size of the PE 
market and its developments were discussed in previous Sections.  
The difference between the buyout companies and their peers in terms of age and initial sales 
and profitability show that the two groups are quite comparable. The only significant 
difference being the company age, at 10 percent level. However, the data shows that the peer 
companies have had slightly higher initial sales than buyouts whereas buyout companies have 
outperformed their peers in terms of initial profitability 
6. Methods & variables 
This section will first introduce the variables used in this thesis and second the methods used 
to analyse the variables. Table 9 summarises and provides a short description and a more 
detailed explanation is given in the following chapter along with justification for the use of 
these metrics. The second chapter introduces the methods in greater detail and provides 
mathematical formulas used to analyse the data.  
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6.1 Variables 
As this paper is concentrating on the operational improvements that PE firms are allegedly 
able to impose on their portfolio companies, the variables that measure this ability are only 
the best possible proxies. Governance can not be measured itself, however, literature has 
identified an number of proxies that are used in this paper. Control variables are also 
introduced to account for other sources of improvement other than governance.  
6.1.1 Dependent variables 
Growth 
The dependent variables used in this thesis measure the companies’ performance through 
three topics: growth, operating performance and return. First, growth is measured by the mean  
Table 9 - Variables used in the analysis 
Variables Explanation of the variables 
  
Dependent variables  
Sales growth Geometric mean growth of sales over the three year period post-buyout 
EBITDA margin  Mean operating profitability over the three year period post-buyout. Calculated as 
EBITDA/sales 
EBITDA/Total Assets Mean return on assets over the three year period post-buyout 
ROIC Mean return on invested capital over the three year period post-buyout. Calculated 
as (Sales-operating costs)*(1-theoretical tax rate)/(fixed assets+non-cash current 
assets-short term payables) 
CCC Working capital efficiency measure calculated as mean cash conversion cycle over 
the three year period post-buyout  
NWC/Sales Mean Net Working Capital/Sales over three years or the holding period 
  
Independent variables  
ICA IND A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the PE firm is industry specialised and 
value of 0 in all other cases, calculated with the Index of Comparative Advantage 
ICA STG A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the PE firm is stage specialised and value 
of 0 in all other cases, calculated with the Index of Comparative Advantage 
HHI IND A measure of PE firm’s diversification across industries, calculated with the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index  
HHI STG A measure of PE firm’s diversification across stages, calculated with the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index 
PE backed A dummy variable in the whole sample regressions, taking a value of 1 if the 
company has been acquired by a PE firm 
PE affiliation A dummy variable measuring the background of the PE firm, taking a value of 1 if 
the PE firm is independent 
PE experience Private equity firm experience measured by the number of funds they are/have 
been operating (funds’ sequence number) 
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PE size Total capital committed to the private equity firm, used in Heckman selection 
regression as a predictor of missing accounts data 
PE market Variable taking account money-chasing-deals, the amount of European private 
equity investments in the year of the buyout 
Initial sales Initial sales of the buyout company, a measure for winner picking 
Initial profitability Initial profitability measured by EBITDA margin at the year of the buyout, a 
measure for winner picking 
Company age The number of years of the company being active at the time of the buyout, used in 
Heckman selection regression as a predictor of missing accounts data 
Acquisitions Acquisitions made by the company within three years of the buyout, a dummy 
taking a value of 1 if the company has made acquisitions and 0 in all other cases 
Divestments Divestments made by the company within three years of the buyout, a dummy 
taking a value of 1 if the company has made acquisitions and 0 in all other cases 
CAPEX Change in the ratio of Capital Expenditure/Sales of the company over three years 
after the buyout 
Employment Change in the ratio of Sales/the number of employees, a proxy for efficiency 
CEO change A dummy variable if the CEO has been replaced within the three years, value of 1 
if the CEO has been changed and 0 in all other cases 
MSCI The standard equity price index of Morgan Stanley, measuring the state of the 
equity markets at the time of the buyout, a proxy for available funding for PEs 
Interest rate 12 month Euribor on the time of the buyout, a proxy for funding available for PEs 
 
Sales growth over the three year period after the buyout. Sales growth has been used widely 
in the literature measuring the post-buyout performance of the PE backed companies e.g. 
Bergström et al. (2007),  Cressy et al. (2007), Boucly et al. (2008), Acharya et al. (2011) and 
Guo et al. (2011). Furthermore, the amount of sales provides a clear comparison between the 
buyout and non-buyout companies as reported sales figures are not easily manipulated. In a 
broad sense, private equity firms approach their portfolio company through improving either 
(or both) the top-line or the bottom-line. Concentrating on the former, Sales growth thus 
specifically measures one of the sources of value creation of private equity firms. Possible 
bias might arise from the fact that in the downturn sales decrease and as the economy picks up 
speed, sales will naturally raise to their previous levels, not affected by the PE firm. However, 
this thesis shows, as seen by the Table 8, that PE firms are able to grow sales beyond the 
capabilities of non-PE backed companies despite the market condition movements.  
Operating performance 
Second, the operating performance measures concentrate on private equity firms’ value 
creation through improving the bottom-line. The value is created by using the company’s 
resources more efficiently and operating the company with less costs and required capital. 
The measures for operating performance used in this thesis are EBITDA (Earnings before 
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interest, tax, depreciations and amortisations) margin (EBITDA over sales) and working 
capital efficiency, using cash conversion cycle (CCC) and Net Working Capital (NWC over 
sales) as proxies.  
EBITDA margin is also widely used in the literature. Recent examples of using EBITDA 
margin to study post-buyout performance provide e.g. Bergsröm et al. (2007), Acharya et al. 
(2011) and Guo et al. (2011). There are also a number of studies using EBIT –based measures 
such as Cressy et al. (2007) and Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007). However, Nikoskelainen & 
Wright used EBIT instead of EBITDA only due to data availability issues. Barber & Lyon 
(1996) identify two reasons why operating income (EBIT) should be used instead of earnings. 
First, productivity of operating assets is better taken in account through operating income than 
earnings and second, the capital structure of the company is changed post-buyout and thus 
having an effect on earnings through interest expenses, but does not have an effect on 
operating income. However, Bergstöm et al. (2007) argue for the use of EBITDA as price and 
the level of leverage are commonly quoted in terms of multiples of EBITDA. Barber & Lyon 
(1996) do not take in account differences in accounting standards which effect on operating 
performance metrics can be further minimized using EBITDA. Different accounting standards 
e.g. FAS (Finnish Accounting Standards) and IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards) allow managing same financial statement items in a different manner. With the 
two accounting standards listed above, the value of intangible assets in IFRS is estimated 
through impairment testing whereas intangible assets in FAS are deducted with a straight-line 
depreciation. EBITDA which is not sensitive to e.g. differences in depreciations and 
amortisations is a more reliable measure to study companies’ fundamental operating 
performance. In this study, the data set will contain companies using the international 
accounting standards as well as national standards, as e.g. in Finland it is not required for 
private companies to report using IFRS. Thus, EBITDA will provide with more accurate 
comparisons across the countries and companies with varying accounting standards. 
Improving the usage of working capital reduces the capital tied in the company and thus in 
other words, releases capital to be used in areas where it may be utilised more efficiently. 
Operation efficiency can be thus interpreted through both EBITDA and the use of working 
capital. According to the literature, private equity ownership creates value through a positive 
impact on the operating performance of the company as well as through releasing capital from 
non-performing activities such as divestments or through sale-and-leaseback agreements. 
Kaplan (1989b), Singh (1990) as well as Berg and Gottschalg (2005) have all found working 
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capital improvements in buyout companies. The working capital efficiency is estimated 
through two measures, firstly, cash conversion cycle, which measures the time of capital tied 
in production and sales before the reimbursement for the output is received from the 
customer. Thus, if working capital is being managed efficiently CCC could also be negative, 
indicating the sales have been collected from customers before paying the suppliers. Cash 
conversion cycle consists of three figures, days inventory outstanding (DIO), days sales 
outstanding (DSO) and days payables outstanding (DPO), and is calculated as summing DIO 
and DSO and subtracting DPO. And secondly with Net Working Capital (NWC) over Sales 
which relates the difference between current assets and liabilities to sales. The NWC measure 
takes in account a greater amount of balance sheet items and provides a comparable figure to 
other companies by calculating the figure relative to sales. NWC/sales has also been used by 
previous literature e.g. Jääskeläinen (2011) who also studied Nordic markets, by using similar 
variables I am able to extend the previous literature. 
Return 
Third, the return measures which also concern value creation of PE firms through improving 
the bottom-line. These measures for measuring operating return include EBITDA/Total 
Assets and return on invested capital (ROIC). EBITDA/Total Assets is widely used measure 
to study the effects of PE ownership on return on assets, recent examples of studies utilising 
the measure include Boucly et al. (2008), Leslie & Oyer (2009) and Guo et al. (2011). The 
reasoning behind using EBITDA-based measure in return on assets rather than EBIT or 
earnings is provided in the previous paragraphs introducing the use of EBITDA margin. 
ROIC has received less attention in the literature, however, recently used by Bergström et al. 
(2007). The authors argue that theoretically ROIC should yield the most neutral comparison 
of operating profitability across industries while accounting for profit margins and capital 
efficiency. However, the authors also recognise the drawback of ROIC, being sensitive to 
financial reporting standards.  
6.1.2 Independent variables 
Private equity specialisation 
The focus of this thesis is to test the Jensen hypothesis of alleged superior governance of 
private equity firms which, according to the hypotheses, would create superior performance 
for their backed buyout companies. Gottschalg & Wright (2008) find some private equity 
firms being able to repeatedly create value for their buyout companies by focusing on small 
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number of industries as well as Wright et al. (2009) further supporting their argument. The 
determinants of superior performance are tested for persistence prior and over the financial 
turmoil which began in 2008. The main determinants are private equity firm specialisation in 
industries or in investment stages.  
The degree of specialisation is measured with two methods: the Index of Competitive 
Advantage (ICA) and the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index (HHI). First, ICA is adapted from 
Archibugi & Pianta (1994) and used in the private equity context by Cressy et al. (2007), 
measuring the PE firm’s degree of specialisation across stages or industries relative to other 
PE firms. It is defined as, 
Equation 1 - The Index of Competitive Advantage 
       
   
   
 
   
   
 
 
where a dot represents summation over the particular subscript and 
Cij represents the number of companies invested in by PE firm i in industry/stage j  
C.j represents the total number of companies invested in by all PE firms in industry/stage j 
Ci. represents the total number of companies invested in by PE firm i 
C.. represents the total number of companies invested in by all PE firms in all industries 
and stages 
The share of private equity firm i of all investments in a industry or a stage j is represented by 
the numerator whereas the share of PE firm of all investments in all industries and stages is 
represented by the denominator. ICA indicates that if a PE firm is relatively specialised the 
index will amount to greater or equal to one. ICA was calculated for each PE firm in the 
sample which had made a Nordic buyout within 2003 to 2007. Therefore, dummy variables 
measuring specialisation were constructed by taking a value of one if the buyout company 
being acquired was in the stage or industry where the PE firm is specialised according to ICA 
and zero in all other cases. 
Second, the degree of private equity specialisation or diversification across industries and 
stages is alternatively tested with the Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index (Hirschmann, 1945 and 
Herfindahl, 1950). The measure has been recently used in the private equity literature by 
Ljunqvist & Richardson (2003) and Lossen (2006). HHI is defined as 
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Equation 2 - The Herfindahl-Hirschmann -Index 
             
   
where i denotes a particular private equity firm and j denotes fraction of capital of the PE firm 
invested in a stage or an industry.  
HHI is thus calculated by squaring the fraction of capital of a PE firm invested in each stage 
or industry, summing up the results and lastly subtracting the results from one. Therefore, 
HHI will have a value of zero for a non-diversified PE firm or a value of one for a completely 
diversified PE firm. The index will be used in this thesis to measure the overall investment 
focus of a PE firm and whether focusing on a limited number of industries or stages yield 
superior performance as Gottschalg and Wright (2008) and Wright et al. (2009) suggest. 
ICA and HHI have both different approaches to measure specialisation and thus both are 
included in the paper to be able to have a more comprehensive approach. ICA measures the 
relative specialisation of a PE firm to all other available PE firms whereas HHI concentrates 
diversification of the PE firm. Furthermore both measures have provided mixed evidence. 
Cressy et al. (2007) found using ICA that industry specialised PE firms are able to 
significantly influence the operational efficiency of their portfolio companies whereas stage 
specialised firms may have an advantage in growth prospects over peer companies. The study 
of Lossen (2006) concentrates on returns rather than operational efficiency and suggests by 
using HHI that stage specialisation would drive higher returns whereas industry specialisation 
would yield lower returns. Ljunqvst and Richardson (2003) by using HHI find that PE firms 
tend to specialise by industry but fail to find any significant connection between specialisation 
and returns.   
PE backed 
The variable is used in the whole sample regressions, including both the buyout companies as 
well as their peers. This dummy variable measures whether private equity ownership leads to 
superior operating performance, taking a value of one if the company is acquired by a PE and 
zero in all other cases. 
PE affiliation 
Private equity firm affiliation measures the relation of performance and whether the firm is 
independent or affiliated with e.g. a bank, government or another institution. The literature 
suggests that non-independent PE firms have fewer incentives to perform. Botazzi et al. 
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(2004) conclude that independent venture capital firms are more active owners than other 
affiliated firms and therefore the portfolio companies are more likely to perform. 
PE experience 
Wright et al. (2009) suggest based on previous literature that experience of private equity 
firms is linked with greater performance. The authors base their arguments not only on 
superior knowledge, but also on the network the firm has built throughout the intermediaries. 
Therefore, experienced PE firms may have access to a higher number of good deals. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) find a relation between greater performance and higher sequence number 
of funds, concluding that size and maturity of the firm drives portfolio company performance. 
The authors also find persistence in performance of PE firms, subsequent funds tend to mimic 
the previous funds’ performance and as a result better performing PE firms are able to raise 
new funds. Thus, the fund’s sequence number is used as a proxy for experience of the firm. 
PE Size 
Private equity firm size is measured through total capital commitments of the firm in 
question. PE size is not used as a typical explanatory variable but rather as a predictor of 
missing accounts data in Heckman selection regressions for the subsample of only PE-backed 
companies. The variable has been dropped from the regressions, other than the use for 
Heckman due to collinearity with the Mills ratio. Cressy et al. (2007) argue that larger PE 
firms tend to take less risk and as a result would be more likely to prefer companies with 
complete data available to be able to reduce the risk in the acquisition. The authors continue 
by suggesting that through their established networks these larger PE firms have easier access 
to better deals than smaller and inexperienced firms. More discussion on the topic is provided 
in Section 6.2. 
PE market, MSCI and Interest rate 
The total value of the European private equity market, Morgan Stanley Capital International 
World Index and Interest rate as 12 month Euribor all are included to account for money-
chasing-deals. The literature suggests that under favourable market conditions capital flows 
for PE investments as well as other investments increase and as a result drives the prices and 
thus the value of the market higher along with general equity indices. Another consequence of 
a money-chasing-deal is usually poor performance as competition for good deals increases 
and PE firms are forced to settle for less attractive investments under the pressure to invest 
their capital commitments. These variables control the fact that could there be connection 
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with performance and money-chasing-deals, especially on the variables that show no 
significant improvement under PE ownership.  
Another way to account for the deals is use the interest rate as a proxy. The literature has 
suggested that favourable credit market conditions allow PE firms to take advantage of 
mispricing between equity and debt markets. Kaplan and Stein (1993) find that the favourable 
credit market conditions fuelled the 1980s buyouts and Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) suggest 
that similar conditions affected the latest wave of buyouts. 
Initial sales and profitability 
Initial sales and profitability control for “winner picking”. These variables control whether the 
operational performance is due to superior selection abilities through better knowledge and 
networks or through abilities to monitor the portfolio companies and drive operational 
improvements. Winner picking has been identified as a source for operational gains as e.g. 
Wu (1997) found that managers tend to manipulate earnings downward prior to management 
buyouts and therefore leave “more room” for improvement for PE firms.  
Company age 
Company age is used in a similar way than PE Size, a predictor of missing accounts data for 
complete sample Heckman selection regressions. And as a selection variable, collinearity with 
Mills ratio forced to exclude company age as a typical explanatory variable. Cressy et al. 
(2007) concluded in their paper that the same predictor, company age or PE size, did not work 
for both the complete sample and a subsample of PE companies. The authors suggest that 
company age is directly linked with the stability and survival of the company. Also, 
companies under financial distress tend to delay or not disclose their accounts data. Therefore, 
company age may be used as a predictor of missing accounts data.  
Acquisitions and Divestments 
Both acquisitions and divestments may influence the company performance significantly. 
M&A activity not only affects the top line but also the operational efficiency if e.g. a poorly 
performing division is divested. In addition to the above, PE firms use M&A as one driver for 
company improvement and as such should be controlled as a source for operational 
improvement gains.  
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CAPEX 
The change in capital expenditure over sales is controlled as previous literature has found that 
LBOs may increase the current cash flows on the expense of future cash flows. (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2009). Also, Long and Ravenscraft (1993) suggest that CAPEX decreases with 
LBOs as a result of two factors. First, buyout companies are cash constrained and therefore 
can not divert cash flows to investments and second, PE firms invest to only value 
maximising targets. Therefore, CAPEX variable controls for change especially in ROIC. 
Employment 
Critics of LBOs have argued that productivity and operating improvements in buyouts may 
arise from employee reductions.  On the other hand literature on the employment effects in 
LBOs has not found such effect. However, in the case especially during hard times such as the 
financial crisis companies may be more inclined to reduce overhead costs through reducing 
the number of employees. Therefore, the employment effect is controlled in this paper 
through the ratio of change in the Sales over the number of employees over the observation 
period. 
CEO change 
The CEO change dummy variable measures whether the CEO of the portfolio company has 
been changed within the observation period. Berg and Gottschalg (2005) suggest that poor 
performance might be due to an incapable CEO or management in general, therefore changing 
the CEO may lead to an improvement in company performance. Furthermore, Acharya and 
Kehoe (2008) found that two-thirds of the CEOs of buyout companies are replaced within 
four years of the buyout.  
6.2 Methods 
The statistical tests to measure the performance of private equity backed buyout companies 
are made in three phases. In the first phase, the buyouts are compared to their peers in terms 
of operating performance, in the second phase PE specialisation effects are tested by 
comparing the operating performance of specialised, non-specialised and peer companies and 
in the third phase the operating performance is tested with regressions against specialisation 
and a number of control variables.  
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6.2.1 Operating performance  
In the first phase the operating performance differences between PE backed companies and 
the peer companies are matched through the mean values of each operating performance 
measure. The mean values for sales growth were intended to be calculated with a geometric 
mean whereas other measures are calculated using an arithmetic mean. Geometric mean could 
be applied to the sales figures due to the fact the method better represents growth rates as it is 
calculated as a product of the sales growth rates. However, as the sample includes also 
negative growth rates the geometric mean produces a high downward bias in the results. 
Therefore, the arithmetic mean is applied to sales growth. The matched pair methodology has 
been previously used in the context of private equity and venture capital by Wright et al. 
(1997), Alemany & Marti (2005) and Cressy et al. (2007). The first phase is studied through a 
corrected t-test with a two-tailed null hypothesis of population means being equal. The 
corrected t-test is applied as the variance might be highly unequal with the two samples being 
tested. The equation for calculating the means are as follows 
Equation 3 - Arithmetic mean 
      
 
 
    
 
   
 
where i represents particular company and j represents a particular year and 
AM is the arithmetic mean 
xj is the operating performance measure in question. 
6.2.2 Specialisation benefits 
The second phase studies the private equity specialisation effects by separating the sample in 
to 12 distinct sub-samples. The operating performance of specialised private equity backed 
companies is tested against non-specialised PE backed companies as well as against peer 
companies. Both stage and industry specialisation is tested separately with their 
corresponding methods to calculate the degree of specialisation. A different method, 
ANOVA, is applied to test specialisation as a more than two means are compared 
simultaneously. In line with the first phase, a two-tailed null hypothesis is tested whether or 
not the means of the sub-samples are equal.  
6.2.3 Explanatory model 
In the third phase two regression models, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Heckman 
selection, are utilized to test operating performance on specialisation and other variables that 
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previous literature has suggested to be significant explaining the performance. The methods 
are adapted from the studies by Cressy et al. (2007) and Nikoskelainen & Wright (2007). The 
complete equations for the regressions are as follows 
Equation 4 – OLS 
                                                         
                                                            
                                                        
                                             
                    
where OP is the corresponding operational performance measure used as the dependent 
variable i.e. Sales growth, EBITDA margin, EBITDA/Total Assets, ROIC, CCC or 
NWC/Sales and where the independent variables are selected to the model and regression in 
question from the list above. More detailed explanation on the variables is provided in Section 
6.1.  
Heckman selection is included to estimate the probability of non-random sample selection. 
The Orbis database for operational data used in this thesis does not have complete reports on 
all the companies in the Nordics, therefore, by excluding companies with missing accounts 
data might create bias in the results. The Heckman selection estimates the bias in the 
regressions with two stages. First, the selection equation uses the Probit model to estimate the 
probability of missing accounts data and generates the inverse Mills ratio, a sample selection 
correlation term. Second, the Heckman regression includes the Mills ratio in the linear 
regression as an additional explanatory variable, partly replacing the error term and avoids the 
bias. The Heckman selection thus corrects the model for the bias. Λ 03BB 0314 0342 
Equation 5 – Mills ratio 
  
  
     
  
       
  
Where, wi denotes the vector of explanatory variables affecting the missing accounts data in 
the Heckman selection equation i.e. company age or PE size, γ* the Probit estimate from the 
first stage of estimation for the coefficient γ,   the density distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution and Φ denotes the density distribution function. 
Following the example of Cressy et al. (2007), I use company age in the total sample 
regressions and PE firm size in the PE backed buyout subsample regressions to study whether 
missing accounts data and thus the sample selection bias is significant in the data set.  The 
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authors continue that through the extensive tests of the model the two variables can not be 
used for both regressions ad the predictor of missing accounts. The authors argue that 
company age is a major factor in survival and stability of companies. Also, distressed 
companies tend to delay or not disclose financial statements. Therefore, company age in 
Heckman selection can be used as a predictor of missing accounts. Justification for using PE 
size in Heckman selection for the subsample containing only private equity backed buyouts, 
the authors suggest larger PE firms being more likely to acquire companies with reported 
financial statements. Without the reported accounts PE firms may not be able to evaluate the 
viability of the target and thus not willing to invest. Also, larger PE firms through their 
extensive networks may be favoured over smaller firms in transactions.  
7. Analysis and the results 
Analysis of the data is divided into two stages where first t-tests and ANOVA are provided to 
analyse the differences between subsamples and on the second stage regressions are 
conducted to analyse the data. The whole sample comparisons between buyouts and peer 
companies were provided in the Section 6. In the first stage the data set is divided into 
specialised PE buyouts, non-specialised PE buyouts and peer companies for the whole sample 
as well as for two subsamples of before and during the financial crisis. Pre-financial crisis is 
defined as buyouts taking place from 2003 to H1 2005 whereas the financial crisis subsample 
consists of buyouts from H2 2005 to 2007 with roughly equal sample sizes. The second stage 
consists of regressions of the whole sample with peer companies to find study whether the 
alleged superior performance of PE companies is present as well as regressions with the PE-
backed companies subsample to dig deeper into the specialisation gains.  
7.1 Statistical tests of the subsamples 
7.1.1 ANOVA 
Table 10 presents the results of comparison across subsamples of specialised buyouts, non-
specialised buyouts and peer companies. ANOVA tests whether the means of the three groups 
are the same. The analysis is made for both industry and stage specialisation, calculated with 
both methods ICA and HHI. The results show that PE firms are able to drive significantly 
higher sales growth in their portfolio companies than the peers, at 1% level in all cases. It also 
seems that specialised PE firms have slight advantage over non-specialised firms except in the 
case of stage specialised by HHI. Specialised firms able to maintain higher EBITDA margin 
than non-specialised and peers in all cases, whereas the difference between the three groups is 
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only significant in the case of stage specialised companies. Non-stage specialised buyouts 
seem to have rather similar EBITDA margins than the peers or even lower in the case of non-
stage specialised by ICA. The ratio between EBITDA and Total Assets show that specialised 
firms are able to drive higher ratios in all cases than peers and non-specialised firms, the 
differences being significant with stage specialised firms as with the EBITDA margin. 
However, with EBITDA/Total Assets, peer companies outperform the non-specialised firms 
in all cases. 
Table 10 - Differences between the post buyout performance among specialised PE firm 
and non-specialised PE firm buyouts and the non-PE backed peer companies 
 
The difference between the groups with ROIC is non-significant in all cases and the figures 
seem to be in line with each other. The working capital measures show mixed results. CCC 
seems to be better for stage specialised firms whereas industry specialised firms are 
Panel A: Industry specialisation by ICA
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/
Total Assets ROIC CCC
NWC/
Sales n
Specialised buyouts 32.62% 9.58% 12.44% 4.37% 75.89 18.12% 82
Non-specialised buyouts 29.48% 7.95% 9.17% 13.45% 31.46 11.05% 45
Peer companies 8.72% 5.85% 10.93% 7.08% 68.27 1.19% 127
F-test 10.81*** 1.80 0.62 1.17 3.17** 4.74***
Panel B: Stage specialisation by ICA
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/
Total Assets ROIC CCC
NWC/
Sales n
Specialised buyouts 31.82% 9.81% 12.12% 6.82% 60.94 17.15% 113
Non-specialised buyouts 28.97% 2.45% -2.11% 8.78% 77.91 1.21% 14
Peer companies 8.72% 5.85% 10.93% 7.09% 68.27 1.19% 127
F-test 10.74*** 3.38** 5.66*** 0.02 0.48 5.35***
Panel C: Industry specialisation by HHI
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/
Total Assets ROIC CCC
NWC/
Sales n
Specialised buyouts 37.16% 10.08% 14.41% 8.65% 71.53 20.82% 55
Non-specialised buyouts 27.19% 8.18% 8.89% 6.78% 51.45 11.63% 72
Peer companies 8.72% 5.85% 10.93% 7.12% 68.27 1.19% 127
F-test 11.81*** 1.90 1.86 0.06 0.85 5.13***
Panel D: Stage specialisation by HHI
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/
Total Assets ROIC CCC
NWC/
Sales n
Specialised buyouts 24.82% 14.25% 15.84% 10.05% 53.76 12.09% 47
Non-specialised buyouts 35.44% 5.91% 8.60% 6.14% 63.90 17.69% 80
Peer companies 8.72% 5.85% 10.93% 7.10% 68.27 1.19% 127
F-test 11.90*** 7.16*** 3.06** 0.23 0.36 4.56**
The table presents the comparison of the mean values of the variables over three years of the buyout or the holding period in
the case the company has been sold within three years. The sample of 127 Nordic PE backed buyout companies and their
corresponding peer companies over the course from 2003 to 2007 are analysed using ANOVA. Panels A and B present the
figures of industry and stage specialised and non-specialised PE buyouts with their peer companies as indicated by the Index
of Competitive Advantage, respectively. Panels C and D present the figures of industry and stage specialised and non-
specialised PE buyoyts with their peer companies as indicated by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, respectively. ROIC stands
for Return on Invested Capital, CCC is the Cash conversion Cycle and NWC is Net Working Capital. *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01
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outperformed by the peers and non-specialised companies, although differences not being 
significant other than in ICA industry specialisation. PE firms, both specialised and non-
specialised seem to be significantly outperformed by the peers in terms of NWC/Sales, where 
the specialised companies are the worst performing. 
The previous results where the total sample of buyouts were compared to the peer companies 
indicated outperformance of buyouts in terms of sales growth and EBITDA margin whereas 
the working capital figures were insignificant or mixed. Specialisation on the other hand 
seems to drive higher Sales growth in general, in all cases but one. Furthermore the results 
show that stage specialised firms may be able to drive higher operating profitability than the 
counterparts. In terms of these three variables, it seems that specialisation and especially stage 
specialisation may be able to drive greater performance. In the study of Cressy et al. (2007), 
where similar test was conducted on Sales growth and EBITDA margin, the authors found 
that only operating profitability was significantly different between the groups. However, the 
stage specialised companies had lower profitability than the non-stage specialised.  
In the total sample comparisons ROIC was slightly higher for buyouts than peers, although 
insignificant. The comparison between the subsamples yield somewhat mixed results, 
however, the ROIC levels seem to be in line with each other. These results are similar as 
Bergström et al. (2007) who found that buyouts had higher ROIC and higher improvement 
during the observation period, however, insignificantly. In the literature working capital 
improvements have been found to be positive and significant with buyout companies, even 
compared to peers. (Kaplan, 1989b; Singh, 1990; Berg and Gottschalg, 2005; Jääskeläinen, 
2011). However these results show somewhat poor performance of buyout companies, where 
in the cases of stage specialised firms outperform the non-specialised and peers whereas the 
non-industry specialised firms outperform the other groups 2with the CCC measure. 
NWC/sales show that working capital management of buyouts is outperformed by their peers. 
Based on the results hypothesis five and six may be partially confirmed. Hypothesis five, the 
industry specialisation, seems to drive sales growth whereas has only a slight positive effect 
on profitability and return. On the part of working capital management, the hypothesis should 
be rejected. Stage specialisation on the other hand seems to confirm hypothesis six on sales 
growth and profitability, whereas having only slight positive effect on return. However, 
working capital management supports rejection of the hypothesis. 
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7.1.2 Specialised and non-specialised buyouts on the peer companies 
This analysis compares the differences of the specialised and non-specialised buyouts and the 
peer companies separately as their own groups through t-tests. The results are shown in Table 
11. In line with the previous analysis sales growth is significant at 1% level compared to peer 
companies in all of the subsamples, although non-stage specialisation by ICA provides an 
exception. Industry specialisation seems to provide significant outperformance in EBITDA 
measures whereas non-industry specialised firms have similar or even poorer performance 
than the peer companies. ROIC and the working capital figures are in line with that of the 
peers for industry specialised and non-specialised firms, as it was the case with the previous 
analysis.  
It also seems that non-stage specialised firms are performing more poorly than non-industry 
specialised firms as non-industry specialised firms by ICA even produce negative and 
significant results. In line with the previous analysis ROIC and working capital measures do 
not provide significant differences among the subsamples. 
Therefore, the results thus far suggests that peer company performance is outperformed by the 
buyouts in terms of Sales growth and profitability, in line with the previous literature, whereas 
both industry and stage specialisation may provide higher drivers in these measures. 
However, unlike the previous literature, working capital is not being used more efficiently in 
the buyout companies, or specialisation does not seem to provide any improvement in the 
matter. This may be due to the financial crisis which could even out the knowhow of the 
private equity firms, however, this will be studied in more detail in the following chapters. 
The results are consistent with the previous analysis and seem to support the hypothesis five 
and six for both sales growth and profitability. However, in this case also industry 
specialisation had significantly positive effect on profitability. On other measures the 
hypothesis are rejected. 
7.1.3 Specialised and non-specialised buyouts 
Table 12 shows the comparison between specialised and non-specialised PE firms for both 
methods ICA and HHI. The industry specialised and non-specialised firms’ figures were in 
line with each other except CCC showed significantly poorer performance for ICA industry 
specialised firms whereas EBITDA/Total Assets were significantly higher for HHI industry 
specialised than for non-specialised firms. For industry specialisation groups, Sales growth  
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Table 11 - Comparison of specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyout companies on the peer companies 
 
 
 
 
Pannel A - Industry special. and non-specialised buyouts by ICA and the peers Panel B - Stage special. and non-specialised buyouts by ICA and the peers
ICA IND NO ICA IND ICA STG NO ICA STG
Buyouts Peers Buyouts Peers Buyouts Peers Buyouts Peers
Variable Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test
Sales growth 32.6% 7.5% 3.61*** 29.5% 10.9% 3.24*** 31.8% 8.4% 4.50*** 29.0% 11.1% 1.15
EBITDA margin 9.6% 5.5% 1.89*** 8.0% 6.4% 0.49 9.8% 4.9% 2.79*** 2.2% 14.0% -1.79**
EBITDA/Total Assets 12.4% 9.3% 1.30* 9.2% 13.7% -1.27 12.9% 9.7% 1.66** -2.1% 19.8% -2.55***
ROIC 4.4% 4.7% -0.08 13.4% 11.8% 0.19 7.4% 5.9% 0.63 8.8% 18.1% -0.30
CCC 75.89 80.51 -0.29 31.61 45.97 -0.75 57.70 72.24 -1.10 84.14 36.21 1.26
NWC/Sales 0.18 0.13 0.70 0.11 0.14 -0.40 0.17 0.15 0.50 0.01 0.04 -0.15
Panel C - Industry special. and non-specialised buyouts by HHI and the peers Panel D - Stage special. and non-specialised buyouts by HHI and the peers
HHI IND NO HHI IND HHI STG NO HHI STG
Buyouts Peers Buyouts Peers Buyouts Peers Buyouts Peers
Variable Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test
Sales growth 37.2% 4.8% 3.63*** 27.2% 11.8% 2.90*** 24.9% 8.0% 2.43*** 35.4% 9.1% 3.97***
EBITDA margin 10.1% 6.3% 1.47* 8.2% 5.5% 1.11 14.3% 6.7% 2.68*** 5.9% 5.4% 0.25
EBITDA/Total Assets 14.4% 11.1% 1.34* 8.9% 10.8% -0.64 15.8% 12.0% 1.69** 8.6% 10.3% -0.59
ROIC 8.7% 7.4% 0.48 6.8% 7.1% -0.05 10.1% 7.7% 1.05 6.1% 7.0% -0.13
CCC 72.39 81.59 -0.48 51.45 58.09 -0.40 53.76 57.54 -0.23 64.40 74.57 -0.59
NWC/Sales 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.12 0.10 0.37 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.36
The table compares specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyouts and their properties on the peer companies over three years from the buyout or the holding period if the company has
been sold within the three years. The sample includes only companies with complete data available for the observation period totalling to 127 observations. Comparisons of the mean values
of the variables between the buyouts and peers have been calculated using Welch's corrected t-test. Panels A and B present the comparison between industry and stage specialised and non-
specialised buyouts as calculated by the Indexof Comparative Advantage, respectively, whereas in Panels C and D specialisation is calculated by Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Sales growth
is the mean growth of sales over the holding period. EBITDA margin and EBITDA/Total Assets are the mean values during the holding period. ROIC is the mean value of Return on Invested
Capital over the holding period and CCC is the mean cash conversion cycle over the holding period, a working capital measure. Current ratio shows the mean current ratio over the holding
period. Net Working Capital/Sales is a working capital measure and indicated as mean value over the period. The sample sizes for ICA IND, NO ICA IND, ICA STG, NO ICA STG, HHI IND,
NO HHI IND, HHI STG and NO HHI STG, 82, 45, 113, 14, 55, 72, 47 and 80 respectively. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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and EBITDA measures were higher for specialised companies than that of the non-
specialised. For stage specialised firms the results show significantly higher EBITDA 
measures than that of the non-specialised, HHI stage specialised being more significant. 
However, HHI stage specialised firms have lower Sales growth than the non-specialised 
firms. For all the groups ROIC and working capital measures, except for CCC of ICA 
industry specialised, were in line with each other and produced mixed results.  
Table 12 - Differences between specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyout 
companies 
 
Overall it seems that stage specialisation provides drivers for higher profitability whereas 
industry and stage specialisation both may have a slight advantage over the non-specialised 
companies in terms of Sales growth and profitability. Working capital and ROIC did not 
produce any significant or straightforward differences between specialised and non-
specialised firms. Consistent with the other results, although less significant, the hypothesis 
Panel A - Industry special. by ICA Panel B - Stage special. by ICA
ICA IND NO ICA IND ICA STG NO ICA STG
Variable Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test
Sales growth 32.6% 29.5% 0.39 31.8% 29.0% 0.19
EBITDA margin 9.6% 8.0% 0.54 9.8% 2.2% 1.39*
EBITDA/Total Assets 12.4% 9.2% 1.01 12.9% -2.1% 2.00**
ROIC 4.4% 13.4% -1.07 7.4% 8.8% -0.05
CCC 75.89 31.61 2.56*** 57.70 84.14 -0.83
NWC/Sales 0.18 0.11 0.91 0.17 0.01 1.26
Panel C - Industry special. by HHI Panel D - Stage special. by HHI
HHI IND NO HHI IND HHI STG NO HHI STG
Variable Mean Mean T-test Mean Mean T-test
Sales growth 37.2% 27.2% 1.02 24.9% 35.4% -1.19
EBITDA margin 10.1% 8.2% 0.66 14.3% 5.9% 2.81***
EBITDA/Total Assets 14.4% 8.9% 1.98** 15.8% 8.6% 2.72***
ROIC 8.7% 6.8% 0.31 10.1% 6.1% 0.71
CCC 72.39 51.45 1.14 53.76 64.40 -0.62
NWC/Sales 0.21 0.12 0.99 0.12 0.18 -0.75
The table compares specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyouts and their properties over three years from the
buyout or the holding period if the company has been sold within the three years. The sample includes only companies
with complete data available for the observation period totalling to 127 observations. Comparisons of the mean values
of the variables between the buyouts and peers have been calculated using Welch's corrected t-test. Panels A and B
present the comparison between industry and stage specialised and non-specialised buyouts as calculated by the
Index of Comparative Advantage, respectively, whereas in Panels C and D specialisation is calculated by
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, where e.g. NO HHI IND stands for non-industry specialised firms by HHI. Sales growth is
the mean growth of sales over the holding period. EBITDA margin and EBITDA/Total Assets are the mean values
during the holding period. ROIC is the mean value of Return on Invested Capital over the holding period and CCC is the 
mean cash conversion cycle over the holding period, a working capital measure. Net Working Capital/Sales, is a
working capital measures and indicated as mean value over the period. The sample sizes for ICA IND, NO ICA IND,
ICA STG, NO ICA STG, HHI IND, NO HHI IND, HHI STG and NO HHI STG, 82, 45, 113, 14, 55, 72, 47 and 80
respectively.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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five and six are supported by these findings in terms of sales growth and profitability, stage 
specialisation and hypothesis six being more significant. 
7.1.4 Buyouts pre and during the financial crisis with the peer companies 
The sample selection allowed to study the relation between PE backed and non-PE backed 
companies pre and during the financial crisis as well as the specialisation effects on both of 
the time periods. The subsamples are done to study whether the superior performance of PE 
backed companies and the specialisation benefits persist over difficult economic conditions 
such as the financial crisis. Table 13 shows the comparison of performance between the 
buyouts and peer companies pre and during the financial crisis as well as comparison of 
buyout companies under the same time periods.  
The results show that during the financial crisis PE firms’ performance not only persisted but 
became more pronounced compared to pre-financial crisis figures. Sales growth and EBITDA 
margin being significant whereas pre-financial crisis there was so significant difference 
between PE backed and their peers’ profitability. The other figures show, although 
insignificant, that PE firms were able to perform slightly better than the peers in terms of 
ROIC as well as working capital measures under the crisis which was not the case pre-crisis.  
Table 13 - Comparison of PE backed buyout companies on the peer companies and on 
themselves pre (2003 - H1 2005) and during (H2 2005 - 2007) financial crisis 
 
Buyout subsamples pre and during the crisis shows no highly significant differences in the 
figures except profitability being on a higher during the crisis, significant at a 10% level. 
Although being insignificant, the figures suggest that buyouts may have been performing 
Panel A Panel B Panel C
During the financial crisis Pre financial crisis During Pre
Buyouts Peers Buyouts Peers Buyouts Buyouts
Variable n Mean Mean T-test n Mean Mean T-test n Mean n Mean T-test
Sales growth 76 30.8% 4.4% 3.93*** 51 32.6% 15.2% 2.48*** 76 30.8% 51 32.6% -0.21
EBITDA margin 76 10.5% 5.5% 1.97** 51 6.8% 6.4% 0.21 76 10.5% 51 6.8% 1.32*
EBITDA/Total Assets 76 10.4% 9.7% 0.25 51 12.6% 12.8% -0.10 76 10.4% 51 12.6% -0.80
ROIC 76 8.2% 6.0% 0.34 51 6.8% 9.1% -0.75 76 8.2% 51 6.8% 0.24
CCC 76 63.63 73.73 -0.60 51 55.56 60.13 -0.25 76 63.63 51 55.56 0.45
NWC/Sales 76 0.15 0.16 -0.14 51 0.17 0.10 1.05 76 0.15 51 0.17 -0.34
The table compares specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyouts and their properties on the peer companies over three years from
the buyout or the holding period if the company has been sold within the three years. The sample includes only companies with
complete data available for the observation period totalling to 127 observations and is split between buyouts that dated pre financial
crisis (2003 - H1 2005) and during the financial crisis (H2 2005 - 2007). Comparisons of the mean values of the variables between the
buyouts and peers have been calculated using Welch's corrected t-test. Panels A and B present the comparison between buyout
companies and the peers during and pre financial crisis, respectively, whereas Panel C presents the comparison of the buyouts during
the same time periods. Corresponding data for pre-financial crisis buyouts. Sales growth is the mean growth of sales. EBITDA margin
and EBITDA/Total Assets are the mean values during the holding period. ROIC is the mean value of Return on Invested Capital and
CCC is the mean cash conversion cycle and, a working capital measure. Net Working Capital/Sales is a working capital measure and
indicated as  mean values over the period. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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slightly better pre-crisis than during the crisis, other than EBITDA margin. However, there is 
a clear difference between buyout performance compared to that of the peers pre and during 
the crisis. Therefore, during financial crisis PEs were able to influence their portfolio 
companies in a more profound manner compared to peers although their own performance did 
not change significantly during the two time periods i.e. the PE performance somewhat 
constant over time periods whereas the non-PE backed company performance varies with 
market conditions. These results thus suggest confirming hypothesis seven, has the 
operational efficiency of buyouts persisted or improved compared to that of the peers over the 
crisis. The results show improvement in all variables during the crisis compared to pre-crisis 
times, Sales growth and EBITDA margin being significant.  
7.1.5 Specialisation of buyouts on the peer companies pre and during the crisis 
Table 14 shows the comparison between specialised and non-specialised firms and their peer 
companies both pre and during the financial crisis. Comparing industry specialised firms 
under both time periods suggests that during the crisis, industry specialised firms have 
managed to grow the difference in performance to that of the peers. ICA industry 
specialisation shows highly significant differences in Sales growth and in EBITDA/Total 
Assets where as HHI industry specialisation has highly significant results in sales growth and 
in both of the EBITDA measures. Pre-crisis industry specialised firms show only significant 
results at a 10 percent level for sales growth for both methods and EBITDA/Total Assets for 
ICA, other variables being insignificant. 
During the crisis non-industry specialised PE firms manage only to influence significantly and 
positively on the Sales growth, however, the significance level being lower than that of the 
industry specialised PEs. The non-industry specialised firms do seem to have slightly better 
performance in other variables than their peers, excluding EBITDA/Total Assets. In line with 
the performance during the crisis, only Sales growth is positive and significant for the non-
industry specialised subsample pre-crisis. However, ICA method shows that these firms 
underperform significantly their peers in terms of EBITDA/Total Assets and ROIC also the 
difference in EBITDA margin being negative. Similar findings, although insignificant, is 
obtained with HHI method for the same subsample. The results show that the non-industry 
specialised firms are not able to match the performance of specialised firms and actually 
underperform in profitability and return compared to peers under good economic conditions. 
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Table 14 - Difference in means of specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyout companies and the peer companies pre (2003 - H1 
2005) and during (H2 2005 - 2007) financial crisis 
  
Panel A - Special. companies with their peers pre and during the crisis Panel B - Non-special. companies with their peers pre and during the crisis
Crisis ICA IND Crisis ICA STG Pre ICA IND Pre ICA STG Crisis NO ICA IND Crisis NO ICA STG Pre NO ICA IND Pre NO ICA STG
Variable Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test
Sales growth 31.6% 3.42*** 27.7% 3.91*** 14.4% 1.40* 17.3% 2.29** 15.7% 2.02** 17.3% 0.82 22.1% 2.64*** 19.1% 1.29
EBITDA margin 5.3% 1.68** 7.6% 2.87*** 2.1% 0.92 1.3% 0.61 4.4% 1.05 -12.3% -1.78** -2.1% -0.46 -9.1% -0.58
EBITDA/Total Assets 2.4% 0.68 4.6% 1.59* 4.1% 1.51* 1.0% 0.44 -2.6% -0.46 -25.0% -2.23** -7.0% -1.78** -14.3% -1.11
ROIC -3.1% -0.49 4.6% 1.23 4.2% 1.08 -2.7% -0.93 13.1% 0.89 -13.4% -0.31 -12.9% -2.56*** 0.6% 0.03
CCC -10.74 -0.49 -16.98 -0.93 5.45 0.26 -11.12 -0.59 -8.80 -0.43 35.30 0.88 -20.90 -0.60 105.73 1.43
NWC/Sales 0.03 0.31 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.83 0.07 1.03 -0.09 -0.85 -0.04 -0.19 0.05 0.65 0.02 0.21
Panel C - Specialised companies with their peers pre and during the crisis Panel D - Non-special. companies with their peers pre and during the crisis
Crisis HHI IND Crisis HHI STG Pre HHI IND Pre HHI STG Crisis NO HHI IND Crisis NO HHI STG Pre NO HHI IND Pre NO HHI STG
Variable Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test Diff. T-test
Sales growth 39.3% 3.21*** 18.9% 2.69*** 21.2% 1.69* 14.1% 1.09 15.9% 2.31** 30.2% 3.19*** 14.9% 1.80** 20.1% 2.43***
EBITDA margin 8.1% 2.54*** 12.0% 2.84*** -3.3% -0.81 2.1% 0.61 2.4% 0.63 1.3% 0.42 3.1% 1.25 -0.8% -0.26
EBITDA/Total Assets 5.1% 1.73** 3.1% 1.10 0.5% 0.11 4.8% 1.27 -2.8% -0.57 -0.5% -0.11 -0.7% -0.31 -4.0% -1.41*
ROIC 2.3% 0.71 1.5% 0.58 -0.4% -0.10 3.3% 0.88 2.0% 0.18 2.5% 0.26 -3.7% -0.83 -6.4% -1.32*
CCC -4.34 -0.16 1.10 0.05 -18.18 -0.71 -9.84 -0.41 -14.76 -0.69 -15.92 -0.71 4.73 0.18 0.03 0.00
NWC/Sales 0.03 0.19 -0.06 -1.32* 0.02 0.18 0.11 0.80 -0.04 -0.58 0.02 0.16 0.11 1.15 0.05 0.75
The table compares specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyouts and their properties on the peer companies over three years from the buyout or the holding period if the
company has been sold within the three years. The sample includes only companies with complete data available for the observation period totalling to 127 observations and is split
between buyouts that dated pre financial crisis (2003 - H1 2005) and during the financial crisis (H2 2005 - 2007). The difference in means is calculated simply by subtracting the
buyout company's values with that of the peer company, therefore the percentages are percentage point differences. Comparisons of the mean values of the variables between the
buyouts and peers have been calculated using Welch's corrected t-test. Panels A and C present the comparison between specialised PE firms' buyout companies and the peers
during and pre financial crisis. Panels B and D present the comparison between non-specialised PE firms' buyouts and the peer companies during the same time periods.
Specialisation is calculated in Panels A and B with the Index of Comparative Advantage and in Panels C and D with the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, where e.g. NO HHI IND or NO
HHI STG stands for non-industry or non-stage specialised firm, respectively. Sales growth is the mean growth of sales. EBITDA margin and EBITDA/Total Assets are the mean
values during the holding period. ROIC is the mean value of Return on Invested Capital and CCC is the mean cash conversion cycle and, a working capital measure. Net Working
Capital/Sales is a working capital measures and indicated as mean values over the period. CAPEX/Sales. The sample sizes are for Crisis ICA IND 51, Crisis ICA STG 66, Pre ICA IND
31, Pre ICA STG 47, Crisis NO ICA IND 25, Crisis NO ICA STG 10, Pre NO ICA IND 20, Pre NO ICA STG4, Crisis HHI IND 34, Crisis HHI STG 26, Pre HHI IND 21, Pre HHI STG 21,
Crisis NO HHI IND 42, Crisis NO HHI STG 50, Pre NO HHI IND 30 and for Pre NO HHI STG 29.   *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Stage specialisation during the crisis shows highly significant differences between the PE 
backed companies and their peers. Sales growth and EBITDA margin are both significant at 1 
percent level for both methods whereas ICA shows significant results for EBITDA/Total 
Assets and HHI for NWC/Sales. The other variables also seem to be slightly better or 
indifferent for PE backed companies. The advantages of stage specialisation seem to diminish 
during normal economic conditions as the specialised firms show only significant difference 
in Sales growth for ICA. The insignificant variables indicate, however, that PE firms might 
have a slight advantage over peers, although insignificant.  
Non-stage specialised companies under the financial crisis clearly underperform their 
specialised counterparts. The HHI method shows only positive and significant differences to 
peers for the Sales growth variable whereas the ICA method reveals negative and significant 
differences to peers in terms of profitability. The other variables do not show mixed results. 
Under pre-crisis economic conditions the non-stage specialised firms’ performance seem to 
be in line with their peers or even underperform, the only positively and significant variable 
being Sales growth for HHI. Both methods show PE backed companies to underperform in 
profitability, where HHI shows significant and negative results for EBITDA/Total Assets and 
ROIC. In line with the results of industry specialised companies it seems that under normal 
economic conditions the PE companies are not able to make a clear difference in performance 
to the peers, however, the specialised firms having a slight advantage over the non-specialised 
firms.  
Overall the results show that specialised PE firms are able to slightly outperform the peers 
under normal economic conditions. However, during the financial crisis the specialised PE 
firms are able to influence the portfolio companies substantially, making a clear and 
significant difference to their peers in performance. The non-specialised firms are able to 
make significant and positive differences to their peers in some of the cases, however, overall 
their performance is either in line with their peers or underperforming. Based on the results it 
can be said that specialisation, both industry and stage, has advantage especially under 
difficult economic conditions and may drive slightly better performance under normal 
economic conditions compared to the peers whereas the non-specialised companies have no 
advantage over peers and may even underperform. Therefore, the results suggest confirming 
hypothesis eight, industry specialisation persistence, on the part of Sales growth and 
profitability. Hypothesis nine, stage specialisation persistence, is confirmed on the part of 
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same variables. Also, stage specialised firms may have a slight advantage in working capital 
management. 
7.1.6 Specialisation of buyouts pre and during the financial crisis 
The last sub-section compared the performance of specialised and non-specialised PE firms’ 
portfolio companies to their peers. This chapter compares the specialised firms’ performance 
to the non-specialised firms, however, the results might not be as meaningful as the 
comparison is made on average across all industries i.e. not matched to comparable peers. 
Despite the shortcoming, it allows to compare the average performance of specialised and 
non-specialised firms. Table 15 provides the statistics on the issue. 
Under difficult economic conditions the two measures gives conflicting results for the 
difference between industry specialised and non-specialised firms. The ICA method suggests 
that non-specialised significantly outperform specialised firms in terms of ROIC and working 
capital management whereas the HHI method shows similar results for working capital, 
however, suggests outperformance of specialised over non-specialised in Sales growth, 
EBIDA margin and EBITDA/Total Assets, former and latter being significant. Under the pre-
financial crisis conditions the ICA method shows advantage of specialised firms in EBITDA 
margin, NWC/Sales, EBITDA/Total Assets and ROIC, the latter two being significant 
whereas the HHI method suggests industry specialised firms to underperform slightly in sales 
growth and profitability. The results do not suggest any definite conclusions, however, it 
seems that the performance of industry specialised and non-specialised firms does not differ 
on average under any economic conditions. 
For ICA stage specialised and non-specialised firms under difficult economic conditions the 
results are in line with above. However, the HHI method suggests that stage specialised firms 
have advantage over the non-specialised firms under both subsamples. The specialised 
companies are able to influence the returns and profitability significantly whereas the non- 
specialised companies are able to drive higher Sales growth. Also, specialised firms seem to 
have a slight advantage in working capital management.  
The results suggest that stage specialised firms may have a slight advantage over non-
specialised whereas industry specialisation does not offer any definite advantage in 
performance. The results for industry specialisation are rather mixed, on average the 
performance is roughly the same for both PE firm groups. The results show that compared to 
peer companies specialised firms are able to drive higher performance under both conditions   
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Table 15 - Comparison of specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyout companies pre (2003 - H1 2005) and during (H2 2005 - 2007) 
financial crisis 
  
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D
During the financial crisis ICA IND ICA STG NO ICA STG HHI IND NO HHI IND HHI STG NO HHI STG
Variable n Mean n Mean T-test n Mean n Mean T-test n Mean n Mean T-test n Mean n Mean T-test
Sales growth 51 34.1% 25 23.8% 0.94 66 31.3% 10 26.9% 0.21 34 40.6% 42 22.8% 1.32* 26 20.9% 50 35.9% -1.34*
EBITDA margin 51 10.3% 25 10.9% -0.16 66 11.3% 10 5.1% 1.20 34 12.9% 42 8.5% 1.13 26 18.1% 50 6.5% 2.66***
EBITDA/Total Assets 51 10.8% 25 9.5% 0.26 66 12.4% 10 -2.9% 1.57* 34 14.1% 42 7.4% 1.71** 26 14.4% 50 8.3% 1.67**
ROIC 51 1.6% 25 21.5% -1.36* 66 7.4% 10 13.4% -0.15 34 8.0% 42 8.3% -0.03 26 8.8% 50 7.8% 0.11
CCC 51 82.45 25 25.24 2.55*** 66 65.29 10 52.66 0.39 34 85.99 42 45.53 1.61* 26 61.43 50 64.77 -0.14
NWC/Sales 51 0.20 25 0.04 1.38* 66 0.17 10 -0.02 1.05 34 0.23 42 0.08 1.13 26 0.08 50 0.18 -1.06
Panel E Panel F Panel G Panel H
Pre financial crisis ICA IND ICA STG NO ICA STG HHI IND NO HHI IND HHI STG NO HHI STG
Variable n Mean n Mean T-test n Mean n Mean T-test n Mean n Mean T-test n Mean n Mean T-test
Sales growth 31 30.1% 20 36.5% -0.57 47 32.5% 4 34.1% -0.10 21 31.5% 30 33.4% -0.13 21 29.7% 29 35.2% -0.40
EBITDA margin 31 8.5% 20 4.2% 0.94 47 7.8% 4 -4.2% 0.77 21 5.5% 30 7.7% -0.53 21 9.5% 29 4.9% 1.19
EBITDA/Total Assets 31 15.1% 20 8.7% 1.65* 47 13.7% 4 -0.1% 1.12 21 15.0% 30 11.0% 0.98 21 17.6% 29 8.9% 2.38**
ROIC 31 8.9% 20 3.3% 1.39* 47 7.6% 4 -2.7% 1.00 21 9.8% 30 4.6% 1.29 21 11.7% 29 3.3% 2.38**
CCC 31 65.10 20 39.99 0.93 47 47.04 4 189.05 -2.23** 21 49.28 30 59.74 -0.41 21 44.25 29 64.10 -0.79
NWC/Sales 31 0.16 20 0.19 -0.39 47 0.18 4 0.09 0.84 21 0.17 30 0.17 0.00 21 0.17 29 0.17 0.00
NO ICA IND
NO ICA IND
The table compares specialised and non-specialised PE firms' buyouts and their properties over three years from the buyout or the holding period if the company has been sold
within the three years. The sample includes only companies with complete data available for the observation period totalling to 127 observations and is split between buyouts
that dated pre financial crisis (2003 - H1 2005) and during the financial crisis (H2 2005 - 2007). Comparisons of the mean values of the variables between the buyouts and peers
have been calculated using Welch's corrected t-test. Panels A through D present the comparison between industry and stage specialised and non-specialised buyouts during
the financial crisis and Panels E through H present corresponding data for pre-financial crisis buyouts. ICA is specialisation as calculated by the Index of Comparative
Advantage, whereas HHI is specialisation calculated by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, where e.g. NO HHI IND or NO HHI STG stands for non-industry or non-stage
specialised firm, respectively. Sales growth is the mean growth of sales over the holding period. EBITDA margin and EBITDA/Total Assets are the mean values during the
holding period. ROIC is the mean value of Return on Invested Capital over the holding period and CCC is the mean cash conversion cycle over the holding period, a working
capital measure. Net Working Capital/Salesis a working capital measure and indicated as mean values over the period. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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whereas on average and across all industries the differences to non-specialised firms’ 
performance is not significant. However, by splitting the samples into further subsamples 
have decreased the reliability of the results and thus further studies with a larger sample 
would be required to be able to make more definite conclusions. The results are consistent 
with previous findings in the study that PE performance does not vary significantly across 
time periods. However, the results do suggest confirming hypothesis nine, stage specialisation 
persistence in terms of profitability. Stage specialised companies are able to keep profitability 
higher than non-specialised companies during pre-crisis conditions and grow the difference 
during more difficult economic conditions. 
7.1 Regressions 
This section presents the regression results on the whole sample of buyouts and the peer 
companies as well as regressions of the subsample of buyouts. The analysis is split into four 
phases where the first includes the whole sample regressions, the second the PE subsample 
and third and fourth are conducted similarly than the first two but with the financial crisis 
subsamples. The regressions are made in the spirit of Cressy et al. (2007) to be able to 
compare the results across the authors’ and this paper’s datasets, although expanded beyond 
testing only Sales growth and EBITDA margin. Heckman selection is included in the 
regressions to estimate the existence of bias in the sample selection due to missing accounts 
data. Appendix 1 shows the test on collinearity for the selected variables. Due to high 
correlation with other variables the following were dropped: CAPEX, Employment, PE 
Experience and MSCI. Also, PE size and Company age are used in Heckman selection as 
predictors of missing accounts data and therefore can not be used in the regressions as typical 
explanatory variables due to collinearity.  
7.2.1 Private equity backed buyouts and non-PE backed peer companies 
Table 16 shows the regression made for the whole sample of 127 buyouts and their 
corresponding peer companies and in the case of Heckman regression for 321 companies of 
which 66 with missing accounts data. The aim of this regression is to study whether the 
alleged superior performance of PE backed companies exist and is there signs of winner 
picking or money chasing deals. The OLS regression shows significance for sales growth, 
EBITDA margin and CCC although the adjusted R-squared for each of the regressions are 
quite low. The results suggest that PE firms are able to influence significantly on the 
development of sales as well as on profitability of their portfolio companies. On the other  
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Table 16 - Regressions of the PE backed and non-PE backed peer companies 
 
variables, the PE firms do not seem to be able to drive superior performance. Interest rate 
variable shows mostly negative signs on the coefficients, EBITDA/Total Assets and ROIC 
being significant. The negative signs indicate that high interest rates e.g. with the buyouts that 
endured difficult economic conditions, may lead to poorer performance. Furthermore, 
significant coefficients for EBITDA/Total Assets and ROIC suggest that the poor 
performance for these variables might have been due to money chasing deals. During good 
economic conditions the volume of transactions increase and PEs has pressure to invest high 
flow of capital commitments which results in less good investments available and buyouts of 
poorer quality companies. Initial profitability is significant for sales growth, EBITDA margin 
and NWC/Sales, former and latter having negative coefficients. The results suggest that PE 
Panel A - OLS regression
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant 0.166** 0.087*** 0.170*** 0.228*** 74.780*** -0.398
PE Backed 0.234*** 0.030* 0.002 0.002 -9.480 1.103
Interest rate -2.074 -1.113 -2.097* -5.176** -154.974 21.448
Intial sales -4.37E-08 1.86E-08 8.38E-09 6.34E-09 -1.66E-05* -1.94E-07
Initial profitability -0.107*** 0.029** 0.022 0.021 17.9775 -0.943**
Adjusted R-squared 0.108 0.032 0.009 0.008 0.0174 0.007
F-statistic 8.639*** 3.072** 1.552 1.484 2.115* 1.469
Panel B - Heckman selection
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant -0.419 0.226 0.308 0.147 290.684 -5.613
PE Backed 0.242 0.029 0.002 0.005 -11.727 1.159
Interest rate -2.255 -0.889 -1.756 -4.909** 115.796 17.158
Intial sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Initial profitability -0.106 0.028 0.022 0.021 17.573 -0.932
Lambda (Mills) 1.637 -0.407 -0.414 0.191 -624.736 14.867
Wald chi-squared 3.430 2.290 1.350 5.690 0.360 1.560
Panel A shows the OLS regression on the whole sample of 127 Nordic PE backed buyouts and 127 peer
companies from 2003 to 2007. Panel B shows the Heckman selection regression on a larger sample
including companies with missing data with a total of 321 companies of which 66 have missing
observations. The Heckman selection is used to estimate the bias of missing account data in the sample
through company age before the buyout, shown by the Mills ratio (lambda). ROIC stands for Return on
Invested Capital, CCC is the Cash Conversion Cycle and NWC is Net Working Capital. PE Backed dummy
takes on a value of 1 if the company has been acquired by a PE firm. Interst rate is the 12m Euribor on the
date of the buyout, a proxy for market conditions at the time thus used to control money chasing deals.
Initial sales and profitability are used to estimate whether winner picking in PE backed buyouts is present.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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companies might be able to pick “winners” as in companies that have room for improvement 
and are able to leverage on the initial performance. 
The Heckman selection regression does not support the findings of the OLS regression, 
however, the results suggest that PE firms might have a slight advantage over the peer 
companies in terms of the variables other than NWC/Sales, in line with the OLS regression. 
On the other hand the selection regression confirms the absence of the sample selection bias 
as lambda i.e. Mills ratio is insignificant in all regressions. Interest rate being negative and 
significant in the ROIC regression creates more support on the presence of money chasing 
deals. The findings of Cressy et al. (2007) with 122 UK buyouts from 1995 to 2002 are in line 
with that of this paper. The authors found PE backing as well as initial profitability being 
significant in almost all of their regressions, although the authors were testing only Sales 
growth and profitability. Also, initial turnover was significant in a few regressions contrary to 
findings of this paper. The regressions seem to support the confirmation of hypotheses one 
and two, buyouts outperforming their peers in terms of profitability and Sales growth. 
Hypotheses three and four for return and working capital management are rejected. 
7.2.2 Private equity specialisation 
The regressions are made for a sample of 127 buyout companies and in the case of Heckman 
selection 160 buyouts of which 33 with missing accounts data. The regressions of Table 17 
are aimed at investigating whether specialisation has influence over operational improvements 
or do the control variables drive performance. Both ICA and HHI methods are used to 
determine specialisation and the degree of specialisation, respectively. The OLS regressions 
show significance in the case of ICA for EBITDA/Total Assets and CCC whereas HHI 
regressions are significant for sales growth and NWC/Sales. As it was the case with previous 
regressions, the adjusted R-squares remain low. Heckman selection regressions are significant 
for Sales growth, EBITDA/Total Assets, CCC and NWC/Sales of which sales growth for both 
methods and the latter only for HHI. Consistent with the previous regression, lambdas of 
Heckman regressions remain insignificant indicating selection bias not being present.  
The results suggest that industry specialisation by ICA does not have any positive significant 
effect on the dependent variables, only a negative relation with working capital management 
through CCC. ICA stage specialisation on the other hand has positive and significant effects 
on profitability ratios as well as on working capital management through CCC. The HHI  
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Table 17 - Regression of PE backed buyout companies 
 
Panel A - OLS regression Panel B - OLS regression
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant 0.223 -0.016 -0.071 0.384** 117.773** 5.752 Constant 0.425** 0.123* 0.138* 0.397** 107.726** 5.132
ICA IND 0.064 0.004 0.002 -0.082 53.521*** 0.766 HHI IND -0.973*** 0.012 -0.057 0.084 -25.179 -11.971***
ICA STG -0.070 0.081* 0.154*** 0.018 -58.376* -3.507 HHI STG 0.675*** -0.177** -0.107 -0.176 -16.969 10.257***
PE Affiliation -0.009 0.046 0.079* -0.149 2.961 -3.895 PE Affiliation 0.063 0.026 0.064 -0.183* 11.322 -2.761
PE Experience 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.246 -0.038 PE Experience 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.480 -0.035
Initial sales -1.03E-07 2.82E-08 1.77E-08 1.65E-08 -1.98E-05 -3.74E-07 Initial sales -6.17E-08 9.88E-09 -2.77E-09 4.80E-09 -1.66E-05 4.86E-07
Initial profitability -0.081* 0.009 0.005 0.013 13.987 -0.734 Initial profitability -0.088** 0.010 0.008 0.011 13.331 -0.889
Aquisitions 0.254** 0.004 0.015 0.004 -19.277 1.925 Aquisitions 0.223** 0.000 0.017 -0.002 -26.513 1.445
Divestments 0.272 -0.028 -0.039 -0.017 53.862 0.027 Divestments 0.311 -0.004 -0.011 -0.002 52.519 0.141
CEO 0.021 -0.011 0.022 0.076 -31.274 -0.018 CEO 0.053 -0.009 0.027 0.065 -24.839 0.319
Interest rate 0.823 -0.410 -1.402 -6.115 -561.679 40.823 Interest rate -3.727 0.304 -1.111 -5.538 -368.707 -22.751
Adjusted R-squared 0.044 -0.019 0.061 -0.015 0.074 -0.011 Adjusted R-squared 0.169 0.021 0.012 -0.017 0.007 0.061
F-statistic 1.578 0.767 1.813* 0.808 1.999** 0.864 F-statistic 3.557*** 1.270 1.159 0.792 1.086 1.820*
Panel C - Heckman selection Panel D - Heckman selection
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant 0.245 0.466 -0.029 -0.081 131.363 6.431 Constant 0.509 0.534 0.251 0.277 -79.741 5.387
ICA IND 0.068 0.032 0.003 -0.105 56.900*** 0.868 HHI IND -0.949*** 0.003 -0.053 0.115 -2.585 -11.651***
ICA STG -0.060 0.060 0.148*** 0.057 -47.832* -3.230 HHI STG 0.684*** -0.170 -0.103 -0.170 -24.018 10.362***
PE Affiliation -0.002 0.037 0.076** -0.126 5.388 -3.698* PE Affiliation 0.080 0.029 0.069 -0.165* 15.311 -2.550
PE Experience 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.244 -0.039 PE Experience 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.124 -0.040
Initial sales -1.06E-07 2.31E-09 1.60E-08 3.85E-08 -2.14E-05 -4.56E-07 Initial sales -7.04E-08 -1.21E-08 -9.90E-09 6.71E-09 -8.87E-06 4.20E-07
Initial profitability -0.080* 0.009 0.005 0.013 14.161 -0.728 Initial profitability -0.087 0.011 0.009 0.012 13.885 -0.868
Aquisitions 0.256*** 0.012 0.015 0.000 -17.625 1.972 Aquisitions 0.232** 0.007 0.021 0.004 -25.446 1.539
Divestments 0.272 -0.022 -0.038 -0.023 53.369 0.028 Divestments 0.308 -0.001 -0.011 -0.007 49.047 0.096
CEO 0.023 -0.015 0.021 0.084 -28.939 0.038 CEO 0.057 -0.008 0.029 0.070 -22.576 0.375
Interest rate 1.353 -0.302 -1.555 -5.355 -257.964 54.521 Interest rate -2.645 0.758 -0.729 -4.602 -97.391 -9.976
Lambda (Mills) -0.166 -1.307 -0.080 1.084 -110.736 -4.591 Lambda (Mills) -0.42 -1.17 -0.37 0.14 452.07 -3.05
Wald chi-squared 17.170* 0.160 19.640** 1.640 17.020* 8.500 Wald chi-squared 38.390*** 0.33 3.63 7.74 0.68 19.020**
Panels A and B show the OLS regression on the whole sample of 127 Nordic PE backed buyouts from 2003 to 2007. Panel C and D shows the Heckman selection regression on a larger sample including companies
with missing data with a total of 161 companies of which 33 have missing observations. The Heckman selection is used to estimate the bias of missing account data in the sample through PE firm size i.e. total capital
commitments made for the firm, shown by the Mills ratio (lambda). ICA IND is the industry specialisation dummy calculated using the Index of Competitive Advantage whereas ICA STG is the corresponding stage
specialisation dummy, taking a value of one in the case of a specialised firm. HHI IND is industy specialisation calculated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index whereas HHI STG is the corresponding stage
specialisation. ROIC stands for Return on Invested Capital, CCC is the Cash Conversion Cycle and NWC is Net Working Capital. PE Affiliation dummy indicates whether the PE firm is independent or affiliated with
e.g. a government or a bank, taking a value of one in the case of an independent firm. PE Experience measures the experience of the PE firm using the fund's sequence number as a proxy. Initial sales and Initial
profitability indicate the amount of sales and the level of profitability using EBITDA margin % as a proxy on the year of the buyout, respectively, indicators of PE firms alleged winner picking abilities. CEO dummy
indicates whether the CEO of the company has been replaced over the three years of the buyout, taking a value of 1 in the case of the event. Acquisitions and Divestments dummies indicate whether the company has 
made acquisitions or divestments during the three years after the buyout taking a value of 1 in the case of the event, respectively. Interst rate is the 12m Euribor on the date of the buyout, a proxy for market
conditions at the time thus used to control money chasing deals. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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method
6
, which measures the degree of specialisation rather than being a dummy variable, 
finds industry specialisation to be highly significant for sales growth and working capital 
management with both methods as well as has a slight advantage in EBITDA/Total Assets. 
HHI stage specialised firms have a slight advantage in terms of profitability ratios and ROIC 
having negative coefficients and EBITDA margin being significant in OLS regression. 
However both OLS and Heckman regressions suggest that stage diversification rather than 
specialisation would drive Sales growth and working capital management. The results suggest 
that stage specialised companies might concentrate on the profitability whereas non-
specialised companies would concentrate their efforts on working capital efficiency and Sales 
growth. 
Comparing the two methods for specialisation suggests that industry specialised companies 
may have an advantage in Sales growth and profitability whereas working capital 
management produces mixed results. These results would give support for hypothesis eight in 
terms of Sales growth and profitability. Stage specialisation on the other hand seems to excel 
over the non-specialised firms in profitability and ROIC. Stage specialisation suggests not to 
drive Sales growth and produces mixed evidence on the working capital management, 
therefore supporting hypothesis nine in profitability and return, however, unlike previous 
results not confirming for Sales growth. 
PE affiliation i.e. independent PE firms do not seem to drive consistently performance in the 
regressions. For ICA regressions PE affiliation is positive and significant for EBITDA/Total 
Assets and for HHI regressions negative and significant for ROIC. Slight evidence of winner 
picking is present in the results as initial profitability is significant for three of four 
regressions for Sales growth, however, the result is far from conclusive. Acquisitions are 
significant explaining the Sales growth in all of the regressions although divestments do not 
drive operational improvements as the theory suggested. CEO change seem to affect 
positively although insignificantly on Sales growth, EBITDA/Total Assets and ROIC. 
Evidence on working capital is mixed. Interest rate does not confirm the presence of money 
chasing deals or suggests that deals made during times of market booms do not perform as 
well as buyouts made under normal market conditions.  
7.2.3 PE buyouts and non-PE backed companies pre and during the crisis 
                                                 
6
 HHI measures the degree of diversification where 0 is completely specialised and 1 is completely diversified. 
Therefore, a negative coefficient will indicate the benefits of specialisation. 
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The same regressions as presented above are performed for subsample of companies pre and 
during the financial crisis to study whether the same effects as found in previous analysis 
have persisted or will change under different economic conditions. The regressions for the 
whole sample of buyout companies and their peers are presented in Table 18. OLS 
regressions include 102 and 152 companies pre and during the crisis samples, respectively. 
The corresponding sizes for Heckman regressions are 129 and 193, where 26 and 40 have 
missing accounts data, respectively. The regressions are highly significant for all except CCC 
for the subsample of during the crisis whereas only for one variable pre-crisis. Adjusted R-
square also shows signs of improvement in the during the crisis sample.  
The results suggest that PE backed companies are able to significantly make a difference in 
Sales growth and EBITDA margin during the financial crisis, whereas the companies’ 
performance pre-crisis was comparable to that of the peer companies. The OLS regression 
suggest that pre-crisis the PE companies are to influence the Sales growth significantly, 
however, in both regressions EBITDA margins have negative coefficients. On the other hand, 
during the crisis PE-backed companies seem to improve their performance significantly in all 
measures compared to the peers, whereas pre-crisis peer companies are outperforming the 
buyouts; only exception being CCC in the during the crisis regressions.  
The interest rate variable is significant and negative in both during the crisis regressions for 
EBITDA margin and ROIC. This implies that deals made during non-booming economy i.e. 
lower interest rates enjoy better profitability and return giving more support to the existence 
of money chasing deals.  
Initial sales variable is significant only for EBITDA margin in pre-crisis and for CCC for 
during the crisis OLS regressions.  The results may indicate that high initial sales being a 
predictor that companies might concentrate on improving the operational efficiency and not 
on sales growth when sales are already at a high level.  
Initial profitability is significant only for pre-crisis CCC in OLS regressions, whereas in 
during the crisis sample, it is highly significant for all variables except CCC for both 
regressions. However, sales growth has a negative coefficient. The results indicate signs of 
winner picking as companies with solid profitability during normal economic conditions are 
able to perform better during more difficult times. Furthermore, these companies seem to 
concentrate more on operating efficiency rather than Sales growth. 
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Table 18 - Regression on the total sample of buyouts and peer companies pre (2003 - H1 2005) and during (H2 2005 - 2007) the financial 
crisis 
  
Panel A - OLS regression for the sample of companies pre-financial crisis Panel B - OLS regression for the sample of companies during the financial crisis
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant -0.17 0.39** 0.33* 0.36 136.69 0.17 Constant 0.06 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.36*** 120.11*** 0.16
PE Backed 0.18** -0.003552 -0.01 -0.02 -6.13 0.06 PE Backed 0.26*** 0.05** 0.01 0.02 -10.68 -0.11
Interest rate 13.63 -14.5778 -8.97 -11.85 -3250.21 -2.08 Interest rate 0.72 -2.84** -2.17 -9.08** -1215.27 1.85
Intial sales 1.16E-07 1.94E-07* 1.35E-07 4.79E-08 -4.12E-05 -4.01E-07 Intial sales -2.41E-08 1.40E-08 4.48E-09 -2.94E-09 -2.06E-05** -3.66E-08
Initial profitability -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 17.55* -0.01 Initial profitability -0.54*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.30*** 26.18 -0.22**
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.03
F-statistic 1.94 2.03* 0.86 0.93 1.10 0.35 F-statistic 13.98*** 14.13*** 6.06*** 4.11*** 1.80 2.08*
Panel C - Heckman selection for the sample of companies pre-financial crisis Panel D - Heckman selection for the sample of companies during the financial crisis
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant 0.95 -4.87 -0.85 0.29 1057.50 -5.25 Constant -0.21 0.14* 0.18* 0.19 211.89 0.19
PE Backed 0.18 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -9.83 0.06 PE Backed 0.26*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.03 -8.15 -0.10
Interest rate 6.14 -7.08 -3.95 -8.91 -3097.92 -9.87 Interest rate 0.82 -2.46** -1.73 -8.14** -859.29 2.29
Intial sales 1.15E-07 1.88E-07 1.35E-07 4.93E-08 -5.64E-05 -4.14E-07 Intial sales -2.39E-08 1.41E-08 4.52E-09 -2.7E-09 -2.06E-05 -3.66E-08
Initial profitability -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 17.86 -0.01 Initial profitability -0.52*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.31*** 16.17 -0.22**
Lambda (Mills) -2.70 14.44 3.04 0.02 -2533.82 15.91 Lambda (Mills) 0.76 -0.04 -0.10 0.37 -296.95 -0.14
Wald chi-squared 0.23 0.00 0.01 3.76 0.01 0.00 Wald chi-squared 22.48*** 56.27*** 23.58*** 17.02*** 1.18 8.73*
Panels A and B show the OLS regressions on the whole sample of Nordic PE backed buyouts and peer companies, pre and during the financial crisis respectively. In the OLS regression the sample size
for pre-crisis is 102 buyouts and companies whereas the corresponding figure for during the crisis sample is 152. Panels C and D show the Heckman selection regression on a larger sample including
companies with missing data with a total of 129 companies of which 26 have missing observations for pre-crisis sample whereas the sample during the crisis has 193 companies of which 40 have missing
accounts. The Heckman selection is used to estimate the bias of missing account data in the sample through company age before the buyout, shown by the Mills ratio (lambda). ROIC stands for Return
on Invested Capital, CCC is the Cash Conversion Cycle and NWC is Net Working Capital. PE Backed dummy takes on a value of 1 if the company has been acquired by a PE firm. Interst rate is the 12m
Euribor on the date of the buyout, a proxy for market conditions at the time thus used to control money chasing deals. Initial sales and profitability (EBITDA margin) are used to estimate whether winner
picking in PE backed buyouts is present. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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The results thus support the hypothesis of PE companies being able to create superior 
performance over non-PE backed companies, although the differences are present only during 
more difficult economic conditions. During normal times, PE-backed companies’ 
performance is comparable to that of the peers. Also, the results suggest the existence of 
winner picking as well as money chasing deals. The results thus confirm the hypothesis seven 
in terms of Sales growth and profitability. 
7.2.4 Private equity specialisation pre and during the financial crisis 
Tables 19 and 20 show the regressions made for buyout companies pre and during the crisis, 
respectively, with both specialisation variables ICA and HHI. Continuing from the previous 
analysis, these regressions measure the PE specialisation effects during normal and more 
difficult economic conditions i.e. persistence or change. Consistent with the regression above, 
significance as well as adjusted R-squared both show improvement in the during the crisis 
sample. 
The regressions show pre-crisis industry specialisation having not much effect on the 
buyouts’ performance. Only one regression show positive and significant coefficient for 
EBITDA margin whereas NWC/sales variables shows poor and significant performance for 
industry specialised companies. Also, in terms of Sales growth these companies are 
underperforming, although not significantly. Under more difficult economic conditions these 
companies seem to increase their underperformance as HHI industry specialisation show 
negative and significant coefficients for Sales growth and profitability ratios, although 
working capital management seem to improve slightly. However, ICA industry specialisation 
shows significantly poor working capital management.  
Stage specialisation on the other hand seems to affect positively on working capital 
management pre-crisis as well as slightly on Sales growth. Profitability in HHI regressions is 
lower for stage specialised companies, significantly in OLS regression whereas the ICA 
specialisation suggests slightly better performance in profitability for stage specialised 
companies. During the crisis working capital performance is diminished as the coefficients 
lose their significance. Sales growth is positive in all during the crisis regressions and 
significant in HHI with OLS. Profitability ratios provide mixed evidence as ICA 
specialisation suggests a significant and positive EBITDA/Total Assets whereas HHI stage 
specialised companies have negative and significant coefficient for EBITDA margin.  
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Table 19 - Regression on PE backed buyout companies before the financial crisis (2003 - H1 2005) 
 
  
Panel A - OLS regression for specialised companies by the ICA method Panel B - OLS regression for specialised companies by the HHI method
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant 1.01 0.72** 0.42 0.41 125.53 -0.27 Constant 1.23 0.75*** 0.53* 0.50* 10.00 -0.18
ICA IND -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 42.31* -0.17 HHI IND -0.71 0.38*** 0.19 0.10 21.67 1.02**
ICA STG 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.07 -145.78*** 0.26 HHI STG 0.36 -0.31*** -0.22* -0.18 11.39 -0.92**
PE Affiliation 0.08 -0.11* -0.02 0.01 20.60 -0.04 PE Affiliation 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 15.68 -0.04
PE Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.06 -0.01 PE Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.02 -0.01
Initial sales -1.72E-07 2.98E-07 1.70E-07 9.90E-08 4.28E-05 -2.75E-07 Initial sales -4.44E-09 1.46E-07 6.86E-08 2.57E-08 9.89E-05 -8.64E-07
Initial profitability -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 11.41 -0.02 Initial profitability -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.02 12.86 -0.02
Aquisitions -0.11 0.02 0.06 0.03 -1.28 -0.08 Aquisitions -0.10 0.02 0.05 0.02 -5.95 -0.07
Divestments 0.56* -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 70.89 0.16 Divestments 0.58* -0.02 -0.02 0.01 59.47 0.20
CEO -0.15 0.01 0.04 0.05 -86.84*** -0.24 CEO -0.16 0.03 0.07* 0.07* -86.72*** -0.24
Interest rate -26.98 -30.81*** -19.62* -20.33* 2775.25 23.67 Interest rate -28.18 -30.28*** -19.04* -19.62* 2625.84 22.13
Adjusted R-squared -0.09 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.33 -0.07 Adjusted R-squared -0.03 0.23 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.01
F-statistic 0.58 1.63 1.58 1.39 3.42*** 0.67 F-statistic 0.84 2.48** 1.42 1.31 1.77* 1.04
Panel C - Heckman selection for specialised companies by the ICA method Panel D - Heckman selection for specialised companies by the HHI method
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant 1.19 0.72 0.20 0.30 206.47 -1.37 Constant 2.23 0.56 0.24 0.37 -169.02 -0.21
ICA IND -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 50.53 -0.23 HHI IND -0.79 0.40 0.22 0.11 51.26 1.03**
ICA STG 0.00 0.11 0.12 0.07 -153.81 0.32 HHI STG 0.33 -0.30 -0.21 -0.17 21.24 -0.92**
PE Affiliation 0.08 -0.11** -0.02 0.01 21.50 -0.05 PE Affiliation 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 17.27 -0.04
PE Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.16 -0.01 PE Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.94 -0.01
Initial sales -2.00E-07 2.97E-07* 2.04E-07 1.16E-07 2.00E-05 -1.03E-07 Initial sales -1.41E-07 1.73E-07 1.08E-07 4.45E-08 1.41E-04 -8.59E-07
Initial profitability -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 11.43 -0.02 Initial profitability -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.02 12.18 -0.02
Aquisitions -0.11 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.14 -0.09 Aquisitions -0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 -6.66 -0.07
Divestments 0.56** -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 76.64 0.12 Divestments 0.64 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 41.39 0.20
CEO -0.15 0.01 0.05 0.05 -88.24 -0.23 CEO -0.16 0.03 0.07 0.07 -86.48 -0.24*
Interest rate -26.05 -30.78*** -20.75 -20.90 3526.81 17.97 Interest rate -21.98 -31.50 -20.81 -20.47 635.86 21.92
Lambda (Mills) -0.56 -0.02 0.67 0.34 -248.80 3.39 Lambda (Mills) -2.99 0.59 0.86 0.41 530.02 0.10
Wald chi-squared 7.05 19.84** 0.94 3.38 5.32 0.26 Wald chi-squared 0.35 1.79 0.55 2.23 0.81 12.99
Panels A and B show the OLS regressions on the subsample of pre-crisis buyouts, from 2003 to H1 2005 whereas Panels C and D show the Heckman selection regressions for the same time period. The
OLS regressions have 51 observations and the Heckman selection has 64 of which 14 has missing accounts data. Panels A and C show specalisation calculated by ICA whereas Panels B and D show
specialisation by HHI. The Heckman selection is used to estimate the bias of missing account data in the sample through PE firm size i.e. total capital commitments made for the firm, shown by the Mills
ratio (lambda). ICA IND is the industry specialisation dummy calculated using the Index of Competitive Advantage whereas ICA STG is the corresponding stage specialisation dummy, taking a value of
one in the case of a specialised firm. HHI IND is industy specialisation calculated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index whereas HHI STG is the corresponding stage specialisation. ROIC stands for
Return on Invested Capital, CCC is the Cash Conversion Cycle and NWC is Net Working Capital. PE Affiliation dummy indicates whether the PE firm is independent or affiliated with e.g. a government or a
bank, taking a value of one in the case of an independent firm. PE Experience measures the experience of the PE firm using the fund's sequence number as a proxy. Initial sales and Initial profitability
indicate the amount of sales and the level of profitability using EBITDA margin % as a proxy on the year of the buyout, respectively, indicators of PE firms alleged winner picking abilities. CEO dummy
indicates whether the CEO of the company has been replaced over the three years of the buyout, taking a value of 1 in the case of the event. Acquisitions and Divestments dummies indicate whether the
company has made acquisitions or divestments during the three years after the buyout taking a value of 1 in the case of the event, respectively. Interst rate is the 12m Euribor on the date of the buyout, a
proxy for market conditions at the time thus used to control money chasing deals. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
95 
 
Table 20 - Regression on PE backed buyout companies during the financial crisis (H2 2005 - 2007) 
  
Panel A - OLS regression for specialised companies by the ICA method Panel B - OLS regression for specialised companies by the HHI method
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant -0.03 0.10 -0.07 0.75*** 101.50 -0.10 Constant 0.336728 0.23** 0.12 0.54* 158.61** 0.08
ICA IND -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 66.36** 0.05 HHI IND -1.03*** -0.15* -0.16 0.14 -80.71 -0.19
ICA STG 0.11 0.04 0.14** -0.13 -17.92 0.10 HHI STG 0.57** -0.06 0.00 0.01 -15.58 0.03
PE Affiliation 0.10 0.09* 0.09 -0.28* 19.11 -0.08 PE Affiliation 0.19 0.09* 0.08 -0.29* 37.89 -0.06
PE Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 PE Experience 0.01 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00
Initial sales -6.88E-08 -4.53E-09 -8.13E-09 -3.33E-08 -2.42E-05 -1.75E-09 Initial sales -4.39E-08 -1.08E-08 -1.95E-08 -1.97E-08 -2.47E-05 -8.89E-09
Initial profitability -0.67*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.42** 33.40 -0.22** Initial profitability -0.64*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.42** 4.07 -0.21**
Aquisitions 0.35*** 0.04 0.03 0.11 -36.41 0.03 Aquisitions 0.30** 0.02 0.03 0.10 -50.31 0.03
Divestments -0.08 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 37.43 -0.04 Divestments 0.00 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 11.16 -0.04
CEO 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.08 7.87 -0.01 CEO 0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.07 13.33 0.00
Interest rate 1.69 -3.65* -1.69 -10.25 -2166.84 4.37 Interest rate -3.45 -3.46 -1.70 -10.69 -2044.79 4.21
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.00 Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.22 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.00
F-statistic 3.87*** 2.42** 2.22** 1.49 1.32 1.02 F-statistic 6.39*** 3.10*** 2.01** 1.32 0.99 0.98
Panel C - Heckman selection for specialised companies by the ICA method Panel D - Heckman selection for specialised companies by the HHI method
Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales Sales growth
EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA/ 
Total Assets ROIC CCC NWC/Sales
Constant 0.13 0.43 -0.16 -0.07 49.15 -0.47 Constant 0.59 0.48 0.08 0.16 -91.47 -0.35
ICA IND -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.14 64.89** 0.02 HHI IND -1.00** -0.13 -0.15* 0.19 -64.73 -0.17
ICA STG 0.10 0.03 0.14 -0.04 -8.73 0.10 HHI STG 0.59 -0.05 0.01 0.02 -14.47 0.03
PE Affiliation 0.10 0.09 0.09 -0.22 24.98 -0.07 PE Affiliation 0.20 0.09 0.09* -0.27* 46.43 -0.06
PE Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 PE Experience 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Initial sales -7.80E-08 -2.46E-08 -2.25E-09 8.79E-09 -2.19E-05 2.03E-08 Initial sales -6.18E-08 -2.71E-08 -1.84E-08 -5.00E-09 -1.28E-05 1.37E-08
Initial profitability -0.67*** 0.17 0.16** 0.41 31.67 -0.21 Initial profitability -0.64*** 0.15 0.18*** 0.44*** 11.21 -0.20
Aquisitions 0.35*** 0.05 0.03 0.09 -37.33 0.02 Aquisitions 0.32 0.03 0.04 0.12 -50.03 0.02
Divestments -0.08 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19 35.64 -0.04 Divestments -0.03 -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 15.50 -0.03
CEO 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.10 10.98 -0.01 CEO 0.15 -0.01 0.03 0.08 17.34 0.01
Interest rate 1.64 -3.08 -2.01 -7.65 -1786.54 3.79 Interest rate -1.93 -2.40 -1.21 -8.61 -1484.61 4.35
Lambda (Mills) -0.42 -0.99 0.30 1.66 65.72 1.08 Lambda (Mills) -0.94 -0.85 0.04 0.65 570.32 1.11
Wald chi-squared 45.53*** 0.90 11.50 1.81 12.94 1.11 Wald chi-squared 22.46** 1.40 22.68*** 11.16 0.48 1.00
Panels A and B show the OLS regressions on the subsample of buyouts during the crisis, from H2 2005 to 2007 whereas Panels C and D show the Heckman selection regressions for the same time period.
The OLS regressions have 76 observations and the Heckman selection has 97 of which 20 has missing accounts data. Panels A and C show specalisation calculated by ICA whereas Panels B and D show
specialisation by HHI. The Heckman selection is used to estimate the bias of missing account data in the sample through PE firm size i.e. total capital commitments made for the firm, shown by the Mills
ratio (lambda). ICA IND is the industry specialisation dummy calculated using the Index of Competitive Advantage whereas ICA STG is the corresponding stage specialisation dummy, taking a value of
one in the case of a specialised firm. HHI IND is industy specialisation calculated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index whereas HHI STG is the corresponding stage specialisation. ROIC stands for
Return on Invested Capital, CCC is the Cash Conversion Cycle and NWC is Net Working Capital. PE Affiliation dummy indicates whether the PE firm is independent or affiliated with e.g. a government or a
bank, taking a value of one in the case of an independent firm. PE Experience measures the experience of the PE firm using the fund's sequence number as a proxy. Initial sales and Initial profitability
indicate the amount of sales and the level of profitability using EBITDA margin % as a proxy on the year of the buyout, respectively, indicators of PE firms alleged winner picking abilities. CEO dummy
indicates whether the CEO of the company has been replaced over the three years of the buyout, taking a value of 1 in the case of the event. Acquisitions and Divestments dummies indicate whether the
company has made acquisitions or divestments during the three years after the buyout taking a value of 1 in the case of the event, respectively. Interst rate is the 12m Euribor on the date of the buyout, a
proxy for market conditions at the time thus used to control money chasing deals. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Independent PE firms seem not to be able to make a difference on non-independent firms, in 
the pre-crisis sample they seem to significantly underperform in terms of profitability. During 
more difficult times the independent firms seem to have a significant advantage in 
profitability, however, lose in terms of return. PE experience does not seem to have any effect 
on company performance and no change is seen during different economic conditions, only 
exception being positive and significant EBITDA margin in one of the regressions at 10 
percent level in the during the crisis sample.  
Initial sales variable is also significant in one of the regressions, under pre-crisis conditions 
for EBITDA margin. It also seems, although insignificant, that under difficult economic 
conditions the coefficients are negative contrary to the other subsample. Initial profitability 
does not seem to affect the performance of the pre-crisis buyouts. However, for the buyouts 
made in the in the latter half of the time period under review, initial profitability shows highly 
significant results, negative for Sales growth and positive for profitability, return and working 
capital management. 
The results are consistent with the previous whole sample regressions where winner picking 
seemed to be present under more difficult economic conditions. High performance will 
persist, where operational improvements are the key and not Sales growth.  
Acquisitions and divestments seem to have contrary effect on company performance under 
different economic conditions. Under pre-crisis conditions acquisitions seem to have a 
negative and insignificant relation with sales growth where as positive and insignificant effect 
on profitability, return and working capital management. Divestments on the other hand have 
positive and significant effect on Sales growth but negative and insignificant effect on other 
variables. During more difficult economic conditions the effect on other variables remain the 
same for both, however, acquisitions have significantly positive effect on Sales growth where 
as divestment coefficients are negative and insignificant.  
CEO change seems to affect positively and significantly on working capital management pre-
crisis. However, these effects are diminished under difficult economic conditions. The effect 
on Sales growth is slightly negative pre-crisis, however, slightly positive during the crisis. 
Interest rate during pre-crisis conditions is negatively correlated with the variables, other than 
working capital measures, being significant for profitability and return for OLS regressions. 
In Heckman selection, the only significant variable is EBITDA margin in ICA specialisation 
regression.  During the crisis conditions the significant relation diminishes, being significant 
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only in one regression for EBITDA margin. However, the variables remain mostly negative. 
These results may suggest the existence of money chasing deals, however, the results should 
be more pronounced for the crisis sample to be able to make definite conclusions on the 
existence. 
These results thus do not support the hypothesis of specialised PE firms being able to drive 
superior performance.  In the regressions of the whole sample of buyouts specialisation was 
seen to be able to influence positively on portfolio company performance, however, by 
splitting the sample into two time periods the effects diminished. Also, there was no solid 
change in performance though specialisation between the two time periods. The subsamples 
of pre-crisis and during the crisis buyouts suggest that PE firms’ performance is quite equal 
during normal economic conditions and during more difficult times the performance driver is 
winner picking abilities of the PE firms in terms of profitability. However, the subsamples of 
these time periods were reduced to quite low levels and therefore are not as accurate. Further 
study of this topic with a larger sample size would be needed to make definite conclusions of 
the pre-crisis and during the crisis PE performance drivers. On the basis of these results, 
hypothesis eight and nine of persistence of specialisation benefits should be rejected. 
8. Summary and conclusions  
This paper studies the Nordic (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway) private equity backed 
companies’ performance over the comparable non-PE backed companies as well as benefits 
of PE firm specialisation on the operational efficiency. Also, the data sample of 127 buyouts 
from 2003 to 2007 with complete accounts data available for three years post-buyout or until 
the exit allowed to study buyout and peer performance pre and during the economic downturn 
initiated by the financial crisis in 2007. This thesis has thus contributed on four major areas. 
First, covering the latest wave of buyouts, second, specialisation benefits, third performance 
of private equity under different market conditions and fourth, shedding more evidence on 
Nordic PE markets. The results of this thesis are summarised in Table 21 with the hypotheses. 
Table 21- Hypothesis and results of the paper 
Hypothesis Confirmed On all variables 
H1:  Sales growth is greater for buyouts than that of the peers YES - 
H2:  Profitability is greater for buyouts than that of the peer 
companies  
YES NO 
H3:  ROIC is greater for buyouts than that of the peer companies  
NO - 
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H4:  Working capital is managed more efficiently in buyouts than in 
peer companies 
NO YES 
H5:  Industry specialisation drives higher operational efficiency in 
portfolio companies 
YES NO 
H6:  Stage specialisation drives higher operational efficiency in 
portfolio companies 
YES NO 
H7:  Abnormal performance of  buyouts over peers has persisted 
over the crisis 
YES NO 
H8:  Abnormal performance of industry specialised firms has 
persisted over the crisis 
YES NO 
H9:  Abnormal performance of stage specialised firms has persisted 
over the crisis 
YES NO 
Both the t-test as well as regression on private equity backed companies’ operational 
efficiency over peer companies suggested confirming hypothesis one and two. However, 
profitability produced significant results mainly for EBITDA margin. Hypotheses three and 
four should be rejected in the absence of positive and significant advantage for buyout 
companies over the peers. The results are consistent with the Jensen’s (1989) hypothesis of 
private equity firms’ superior governance creating operating performance for the portfolio 
companies over peers. However, the results are not consistent with Kaplan (1989b), 
Bergström et al. (2007) and Leslie and Oyer (2009) who all fail to find PE firms to 
significantly influence sales growth. On the other hand with more recent samples Acharya et 
al. (2011) and Jääskeläinen (2011) as well as Havu (2007) and Männistö (2009) with Finnish 
samples find sales growth to be significant. PE backed buyout companies’ high profitability 
is, however, confirmed by Guo et al (2011) and Kekkonen (2004) as well as the above 
mentioned authors except Leslie and Oyer (2009) and Havu (2007). A number of studies 
including Kaplan (1989b), Singh (1990), Berg and Gottschalg (2005) and Jääskeläinen (2011) 
have found either ROIC or working capital management to be significantly higher for buyout 
companies or have found significant improvement in the measures. This study has failed to 
confirm private equity firms’ outperformance for these variables. The most clear difference in 
results being with Bergström et al. (2007), Havu (2007) and Jääskeläinen (2011) which 
concentrated on Swedish, Finnish and  Nordic markets, respectively. Bergström et al. (2007) 
on the other hand had an older dataset only covering Sweden, the study by Havu (2007) 
included only Finnish LBOs around the IT-boom and Jääskeläinen (2011) concentrated on a 
shorter time period with different data sources. 
This thesis combined two different methods to study specialisation; the Index of Comparative 
Advantage and the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index. Both methods were used to test industry 
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and stage specialisation. The results suggest for both the regressions and t-test that industry 
specialisation has slight advantages in Sales growth and profitability over non-specialised PE 
peer companies and a significant advantage over peers. Stage specialisation on the other hand 
shows significant advantage in profitability in all cases whereas the results indicate significant 
differences to peers in sales, however, only a slight advantage compared to non-stage 
specialised PE firms. Therefore the hypothesis five and six should be partially confirmed as 
significant or slight advantages were found only for Sales growth and profitability. 
Hypotheses are rejected for return and working capital measures. The previous literature has 
suggested that industry specialised firms are able to drive higher profitability than non-
specialised firms on their portfolio companies as well as tend to be more successful. (Cressy 
et al., 2007; Gottschalg and Wright, 2008 and Gompers et al., 2005). Cressy et al. (2007) also 
found that stage specialisation may have a slight advantage in Sales growth whereas no effect 
on profitability. On the other hand Lossen (2006) found that stage specialisation would result 
in higher returns which are unachievable with industry specialisation. Ljungvist and 
Richardson (2003) and Brigl et al. (2008) found industry specialisation not having any 
influence on performance or returns. The findings presented in this thesis provide support for 
specialised firms being able to drive higher performance in Sales growth and profitability.  
The t-tests and regressions of private equity backed buyout performance over that of the peers 
pre and during the financial crisis shows that during pre-crisis economic conditions the 
buyout performance was on average comparable to that of the peers. Also, private equity 
firms’ portfolio company performance across all industries and stages did not change 
significantly during the two time periods, except during the crisis market conditions EBITDA 
margin was significantly greater than in pre-crisis conditions. However, under the economic 
downturn PE companies were able to make a clear difference in performance to that of the 
peers. Improvement could be seen in all variables, although only Sales growth and 
profitability being significant. The results thus suggest PE firms being able to create superior 
performance over non-PE backed companies, although the differences are present only during 
more difficult economic conditions. During normal times, PE-backed companies’ 
performance is comparable to that of the peers. Therefore, hypothesis seven is confirmed in 
terms of Sales growth and profitability as PE firm performance persists and improves 
compared to peer companies under more difficult economic conditions.  
The t-test between specialised and non specialised firms on their peer companies revealed no 
significant differences in performance during pre-crisis economic conditions. However, 
100 
 
during the downturn non-specialised firms’ performance is in line with that of the peers or 
underperforming. Both industry and stage specialised firms are able to make significant 
difference for their portfolio company performance in terms of Sales growth and profitability 
compared to the peers, confirming hypothesis eight and nine for these measures. Also, stage 
specialisation may provide an advantage in working capital management under more difficult 
economic conditions.  
Comparing specialised and non-specialised PE firm performance on average across all stages 
and industries during both time periods suggest a rather stable development. These results are 
in line with the previous literature as the studies have found PE firms to perform despite 
market movements and time periods. The t-test shows stage specialisation to grow difference 
to non-specialised firms during the recession in terms of profitability, however, in other 
variables as well as for industry specialisation there was no clear difference in performance 
between the two time periods. The results thus suggest that compared to peer companies 
specialised firms are able to drive higher performance under both time periods whereas on 
average and across all industries the differences to non-specialised firms’ performance is not 
significant. Stage specialisation may have an advantage in profitability. The regression results 
are mainly in line with the t-test, showing no clear difference between specialised and non-
specialised firm performance during the two time periods.  
The rather small sample sizes of specialised and non-specialised firms under different time 
periods do cast doubt on the reliability on the results, a larger sample would be required to 
make more definite conclusions on the issue. The larger sample regressions show more 
significant effect for specialisation benefits. The results also suggest that PE firm performance 
does not differ between the non-specialised and specialised firms on average across all 
industries and stages whereas more specific comparisons to a hand-picked and matched non-
PE backed peer group indicates significant differences in operational efficiency. 
The regressions of the different subsamples of PE firms do not show clear specialisation 
benefits, performance being quite equal during normal economic conditions. However, during 
the recession the regressions suggest performance being driven by winner picking abilities of 
PE firms due to the fact that companies with solid profitability at the time of the buyout are 
able to outperform other companies under the recession.  These companies also tend to 
concentrate on maintaining high profitability and other operational performance on the cost of 
declining sales. The negative and significant coefficients of interest rate in a number of the 
regressions also hint the presence of money chasing deals. Buyouts made during the economic 
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boom, high volumes of PE M&A activity and high interest rates tend to be outperformed by 
the buyouts made during more stable economic conditions. Also, this effect might be due to 
the fact that the companies went under the more difficult economic conditions. Cressy et al. 
(2007) do not find evidence of money chasing deals in their sample with similar methods and 
suggest also that PE firms are adding value on their portfolio companies and not simply 
picking winners. The results of this thesis support the findings of the authors as PE firms are 
able to improve the performance of their portfolio companies, however, their skill and 
expertise might give them an advantage to also pick better companies.  
The literature has suggested that the determinants of the performance and the performance of 
the PE firms may differ by country. The literature and the results of this thesis do not support 
that any market area would have specific characteristics in the performance or determinants. 
However, over all the literature suggests that the findings on private equity are consistent 
across methods, time periods and geographical areas. More studies on the issue would be 
needed to make more definite conclusions. Also, due to the lack of specialisation studies on 
operational efficiency it is hard to determine whether the effects differ by geographical areas. 
The methods used in this thesis, ICA and HHI, have produced mixed evidence in the previous 
studies where only either one has been used. This paper show that the methods may give 
different results under certain subsamples, however, the results seem to be largely similar 
with the two measures of specialisation. Therefore, it may be concluded that the specialisation 
effects are consistent across different methods.  
The evidence of Nordic private equity markets for the latest wave of buyouts and under the 
recession suggest:  
1. PE firms to outperform the peer companies in Sales growth and profitability 
2. Industry and stage specialisation both drive higher performance for Sales growth and 
profitability, stage specialisation may have an advantage in the latter 
3. Under pre-crisis economic conditions PE firm performance is on average comparable 
to peers. Under crisis conditions PE firms are able to maintain the performance of 
their buyouts, thus creating clear difference to that of the peers. Specialisation seems 
to have an advantage during more difficult economic conditions compared to 
comparable companies. 
4. Private equity firm performance across all stages and industries does not seem to 
largely differ across time periods. 
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Interpreting the results one should keep in mind the possible bias associated with the study. 
Although Heckman selection regressions indicated no selection bias to be present which 
might have arisen due to missing accounts data, there are other possible sources for bias in the 
sample. The Thomson VentureXpert database is not exhaustive and thus smaller private 
equity firms might have been omitted. Also, the sample size was decreased to quite low levels 
in the subsample analysis and thus might not be as accurate as the whole sample analysis. 
Therefore, a possible future research topic would be to study the effects with a larger data 
sample for pre-crisis and during the crisis buyouts to make more definite conclusions. Also, 
previous literature has studied the diminishing effects of PE-backing benefits and it would be 
interesting to study whether the specialisation gains are diminished after the exit. As previous 
literature has suggested on the difference of the determinants of performance across 
geographical regions, further study could be conducted to measure different market areas with 
the same methods and similar data samples. Also, it would be interesting to see whether 
specialisation effects would differ across different markets. 
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9. Appendix 
Appendix 1 - Sample correlations of PE backed companies 
  
Sales 
G.
EBITDA 
Margin
EBITDA/
Total 
Assets
ROIC CCC
NWC/
Sales
ICA 
IND
ICA 
STG
HHI 
IND
HHI 
STG
PE 
Aff.
PE 
Exp.
PE 
Size
PE 
Marke
t
Initial 
Sales
Inital 
Prof.
Comp. 
Age
Acq. Div. CAPEX Empl.
CEO 
C.
MSCI
Int. 
Rate
Sales Growth 1
EBITDA Margin - 1
EBITDA/Total Assets - - 1
ROIC - - - 1
CCC - - - - 1
NWC/Sales - - - - - 1
ICA IND 0.03 0.05 0.10 -0.12 0.21 0.01 1
ICA STG 0.02 0.15 0.29 -0.01 -0.07 0.11 0.26 1
HHI IND -0.20 -0.10 -0.13 0.01 -0.08 0.17 -0.38 -0.16 1
HHI STG 0.11 -0.26 -0.21 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.30 -0.21 0.56 1
PE Affiliation 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.01 -0.12 1
PE Experience -0.10 0.26 0.22 0.05 -0.05 0.10 -0.17 -0.01 0.33 0.22 0.18 1
PE Size 0.02 0.13 0.18 -0.16 0.04 0.17 -0.37 -0.05 0.22 0.05 0.11 0.47 1
PE Market 0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.12 -0.01 -0.11 0.09 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 1
Initial Sales -0.06 0.19 0.07 0.00 -0.16 0.06 -0.05 -0.17 0.06 -0.09 0.08 0.32 0.60 0.05 1
Inital Profitability -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.02 1
Company Age -0.10 0.11 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.03 0.14 0.05 -0.11 -0.19 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.16 0.02 0.01 1
Acquisitions -0.19 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.12 -0.02 0.12 -0.09 -0.10 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 -0.12 -0.12 1
Divestments -0.06 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.25 0.05 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.18 1
CAPEX 0.03 0.31 0.16 0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 1
Employment 0.55 -0.12 -0.09 -0.15 0.03 -0.24 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.02 -0.15 -0.09 -0.18 -0.03 0.15 0.11 0.01 1
CEO Change 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.02 -0.14 0.07 -0.10 0.06 0.10 0.09 1
MSCI 0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 -0.04 -0.12 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.95 0.09 -0.06 -0.14 -0.03 -0.09 0.17 -0.14 0.13 1
Interest Rate 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 -0.10 0.11 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.93 0.08 -0.05 -0.19 -0.02 -0.09 0.06 -0.15 0.11 0.90 1
The table presents correlation of variables used in the regressions of the PE backed buyout subsample from 2003 to 2007, including 127 observations. The figures in bold show high correlation. ICA IND is the
industry specialisation dummy calculated using the Indexof Competitive Advantage whereas ICA STG is the corresponding stage specialisation dummy, taking a value of 1 in the case of a specialised firm. HHI IND
is the industy specialisation dummy calculated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index whereas HHI STG is the corresponding stage specialisation dummy, taking a value of one in the case of a specialised firm. PE
Affiliation dummy indicates whether the PE firm is independent or affiliated with e.g. a government or a bank, taking a value of 1 in the case of an independent firm. PE Experience measures the experience of the PE
firm using the fund's sequence number as a proxy. PE Size indicates the total capital commitments made to the firm, a proxy for experience in investments. PE market is the total investments of European PE firms
made on the buyout year according to Thomson Venture Xpert. Initial sales and Initial profitability indicate the amount of sales and the level of profitability using EBITDA margin % as a proxy on the year of the
buyout, respectively, indicators of PE firms alleged winner picking abilities. Target company age measures the age of the company on the year of the buyout, controlling for the relation of age and possible
improvements in the company. Acquisitions and Divestments dummies indicate whether the company has made acquisitions or divestments during the three years after the buyout taking a value of 1 in the case of
the event, respectively. CAPEX and Employment measure the changes in the ratio of CAPEX/Sales and Sales/Employees over the holding period proxies for CAPEX stripping and efficiency improvements,
respectively. CEO dummy indicates whether the CEO of the company has been replaced over the three years of the buyout, taking a value of 1 in the case of the event. MSCI is the Morgan Stanley Capital
International World Index whereas Interest rate indicates the level of the 12 month EURIBOR at the time of the buyout and thus measuring the state of the market.
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